The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1939 An Italian Declaration

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVII, Issue 21530, 18 December 1939, Page 6

The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1939 An Italian Declaration

effort towards general conciliatoriness is A evident in the Italian Foreign Minister's spool'll on Hie international situation. Fount Ciano lias made a good attempt to please everybody, but he has made it abundantly clear that Italy s chief objective is to protect her own interests and there is no reason why she should not do so. With the position as it is now Count Ciano is wise in affirming, for the benefit of his countrymen, Hint Italy's duty is to assure her own security and independence. This declaration is also intended probably as a warning to the Soviet, for no other nation just now has aspirations likely to threaten Italian independence or security. Italy to some extent must regard herself as a guardian of the Balkans and it is there that an Italian sphere of influence, in fact the only remaining Italian sphere of influence in Europe, is endangered.

Count Ciano administered a few rebukes, and it was only the fact that he was called upon to give a formal reaffirmation of the Rome-Berlin axis which prevented him from saying what Italians must really feel about Hitler's capitulation to Stalin. Count Ciano, in referring to the AntiComintern Fact, declared that Italy was the first to fight Bolshevism, so it may be assumed that her original distaste of what the Soviet stands for remains unchanged. However, he did attempt a pallid explanation of the factors which drove Berlin into the arms of Moscow. Such action was necessary, according to Count Ciano, to isolate Russia from the encirclement policy of the Allies. It is clear, however, from what has happened since the end of August, that Russia was determined to play the aggressive game, and since Britain and France would not be parties to her nefarious plans, she turned automatically to Berlin. If von Ribbentrop went to Moscow solely to remove the menace of encirclement it becomes clearer than ever how calamitously and completely the Nazis have been duped by Stalin.

It is more and more apparent that Italy, while committed to a policy of neutrality, is determined to make as much out of neutrality as she can; but to preserve neutrality in the meantime it is impossible for her to reject entirely her former associations witli Berlin. That would be equivalent to an admission that she was virtually on the side of the Allies. The best indication of the slackening of bonds with Berlin was the reconstitution of the Italian Cabinet after war broke out. I’ro-Nazi elements were removed, and those men who had been particularly identified with the development of the Axis policy had to be removed. The new members of the Cabinet had a double qualification. 'They were able to deal impartially witii Italy's Nazi associations, but at the same time they were competent to stand on friendly terms with the Allies. The result of this new Italian policy is to be seen in a drift away from Berlin, but one unaccompanied by a corresponding drift towards Baris and London. Italy’s first concern, as Count Ciano lias declared, is for herself, but she is prepared to lend her offices in the cause of peace. She may even hope to dominate the peace by keeping herself unscathed by war. What present Italian policy must be. was summarised recently by the Rome correspondent of the A'cic York Times. “Now the fountain of Fascism returns to its source, so far as Italians are concerned,” he said. "The watchword is ‘contruct’ not ‘conquer.’ Italian Fascism will build new buildings, reclaim unfertile lands, colonise their empire, follow peaceful pursuits and return to her origins.” Such a withdrawal, if it can be maintained, is obviously to Italy’s advantage. And from the Allied standpoint a neutral Italy makes the successful prosecution of the war against the Nazis easier.