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“BRITAIN MUST BE FIRM”

THREATS OF WAR IN EUROPE BRITAIN'S MODIFIED POLICY STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER RISKS IN REBUFFING GREAT POWERS United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright London, February at. In moving the adjournment of the House of Commons to enable a discussion, the Prime Minister (Mr Neville Chamberlain) said that Mr Eden's resignation came as a shock. None of his colleagues had anticipated any danger of such an event until a few days ago, when last week a section of the Press declared there were serious differences. He had been under the impression that there was complete agreement, and the Government had not felt that the differences on the immediate question were sufficiently Important to make Mr Eden’s resignation necessary. Three Points of Principle "My foreign policy is based on three principles,” said the Prime Minister: (1) The protection of British interests and the lives of its nationals; (2) The maintenance of peace, and the settlement of differences peacefully and not by force; (3) The promotion of friendly relations with other nations, who are willing to reciprocate and keep the rules of international conduct, without which there can be neither security nor stability.” Plea For Appeasement Mr Chamberlain did not believ'. that it was impossible with goodwill and determination to remove genuine grievances, for which reason the Government had been seeking opportunity for conversations with Italy and Germany "to find whether there was any common ground on which might be built up a general scheme of European appeasement.” After referring to the "Gentlemen's Agreement” with Italy in 1937, and his exchange of personal letters with Signor Mussolini last year, Mr Chamberlain said: “Unfortunately, certain incidents occurred in the Mediterranean. which, in the British Government’s opinion, rendered it impossible that conversations at that tir. could have any chance of success. “It could not be denied that, during the months since the original Interchange of letters with Signor Mussolini, Anglo-Italian relations had seriously and steadily deteriorated. It always seemed to me that In dealing with foreign countries, we dr not give ourselves a chance of success unless we try to understand their mentality, which is not ah.'ays the same as our own.

Relations With Italy “I am Informed,” added the Prime Minister, "that all this time, when It appeared that obstacles to conversations had arisen entirely from Italian action, exactly the opposite view was heard in Rome. All this time that suspicion was growing in Rome that we did not want conversations at all, and were engaged in a Machiavellian design to lull the Italians into activity while we completed our rearmament programme with the intention of presently taking revenge for the conquest of Abyssinia. “It was in a steadily worsening atmosphere overhanging our relations with Italy that fresh opportunity arose to break from the vicious circle when Count Grand!, after certain talks, called at the Foreign Office and said that the Italian Government was ready at any time to open conversations. Count Grand! had pointed out that his Government desired the Conversations to be as wide as possible, embracing formal recognition of the Abyssinian conquest and not excluding Spain. The Government replied that it was bound to act as a loyal member of the League of Nations and that the attitude of the League, especially the Mediterranean Powers, would be considerably influenced if Great Britain and Italy reached an agreement which was a real contribution to general appeasement. The Foreign Secretary emphasised that this was a facte;- which would have great weight with public opinion in Great Britain p.” J Fran: on the Mediterranean, and in ths United States.” Mr Chamberlain added that in all this, the Foreign Secretary spoke for the Government as a whole. Abyssinian Conquest “I have, he said, "always taken the view that the question of the formal recognition of the Italian position in Abyssinia is morally justifiable only if it is found to be an essen' 1 -.! factor in general appeasement.” Opposition cries of “Shame. It will never be.” No “Now or Never” That was the view of all of us, Mr Chamberlain added. Expressing the view that Mr Eden in one point was not quite fair, the Prime Minister continued: "He represented to the House that the Italian Government called on us to enter into conversations now, or never, and that we are being asked to submit to a threat. There is nothing in any communication from the Italian Government which in my judgment, would justify that description." He added that Mr Eden had asked him not to commit the Government to anything specific in the conversations with Count Grandl, f.r.d he had abstained from anything of that kind. It was after the talks with Count Grandi that the differences between

Mr Eden and himself first became acute. * Divergence of Views "I am convinced,” the Prime Minister concluded, "that a rebuff to the Italian desire for conversations would be regarded to Italy as confirming the suspicions that we were never really in earnest about the conversations. If that were the impression the result would be disastrous. It would be followed by an intensification of antiBritish feeling in Italy, rising to a point at which ultimately war between us might become inevitable. Mr Eden, on the contrary, wanted to wait for a substantial withdrawal of volunteers, but he i."’- it clear that objections would still remain even if acceptance of the British formula for withdrawal were obtained from Italy. 1 '

Danger of Surrender of Principles Sharp Divergence on Foreign Policy United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright LONDON, February 21. “The occasion is most painful to me, both personally and politically,” declared Mr Anthony Eden in the House of Commons to-day, speaking slowly and obviously under stress, in explaining his resignation as Foreign Secretary, “but at times strong political convictions must override all other considerations, of which only the individual himself can judge. None can be the keeper of another’s conscience.” (Cheers.) “The ultimate aim of us all, and the objectives of the British foreign policy,” Mr Eden continued, “must always be the maintenance of peace, but if peace is to be enduring it must rest on foundations of frank reciprocity and mutual respect, but the method by which we seek that end must strengthen and not undermine the foundation on which international confidence rests. We must be ready to negotiate with all countries, whatever their form of government, in order to promote international understanding.”

