The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1940 Nazi Invasion Chances

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVIII, Issue 21560, 24 January 1940, Page 6

The Timaru Herald WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1940 Nazi Invasion Chances

IN the event of Hitler deciding upon a move in the west it is suggested that three strategic courses are open to him. The first is a paralysing attack on Britain from the air; the second, direct invasion, and the third an assault upon the Maginot Line. The idea of direct invasion of Britain has been discussed ever since Napoleonic times, the defensive Martello towers still to be seen along the Sussex coast being monuments to the groundless fears of those far away days. An imaginary scheme for the invasion of Britain by Germany was sketched before the Great War in The Riddle of the Sands, a novel by Erskine Childers, a brilliant Irishman who was later executed by his own countrymen. The novelist's plan visioned the accumulation by the Germans of sea going lighters behind the shelter of the Frisian islands. At the chosen moment, they were to descend upon the British coast under the protection of a squadron of warships. Nothing of the sort, of course, was attempted during the Great War, and for a reason which is even more obvious now as it was then.

If an invasion of this kind were to be undertaken an essential preliminary would be temporary command at least of the North Sea. No matter from what point the invaders came this would be necessary. Even if the Germans were able to force their way to the Dutch and Belgian ports command of the sea would be necessary if troops were to be transported across the water. It would take a day or more to move troops in such conditions and it is impossible to imagine in the most pessimistic moment that the British navy would be luckless enough to lose control of the sea for so long a period. This prospect has to be ruled out entirely, for the Nazis have not sufficient naval strength to provide distractions in other oceans great enough to compel Britain to weaken her hold on the North Sea area.

But there is an alternative to sea invasion. It is invasion by air, two methods of which might be tried. The first would be by the use of airships. Such vessels have been able to make a gross lift of 180 tons, which would allow for the transport of troops and equipment. Airships, however, have important weaknesses. They are frail and ever at the mercy of the weather, but above all they would be completely vulnerable to attack by speedy heavier-than-air craft. They would have no chance at all in combat. The remaining possibility for invasion by air would be through the use of troopcarrying aeroplanes. Such machines have already been used by the British army, chiefly in the East, but so far they have carried only 20 fully equipped men. When the prospect of invasion by troopcarrying planes was considered recently in the Spectator, the possibility submitted as a basis for argument was the fantastic one that Germany has prepared in secret aeroplanes capable of carrying 100 fully-equipped men. A large number of troops, upwards of a division, would be needed to make the semblance of a blow at a vital English industrial centre, and this would mean that 200 such aeroplanes would be required for men alone, and it was estimated that another 100 would be wanted for artillery and other services. To strike with the maximum effect such an air armada would have to set out secretly, an impossible accomplishment. Without secrecy to aid them in a surprise blow the air legions would be met by air defence strong enough at least to assure that many of the enemy machines would not reach England. But even if they did get there Britain would still have soldiers to resist the attack. Many things are possible in the present struggle, but the direct invasion of England is not one of them. Hitler’s strategy seems, therefore, to be limited to an ordinary air attack on Britain, or an assault in the west. These two, of course, could be combined.