FAR EAST CRISIS

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLIV, Issue 21004, 5 April 1938, Page 9

FAR EAST CRISIS

Key to Situation Chinese Face Common Enemy ECONOMIC STRESS IN JAPAN That there were two vital keys to an Intelligent understanding of the situation in the Far East was stressed by Mr W. L. Holland, Research Secretary to the Institute of Pacific Relations, in an address to the Timaru Rotary Club last evening. The function, which was presided over by Rotarian A. G. Tait, was attended by the wives of members of the Club, representatives of the senior and junior Chambers of Commerce, the Oamaru Rotary Club and other organisations. Mr Holland spoke for an hour and in that time he gave the audience a vivid picture of the causes which led up to the present conflict, and the reasons for the determined resistance being offered by the Chinese, and he spoke in optimistic vein when expressing his personal views concerning the outcome of the war. After acknowledging the chairman's welcome, Mr Holland said that he had spoken in Timaru just six years ago, and in that same year he had sailed up the Wangpu river at the mouth of which was Wu-sung, which was nothing but a desolate heap of ruins. In the next five years Wu-sung was rebuilt into a modem village, and when he had passed. the same spot only a few months ago, it was again in ruins. That incident deserved fuller examination, and he proposed to talk about how it how come about. The speaker first referred to the attempt by Japan in 1931 to expand her island Empire by her conquest of Manchuria, the excuse for which was an explosion on a portion of a Japanese controlled railway. Overnight Japan rushed in her armies, and in a few weeks she occupied the whole territory. The point that was often forgotten, however, was

that incident, great a.s it was, was only the prelude to a series of similar continental adventures on the part of the Japanese military leaders. Unless one knew* something of these, one could have no idea of the extent of hostilities in China to-day. In 1932 Japan consolidated her position in Manchuria or what was now the independent State of Manchukuo; in 1933 she moved north towards the border of Mongolia and attempted to exploit every dissatisfied Mongol prince by a programme of intrigue with a view to preparing the ground for a large scale insurrection; in 1934 she moved inside the Great Wall almost to Peking, and there followed minor military engagements and political intrigue and bribery, and in 1936 Japan began an attempt to sweep to the west and for a time had success in organising a Mongolian rebellion. These episodes were the main steps in the process of expansion that had been going on during the five years previous to the outbreak in July last when China turned from her ancient course of yielding to the conqueror and resisted. “The most noteworthy fact about Japanese expansion in China has been the fact that in the past the Japanese leaders could count on finding a sufficient number of corrupt Chinese officials who wejre willing, for generous considerations, to take the part of Japan and to connive at attempts to take further territory,” said Mr Holland. “What has made this way so remarkable has been that this time the Japanese were completely deceived in assuming they would have an easy conquest.”

Mr Holland said that the Japanese were not entirely wrong in the early stages, and they were on the point of negotiating an agreement with the Chinese general in command. That agreement would virtually have handed over to them five provinces with a

population of between 100,000,000 and 120,000,000, and richly endowed with cotton, iron and coal which Japan badly needed, and it was this fact which was the key to the understanding of the whole struggle, and an explanation as to why the Chinese were resisting so resolutely. The agreement was signed and sealed, but could not be delivered, because the rank and file of the Chinese Army refused to carry out the orders of their superiors, for they knew it would have meant the last nail in the coffin of Chinese territorial Independence. “Fired by this example,” said Mr Holland, “the Chinese troops in Shanghai repeated the process and forced the Japanese into an unexpected and unwanted fight on two fronts. The whole countryside had awakened to the fact that there was a common enemy, and this situation had never existed before.”