CHEERED BY CROWDED HOUSE OF COMMONS MR ANTHONY EDEN'S STATEMENT United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright LONDON, February 21. Prolonged cheering greeted Mr Anthony Eden, when he rose in the House of Commons to make a statement on his resignation from the post of Foreign Secretary. Defence Of Principles "It recently became clear to me, and I think to the Prime Minister,” said the retiring Foreign Secretary, that there is between us a real difference of outlook and method. It may M argued that this is not a difference ia fundamental principles, in the sense that the objective of all foreign policy is the maintenance of peace. That is true. But, in international affairs, can anyone define where outlook and method end and principle begins?” Raising his voice, Mr Eden declared: “The Prime Minister has strong views on foreign policy. I respect him for it. And I have strong views, too. Those views have resulted in a divergence, not of aim, but of outlook and approach. It is clearly in the national interest that unity should be restored at the earliest possible moment. The conviction has steadily grown upon me that there is an over-keen desire on our part to make terms with others, rather than that others should make terms with us. Italian Talks Inopportune After a reference to "certain exchanges of views,” between England and Italy regarding the opening of conversations between the two Governments, Mr Eden continued: "The immediate issue is whether such official conversations should be opened now. It is my conviction that the attitude of the Italian Government to international problems in general, and to this country in particular, is not yet such as to Justify this course. (Opposition cheers). “Propaganda against Britain by the Italian Government is rife throughout the world. I myself gave a pledge to this House that I would not open con- 1 versatlons with Italy until this hostile propaganda ceases. Though much is promised, little progress has been made to a solution of the Spanish problem. I do not suggest that I advocate that the Government should refuse conversations with the Italian Government or any other Government which shows any disposition to conversations with us for the betterment of international understanding, but we must be convinced of the likelihood of success in any such conversations. I do not think that those conditions exist to-day. Facing Stern Realities “In January of last year we signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement, but al-

most simultaneously the first considerable consignment of Italian battalions was sent to Spain. The Prime Minister and Signor Mussolini exchanged letters last summer, and for a few days relations between Britain and Italy took a marked turn for the better. Then ensued the incidents in the Mediterranean and the glorification by the head of the Italian Government of the victorious Italian forces in Spain.” Conditions Imposed “My submission is that we cannot risk a further repetition of this experience. Therefore it is my contention that, before the Government opens official conversations with Rome, we must make further progress with the Spanish problem. We must agree, not only on the need of the withdrawal and the conditions ot the withdrawal of foreign volunteers, but we must show the world that such withdrawal is not only a promise but an achievement. "Recent months, recent weeks, and recent days, have seen successive violations of international agreements and attempts to secure political decisions forcibly. In the light of the present international situation, this Is the moment for this country’ to stand firm. (Loud and prolonged cheers.) “Agreements that are worth while are never made on the basis of a threat, nor in the past hac Great Britain been willing to negotiate cn such conditions. It is seldom right to depart from the traditional method of diplomacy, which is to prepare for conversations before they are formally opened. It is certainly never right to do so because one party to the negotiations intimates that it Is now or never.” Fundamental Differences Mr Eden added that this was not r.n isolated Issue between the Prime Minister and himself. “Within the past few weeks,” he said, “upon one of the most important decisions regarding foreign policy, which did not concern Italy at all, our difference was fundamental.” Mr Eden proceeded to affirm that if his colleagues were right their chances of success would be enhanced if their policy were pursued by the Foreign Secretary with complete conviction in the methods he was being asked to employ. , "I do not believe that we can pro- ; gress in European appeasement, more particularly in the light of the evea’.t : of the past few days, if we allow, an impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure. I am certain that progress "-pends above all on the temper of the nation, and V. at temper must fl”'* exprr ■ sion in v firm spirit. I am confident that that spirit is there. Not to give voice to it is, I believe, fair neither to this country nor to the world.” (Loud cheers.) Lord Cranborne Explains Lord Cranborne said that he had resigned because he was In fullest agreement With Mr Eden or a matter of fundamental principle. To enter into official conversations —ith Italy would be regarded as no contribution to peace, but as a surrender to blackmail. (cheers). Unless the nations were able to trust one another agreements were valueless.

