RUGGED LAND

Timaru Herald, Volume CL, Issue 22156, 27 December 1941, Page 4

RUGGED LAND

Geography Of Malaya Rivers And Jungle Influence On Strategy Problems of strategy and tactics imposed on attacking and defending forces in Malaya by the nature of the country are described by a special correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald." Those not well acquainted with the Malay Peninsula may find it hard to appreciate, from the ordinary map, the strategical problems now confronting the Japanese High Command in their invasion of this territory. Local conditions vary so widely from'place to place, with communications —so vital to modern warfare—here bad, there good, elsewhere impossible, that any plan of attack must inevitably be governed by certain topographical and geographical factors. Malaya is roughly divided from north-west to south-west by an intermittent chain of hills and mountains, thickly covered with dense jungle. Communications across this “divide,” while they do exist at one or two places, are so scanty and open to demolition and air attack that it would seem barely likely that the Japanese could hope to conquer the east and west coast areas without two separate drives or offensives.

East Coast Offensive North-south communications along the east coast of Malaya are so scanty that anything like a concerted drive hi this direction would have to rely largely on sea-borne landings at certain well-defined “gateways.” The State of Kelantan, in the extreme north-east of British Malaya; affords the first of these “gateways.” The northern part of the State, around the capital, Kota Bharu, consists largely of open paddy fields, and it is here that the Japanese scored their first success in capturing Kota Bharu eerodrome. From a purely military point of view, the British have an excellent base further Inland at Kuala Krai, due south of Kota Bharu, where the terrain is much more closely wooded end suitable for defensive operations. South of Krai, the Kelantan railway winds through thick jungle and tortuous mountains; effective demolition could destroy all communications for months. Anything in the nature of an Advance by mechanise troops in this region is out of the question. Jungle Fighting

South of the wild and undeveloped State of Trengganu lies Pahang, the largest of the Malay States, which contains the second "gateway" into the east coast of Malaya—Kuantan, where the Japanese have already landed. From Kuantan a good motor road runs through the “divide” to the populous west coast and the Federal capital, Kuala Lumpur. For much of the way this road runs through thick jungle, and fighting in this district is likely to be confused, with communications liable to Interruption by aerial attack on both sides. Those troops showing themselves most apt at jungle warfare are likely to prove the victors in this struggle. South of Kuantan, communications are again difficult, and there are considerable tracts of jungle between there and the third “gateway”—Mersing, in the north of Johore. From Mersing a motor road leads direct through Kota Tinggi and Jahore Bahru to Sincapore. (The danger of a Japanese landing at Mersing has long been foreseen by the British High Command, and particular attention has been paid to Its defences. Fight for Airfields The main implications of the Japanese attack on the east coast of Malaya are, then: The attack in Kelantan has its chief significance in the fight for air landing grounds, and by itself would not in all probability constitute a very great military threat; the landing at Kuantan, unless checked, might develop into a dangerous thrust toward Kuala Lampur, threatening the rear of the Britisn troops in northern Malaya; a landing in the neighbourhood of Mersing would be a direct threat to Singapore, and extremely violent fighting would be expected to develop from it. A Japanese offensive .on the vest coast of Malaya represents many different military problems when compared with the east coast. Communications north-south are excellent, particularly road, and there are many open tracts of paddy fields, and tin areas (particularly in the north) where large forces may be deployed. There are also extensive rubber plantations through which troops can advance easily and often unseen. South of the border, the country opens out into the broad paddy fields of Kedah. There are a number of excellent air fields in Kedah which make this district an important prize. The chief importance of Penang lies in that its docks and harbours are vitally necessary for the unloading of supplies and reinforcements from India and Burma. South of Kedah lies the State cf Perak, the north-west part of which (known as the district of Krian) is largely open paddy fields, and would offer little opportunity for an effective defensive position. In the neighbourhood of Taiping, the capital, more hilly and wooded country would provide better terram, however, and a stand could well be made here. Further to the south-east runs the great Perak River, roughly north-east to south-west, often half a mile wide, and this would provide an extremely effective barrier to further Japanese advance. Further to the south lies the rtch tin-bearing Kinta Valley district, centred round Ipoh, the economic importance of which both to Britain and the United States is enormous. The development of any fighting further to the south so much depends on events elsewhere and is so hedged with “ifs” and “supposings” that speculation at this stage is useless. Communications, in most places excellent, run throughout the west coastdistrict to Singapore, which muse be the Japanese ultimate objective; but how they would be defended, and in which direction the fighting- will sway, is hard yet to foresee.