Revolutionary Change

Mr Holland said that two things had brought about this revolutionary change in China, one being the work of the Communists and the other the stupidity of the Japanese themselves, and by that he meant the insane attempt to force the issue by a process of terrorisation, namely by bombarding civilian populations. By this one action the Japanese did more than the Nanking Government had been able to do in 10 years, and that was to unite the Chinese people in one force to meet a common enemy. The expressed desire of the Japanese to help the Chinese had this time fallen on deaf ears for ttie reason that while Japanese aeroplanes were dropping pamphlets in one place, in ten others they were dropping bombs, and the bombs told a more convincing story than the pamphlets. So there was the unprecedented spectacle of a united China, politically aware that its whole cultural existence was being menaced by a common enemy. As evidence of the determination of the Chinese, the speaker referred to the fact that provincial troops from all parts of the country held out for 75 days under intense bombardment from the Japanese naval vessels and that had done a lot to build up the solidarity of the Chinese and explained why the Chinese Government had retired in good order to Hankow.

“The news of the last few days is not fundamentally surprising to those who have followed the situation,” said Mr Holland, “because they realised that eventually the Japanese would over-reach themselves and be cut off. I don’t mean that China will inflict a resounding defeat on the Japanese, because the invaders are waging the war with all the instruments of modern warfare and the Chinese are not so well situated. It is tragic to see American lorries passing up to the front lines laden with guns, ammunition and men, and driven by petrol supplied by British and American firms.” The speaker said that the Chinese had increased morale, however, and some of their troops have been taught by German officers. They also had a strong air force at the start, but sadly lacked mechanics to repair the machines and was at a big disadvantage in having no navy, whereas Japan had conducted a great deal of the campaign from the water. Mr Holland then dealt with the part played by the Communists (reported elsewhere) and touched on conditions in Japan itself. He said that just as the process of continual expansion had been going on in China, so in Japan itself there had been a steady process of regimentation of economic forces which had come mor and more under the control of the leaders of the army and navy. At the moment lhey had the power to prevent the formation of a Cabinet of which they did not approve, and to-day one saw only a vestige of the modern parliamentary system which was built up in Japan following the Restoration Act of 1868. More and more civilian powers

had been whittled away and control had been turned over to a committee dominate* by the military leaders, and because of that it was possible for them to proceed with expansion without the danger of being called to account by the civilian leaders. The Japanese were a poor people, but they had had to provide colossal sums for the army and navy and under the tremendous economic difficulties to-day the people had to tighten their belts and give up services so that their spare resources could be devoted to the building up of the military machine. Financiers Bribed Mr Holland said that they had still to reckon with the business world in Japan. The military leaders had held out a bribe to the big financial interests in the form of material to develop heavy industries, and Japan was no longer a country of light industries for the manufacture of clothing and toys. She was now a manufacturer of steel, cement, copper and basic chemicals, and that had meant that she was much less concerned with the good will of her customers overseas. The population at large was suffering terribly in order that the large financial interests could have their profits. “The war might go on another 12 months, at least,” said Mr Holland, “but a break may come.” The resistance of the Chinese was having a big effect on the morale of the Japanese troops, and there had been instances of panic and demoralisation. In Japan there was a danger that as soon as the troops came home in large numbers and found that they would have to face heavy taxes, it was likely that a tremendous feeling of despair and disillusionment would spread. There was a danger of an upheaval in Japan, and it might compel a change of Government, and a drastic change of policy. Mr Holland gave it as his opinion that this was the best outlook he could see. The great hardships of the Japanese and the tremendous suffering of the Chinese would go on for another year, and the loss of another harvest would mean starvation for millions, but it was encouraging to know that the discontent in Japan was the only thing which would make possible the discrediting and removal of the military leaders, and it would then be possible for Japan to return to a civic government. It might also be that in 18 months' time Britain and America would be able to take a more positive stand in the Far East than they were to-day, and the slightest show of force on the part of these two nations might release the feeling which was developing in Japan, and might be the means of bringing better days for both the Japanese and the Chinese. On the motion of Mr W. Thomas, seconded by Mr J. M. Jenkins, the speaker was accorded a hearty vote of thanks.