The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1943. THE NEXT MOVES IN THE PACIFIC WAR

Timaru Herald, Volume CLIII, Issue 22474, 8 January 1943, Page 4

The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, JANUARY 8, 1943. THE NEXT MOVES IN THE PACIFIC WAR

WHEN asked in Auckland what he thought the next Japanese move would be Admiral William Halsey, Commander-in-Chief of the South Pacific area, replied confidently: “Japan’s next move will be to retreat. A start has been made to make them retreat. They will not be able to stop going back.” For a number of reasons Admiral Halsey’s optimism is not yet widely shared in Australia where feelings of uneasiness concerning the next Japanese moves prevail. Australia’s attitude towards the Pacific war was made clear last week by the Commonwealth Prime Minister, Mr J. Curtin, and his feelings on the question were endorsed by a number of American commentators, ft is fairly plain that there can be only two reasons why Mr Curtin spoke as uncompromisingly as he did. The first is that he had knowledge of the fikely direction of the next Japanese moves; the second is that he is Uneasy about possible moves in prospect and is doing his best to awaken people outside the South Pacific area to a sense of impending danger so that fresh war supplies would be sent to this theatre.

Whether the latest reports of Japanese activity are to be taken at their face value or not cannot alter the fact that it is almost certain that the Japanese will make further attempts to extend their gains in the South Pacific even though their recent experiences have been discouraging. It has been shown already that the Japanese do not learn from experience. They will continue to embark upon dangerous enterprises even though experience has proved that their objectives cannot be gained. In war the Japanese have single-track minds. They will continue to bump their heads against brick walls and it most improbable that this strategy will be greatly varied in the future. This stupid and profitless determination makes them extremely dangerous enemies; it means also that at no time can the course of the Pacific war be taken for granted. A defeat, or even a succession of defeats, will not discourage the Japanese; as long as they have war material, and and as long as they have ships to ferry troops where they are wanted, the possibility of new Japanese attacks must be kept in mind. The present feeling in Australia is that a new threat to the Commonwealth is developing. The first reason for this fear is said to be “a huge concentration of enemy shipping in Rabaul and other New Britain harbours.” If the Japanese are assembling new forces one certainty is that they cannot do so with the ease and secrecy they would desire for a surprise move. Allied bombers within the past few days have jpaid a profitable visit to Rabaul, putting a large amount of shipping out of commission. This form of attack can be continued at relatively light cost and it must hamper whatever preparations the enemy may be making. The general suggestion is that the enemy is seeking to strengthen his line from Timor to the Solomons in the hope of establishing a strong bastion north of Australia. This is bis inevitable strategy, but it does not follow that the plan can be completed. Allied forces are strongly established in New Guinea and the Solomons and it will require a supreme effort on the part of the enemv to move them from the positions they already hold. A powerful enemy move towards Guadalcanal was broken up in November and it is extremely unlikely that a similar movement would fare any better now. The best pointer to the severity of the blow then delivered by Admiral Halsey is that the enemy has taken so long to rally for another allempt.

While it is certain that the Japanese will attempt to consolidate their position north of Australia, these efforts will bi completely checked as long as the Allied forces retain command of the sea and gain unquestioned superiority in the air. The naval battles already fought in the Pacific suggest that the enemy is already mastered at sea, but in the air the issue is more open. It has been suggested from Australia that the minimum diversion of 500 aeroplanes to the South-west Pacific would produce a maximum result “in restoring to the United Nations command of the areas from which alone it will be possible to plan the recapture of the rubber and tin areas whose control may be vital in later stages of a global war.” In spite of Australia's uneasiness there can be little doubt that the Allies will prevent further Japanese movement and consolidation in the South Pacific, but this is not enough for Australia. The Commonwealth will not be reassured until there is a strong Allied move northward.