MR EDEN “THROWN TO WOLVES” LABOUR'S HOSTILE ATTITUDE MOTION TO CENSURE GOVERNMENT CRITICISM OF CHANGE OF POLICY United Press Association—Bj Electric Telegraph—Copyright (Received February 22, 8.30 p.m.) LONDON, February 21. In the House of Commons, Labour members tabled a vote of censure saying: “This House deplores the circumstances in which Mr Anthony Eden was obliged to resign, and has no confidence in the Government.” Mr Arthur Greenwood (Deputy Leader of the Labour Party) will move this motion on Tuesday. "GREAT VICTORY FOR DICTATORS” LABOUR CRITICISM OF POLICY United Press Association—By Electrio Telegraph—Copyright LONDON, February 22. In the House of Commons, discussing Mr Anthony Eden's resignation, the Leader of the Opposition (Mr C. R. Attlee) said that public opinion would equally condemn the Government now as when Sir Samuel Hoare resigned from the Foreign Office. He declar.l that the new Foreign Minister must be a member of the House of Commons as the Under-Secretary would be unable to satisfactorily reply to questions. Mr Attlee added that Mr Eden’s retirement was being acclaimed as another great victory for Signor Mussolini. He went on to say: "An agreement resulting from Mr Chamberlain”s methods, which are lacking in principle, will make Signor Mussolini master in the Mediterranean, which is sheer madness from the strategic viewpoint. It involves the end of the League of Nation;, and will be regarded throughout Europe as an abject surrender to the dictators.”

Mr Attlee said he thought the weekend’s events would have grave repercussions in Europe, In the United States and the Dominions, and he believed stiil greater repercussions at Home. They were faced with the entire negation of the policy which the Government had professed. In place of a constructive peace policy, there was a fatal playing at power politics—the playing off of one dictator against another. It was the kind of policy which led inevitably to war. "Whining Cap in Hand” Mr Attlee added: “Mr Chamberlain’s speech revealed that two foreign offices had been operating. I sympathise with Mr Eden who had suffered from apparently extremely amateur methods. Mr Eden had now been thrown to the wolves, in an affair unparalleled In English history. It iz curious when foreigners are continually attacking the Foreign Minister his colleagues have not supported him. Mr Attlee declared that Signor Mussolini Was a bankrupt dictator living "on tick,” with increasing home difficulties. The Spanish war had not been successful and Abyssinia was unsettled. Moreover the Rome-Berlin axis was uneasy and Herr Hitler had jumped into Austria, it is Just at this juncture that Mr Chamberlain goes whining, cap in hand, and asking for agreement without any condition. "I am amazed,’’ Mr Atlee concluded, “at this surrender of the greatest world power to the weakest dictator, and the recognition of aggression which would damage British prestige everywhere, including Palestine and Arabia, and seriously affect the United States and produce grave repercussions to the Dominions and Britain, where thousands hoped for a peace policy. “Enemies Will > eJoice” Sir Archibald Sinclair (Leader of the Opposition Liberals) said that Mr Eden’s resignation would be a subject for rejoicing among the enemies of Great Britain and would discourage her friends. Dictators would exult while free peoples v'ould be filled with foreboding. Sir Archibald said that Mr Eden, who had been regarded in all British schools of thought aS the champion of democracy, law and peace, had been hampered by his colleagues, when a wrong turn might be fatal.

RECALL DEMANDED SUPPORT FOR MR EDEN APPROACH TO ITALY CONDEMNED United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright (Received February 22. 6.30 p.m.) LONDON, February 21. The Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction has issued a manifesto supporting Mr Eden’s policy and condemning negotiations with Italy. The resolution declares that millions of electors rightly regarded Mr Eden as a firm supporter of the League, and that the reply to the Government’s attempt at the betrayal of the national honour and Imperial interests must be an unmistakable nation-wide call for Mr Eden’s recall and the re-establishment of his policy of no surrender on principles. .

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/THD19380223.2.77

Bibliographic details

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLIV, Issue 20969, 23 February 1938, Page 9

Word Count
2,640

“BRITAIN MUST BE FIRM” Timaru Herald, Volume CXLIV, Issue 20969, 23 February 1938, Page 9

“BRITAIN MUST BE FIRM” Timaru Herald, Volume CXLIV, Issue 20969, 23 February 1938, Page 9

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