The Timaru Herald MONDAY, MAY 6, 1940 Lessons From Norway

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVIII, Issue 21646, 6 May 1940, Page 6

The Timaru Herald MONDAY, MAY 6, 1940 Lessons From Norway

NOW that a fuller explanation of the conditions in which the British North-Western Expeditionary Force had to in Norway is available, the reasons for the withdrawal of troops from the southern region become more irresistibly valid. When the whole question is debated in the House of Commons this week there will be recriminations and criticism since it now appears that the troops were faced with an impossible task, harried as they were by unrelenting and punishing air attacks. What the Allies lacked, and it was a major lack, was an air base in Norway, from which fighting machines could have gone out to intercept the attackers. Whatever aid was given to the Allied troops came from the naval air arm and from machines which had a long stretch of sea to cross before they could engage the enemy. The troops were further disastrously handicapped by being without anti-aircraft guns, and it is on this point that criticism is likely to be nfost bitterly expressed. One message states that the men of the North-Western Expeditionary Force came chiefly from the bodies of troops assembled earlier to assist Finland, but while these men were available their equipment had been dispersed, and part of the dispersed equipment included anti-aircraft guns. There are only two grounds upon which the despatch of partly-equipped troops could be justified. The first, and obvious one, is that speedy assistance had to be given to the Norwegians; the second is that the strength of the German hold on the country was under-estimated. How far these explanations can be accepted as reasonable will probably be the most discussed question in the coming debate. It is clear, of course, that the losses suffered in such campaigning conditions must have been much heavier than they would have been if the Allied troops had been fully equipped and screened by an air force approximately on terms with that of Germany.

It has been emphasised that the withdrawal of troops south of Trondheim does not mean that the Allies are abandoning their interest in the Norwegian campaign. Far from it. Tn the first phase of the struggle an impossible situation developed and there was no alternative but to withdraw the Allied forces. This does not mean that they will not be available for service elsewhere. Although it is too early to cast up anything but a sketchy interim balance-sheet of the fighting in Norway since the campaign began, there will be a tendency to let the withdrawal of the Allied troops, admittedly a moral defeat, overshadow some of the happenings which went definitely in favour of the Allies. In the naval fighting, for example, the British Fleet was able to strike home a crippling blow against the enemy. It may be argued by the pessimists that the Germans did not have a large navy because it did not suit their purpose to have one. The answer, of course, is that the Nazis did not build what ships they had for ornament. They built them because they wanted them and in the past three weeks they have lost valuable fighting assets. Further, the Royal Navy, through being able to attack German transports, probably inflicted losses compensating for those suffered by the Allies on Norwegian soil. Perhaps the most important feature of the early part of the campaign was that it provided the first test of the relative strength of sea and air power. In planning their assault on Norway, which they knew must be resisted by the Allies, the Nazis -leaders would have known that their navy was outclassed by the British sea forces. It may be assumed, then, that they imagined that their air force could compensate for this deficiency. Since the war began there has been discussion as to whether sea power, confronted by the new challenge from the air, would be as important now as it was in the past. German strategy seems to have been based upon the supposition that the aeroplane can master the cruiser and battleship. The issue between sea power and air power is not yet conclusively settled, but considerable comfort may be gained from the fact that the British Navy had everything its own way in Norwegian waters. Nazi air strength did not interfere with the capacity of the naval forces to strike frequently and effectively. In this first test (he honours appear to lie with sea power. That, of course, leaves out of consideration what happened on land, which was no concern of the naval forces. It is beyond doubt that the navy could have inflicted great damage in the ports of southern Norwav. but such attacks were not to be made. The Germans have certainly gained some immediate advantages in the north, but the struggle is not yet over. When it is the reckoning will disclose solid advantages of lasting value in favour of the Allies. It takes more than one reverse to make a defeat. This is particularly true when the reverse can be easily explained.