The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1926. AFTER GENEVA—WHAT?

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXIII, 18 March 1926, Page 6

The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1926. AFTER GENEVA—WHAT?

Thanks to Sir Austen Chamberlain’s use of the fatal free hand Mr Baldwin and his colleagues gave him, and the shameful intriguing' by France and her fellow conspirators, the conciliatory spirit which grew out of the Locarno miracle, bps been so completely scotched that the Council of the League of Nations has npt dared assemble for the open discussion of Germany’s admission to the League and the representatives of the nations now assembled at Geneva have decided to agree in their disagreement and postpone the inevitable public declaration of individual attitude to Germany. Before lie took his departure for Geneva, Sir Austen Chamberlain delivered this reply to an innuiry m the House of Commons, requesting he should say whether lie favoured giving a permanent seat to Poland: “I do not think the interests of peace and international understanding would be served by menibfers cf individual Governments saying what they would do at the forthcoming League meeting. I do not /see how we can come to an agreement if each Government announces its policy beforehand and is unwilling to make concessions."

Unhappily, however, Sir Austen Chamberlain committed such a grave tactical blunder in his speech at Birmingham that lie went to Geneva,, with a free hand as far as the Baldwin Cabinet and British opinion were concerned, hut irrevocably and _ hopelessly tied to the apron strings of the subtle, evil-scheming representative of France.' There was no calm consideration of the problems confronting the League. The British Foreign Minister fell to the snare pf the fowler and was virtually a captive in the hands of the anti-German bloc which sought to create a , Latin bloc within the Council of the League, regardless of the lery definite understanding' concluded with Germany at Locarno,. Sir 1 Austen Chamberlain failed and the secret negotiation failed because! the opponents of Germany had announced their policy beforehand and were unwilling* to make concessions. Even the La,t,inAmerican States disc,era the drift of the dark diplomacy of Geneva, and it is significant that the South American Republics join with the British Dominions in unanimously resenting' the existence of a League .of Natrons newly rigged and weighted to suit the purposes of Continental partisanship. From, the outset Sir Austen Chamberlain hals been completely out of touch with British opinion both at Home and Overseas. In the House of Commons the Foreign, Minister pleaded for freedom in dealing with the problem of peripaneiii seats at Geneva, and contended that it would he extremely unwise for the British Government to adopt a cast-iron policy and announce the fact beforehand. Those sharing those views argued that Sir Austen should he permitted to attempt another Locarno triumph at Geneva,. All that was required of the Council of the League of Nations was not secret, intrigue, hut the honouring- of a definite understanding made with Germany at Lpcerno. On his return from Locarno after .ensuring Germany’s application for membership of the Lea gue, Sir Austen Chamberlain was acclaimed by all sections of political opinion and was honoured by the King-. But such is fate! _ On his return from Geneva it is not unlikely iliat tiie Minister’s resignation will he demanded by the very people who cheered Jus Locarno .jcliieveaii at. After Locarno, Sir Austen Chamber] ai n came home, to he crowned : he may return from Geneva to suffer the indignity of political •crucifixion. Before, the Council of the League assembled the Imperial Government, was reminded that, Germany's mem norslyp of the League morally began with her signing' of too Loc.mio Treaty, and that therefore her consent is absolutely necessary for any enlargement of the Council. “We cannot belie'e,” says one newspaper, "That Britain will consent, to, or that tiamo will persist in demanding, additions to the Council prior to Germany's entry. It would wreck the whole venture of Locarno, providing not the, beginning but the mordant epitaph of peace. The Locarno bargain is complete, and must no ff ho re-opened. by fresh haggling and dishonest ‘'afterthoughts.’’ Eight days before the Council oi the, League, was timed to assemble (lie political correspondent of “The Observer” said that “the Government is facing the most anxious moment it, has known since it entered office, owing to the likelihood of an industrial revival being prejudiced by the League dispute. Sir Austen Chamberlain ought,” says the correspondent, “to declare that if France,, Italy, and Poland persist in their present policy, Britain, America, ami Germany may abandon the League, owing to the alienation of the non-Latin world.” Viewing the miserable result of underground bartering for scats on the League Council for their friends iyul proteges, the principal signatories of the Locarno agreement, are. making frantic efforts to retrieve, the position and restore the prestige of the League. Like a silly fly Sir Austen Chamberlain walked into the, French ■spider’s parlour, when bo foolishly supported Poland's claim by saying that if suitable, additions to the Council could bo found

thevo is no reason why they should not be* admitted. This is precisely the attitude of Brazil, and indeed the other smaller Powers.which demanded seats on the League Council, if Germany were admitted. But what is the influence behind these persistent demands ? No one can shy! The question, however, presenting itself to the British Commonwealth of Nations is after Geneva. —wha t ? Unquestionably the most effective way to give Europe a. substantial guarantee of peace is to persuade the nations to submit their disputes to arbitration. Germany seeks admission to the League in the full realisation of what shell a course involves. But so dark is tire intrigue .of some of Germany’s old-time enemies and their impudent proteges that the non-Latin peoples are beginning to ask themselves whether it is safe to keep company with the schemers who have nearly wrecked the Locarno agreement; they desire to know if an AngloSaxon confederation would not be the safer plan since it would create a. most effective deterrent, to war makers and at the same time lift, the consideration of world problems out of the mire of secret diplomacy and sinister recalcitrance, and by dealing openly with all peoples ensure durable peace for the civilised world.