WHY SINGAPORE FELL

Timaru Herald, Volume CLI, Issue 22201, 19 February 1942, Page 5

WHY SINGAPORE FELL

Island Was Never a Fortress Lack Of Air Support Leadership Criticised By Telegraph—Press Association —Copyright (12.38 a.m.) LONDON. Feb. 17. The Singapore correspondent of “The Times” in a dispatch from Jia tavia asks: “Why Did Singapore Fall?” The following is an attempt to explain—but not to explain away—what happened:— (1) Singapore never was a fortress, but a potential naval base. Its whole significance depended on certain unfulfilled or partially fulfilled conditions, the chief of which was the ability of the Allies to produce enough ships and aeroplanes to operate from the base and keep the Japanese several hundred miles away. The “fortress” concept arose from loose thinking when our propagandists were trying to keep the Japanese from war by making them think we were stronger than we were. (2) The majority of the troops participated in a long, exhausting and thoroughly dispiriting withdrawal for more than 500 miles. Many of our best units suffered heavily in the fighting on the mainland. The single Argyll and Sutherland battalion engaged lost 80 per cent of its men. The Ghurka casualties were even heavier. The remnants of the East Surreys and Leicesters, who took the brunt of the attack in Kedah early in the war, were amalgamated into a so-called British battalion. Two Australian battalions were cut up in Huar. The Australians also lost heavily in other sectors. (3) Many of the white troops—the Australians were conspicuous exceptions—never seemed physically up to the mark. Some had been too long in a tropical climate and had gone soft. Others were unaccustomed to the climate or the terrain. One brigade plunged straight into the jungle fighting in Johore three days after landing after an 11 weeks’ sea voyage. (4) The troops whose duty it was to repel the Japanese in the sector where they landed were subjected after three days to a crescendo bombardment reaching its climax on the evening of February 8 when, after four hours, Japanese light, medium and heavy guns fired at machine-gun tempo. The Japanese also had the advantage of continuous aerial observation.

Lack of Leadership (5) The enemy’s complete aerial ascendency had a big effect on the fighting and a bigger effect on morale, especially of the Indians. Only one thing could have transformed this state of affairs—dynamic, able leadership. The general showing the greatest qualities of leadership was Major-General Gordon Bennett. Though hard, bitter, sarcastic and difficult he was a fighter through and through and Imbued, like his men, with an aggressive, offensive, unconventional spirit. Other generals lacked this vital spark. The absence of forceful leadership at the top made itself felt from the top downwards. The morale of the men was potentially good, but something was lacking to crystallise and co-ordinate it and infuse it with fire and confidence. The same lack of dynamism characterised the upper ranks of the civilian administration. Except for certain sections of the Chinese community—some inspired by Free China’s struggle and others by the Soviet precept and example—the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from the start to the finish. Their inclination was to get as far as possible from the hostilities in Singapore. This caused acute labour difficulties. Bomb craters on airfields were not filled because no Asiatics and not enough Europeans were available for the work of a labour force. Of 12,000 Asiatics employed at the naval base early in the war only 800 reported for duty. There was no native labour at the docks and soldiers had to be taken from their military duties for the loading and unloading of ships. Many small ships which could have evacuated many thousands of persons from Singapore were immobilised in the harbour because the native crews deserted and there were not enough Europeans to man them. After nearly 120 years of British rule, a vast majority of the Asiatics were not sufficiently interested tb take steps to ensure its continuance. The few thousand British officials resident in Malaya were completely out of touch with the people. The British and the Asiatics lived their lives apart. British rule, culture, and the small British community formed no more than a brittle veneer. Against this structure there was suddenly launched the explosive force of a nation impelled by both fanaticism and the frustration of economic repression. Tire Japanese in Malaya revealed themselves to be able, disciplined and resourceful soldiers, well equipped and well supported from the air. The normal Japanese elan was heightened by continuous and unexpected victory. The Japanese also enjoyed certain natural advantages such as Asiatic appearance and ability to live off the country. Over all they possessed the capacity for co-ordinated effort with every man and every weapon, thus achieving the maximum effort. This capacity was conspicuously lacking on the British side. One good push sent the structure crashing to the ground. What is the answer? Until more aeroplanes are available for the Allies in the Pacific it will be difficult to hold the Japanese at sea and on the ground. It is not the Japanese who are strong in the air; it is the Allies who are weak. Until the British exercise to the full those qualities of vigour and ruthlessness which made them great in the past they cannot expect greatness in the present. Fifth Column Influence Asserting that the loss of Singapore was due at least partly to bureaucracy

and complacency and a legion of fifth columnists, the representative of the British United Press, Mr Harold Guard, who is in Batavia, recalls that he wrote a story on April 18, 1941, quoting the military authorities as saying that the Malayan jungle did not offer sufficient protection against enemy infiltration. The censor passed it but said it was so absurd that it would make the British United Press look ridiculous. “During the next four months natives who had a grudge against the British, showed the Japanese paths through the jungle thickets,” he states. “I followed the battle down the Malayan Peninsula and saw fifth columnists swarming through the jungle. I believe that in December the natives might have been rallied but it did not happen. “The battle of Malaya, as reported officially, might give the impression of a bitter, hard-fought, planned defence. Actually it was a retreat, improvised from day to day.”