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Timaru Herald, Volume CVI, Issue 16231, 29 March 1917, Page 6

. The British have made further progress east and north-east or I'eronne, where the villages of Longavesnes and Lieramont have been seized by their cavalry. Between the Sonime and Oise, immediately to the southward, the Germans have beeii counterattacking against the French without effect. An early message describes the knob of the St. Gobian hills, strongly defended by the Germans, which is being held by them between the Oise and the Aisne, yet further south. Its disadvantage is that it does not extend all the way to the Aisne, and will be turned by our Allies if they can push their way between its. southern extremity and the river. The Germans have not been able to meet this danger without falling- back, as their communique admits, and as the French capture of three more villages, with the lower part of the Forest of Coucy, bears witness,

The Germans admit the British' occupation of Roisel, east of Perohne, and a little south of Longavesnes, where progress has been at a faster rate in the last few days. The torpedoing, fortunately. with small loss of life, of a British, hospital ship, the .Asttlrias, well marked and illuminated., is also proudly reported by our. enemies. Local successes have been won by the Germans, on the north Russian front, and French in the Salonika theatre. Too late for detailed comment comes a London Teport of rumours in Berlin that Germany has offered ,a separate peace to Russia, up6n terms which would reveal her weakness, without any guarantee that Russian aspirations would be realised. Russia! has duties to her allies, as well as to herself, however, and will fulfil them.

If, as is said to have been admitted by- the Prussian. War' Minister, the German withdrawal in France has been due mainly to insufficiency of guns, the Germans have something more to fear than the new artillery predominance of their opponents. They must fear the issue of a struggle when an infantry, which has always been taught to regard itself as a minor and subordinate arm, is forced to grapple with an ini'ania-y which has been trained as the most important arm. Mr Buchan, in the latest volume of his History of the War, puts this point strongly when he urges that the German Staff's wliole theory of Avar, depending upon battles at long range,' in which they would crush their opponents by superior gun-power, was intrinsically wrong. It could only have succeeded if the whirlwind fury of the first German assault had immediately achieved its object. When the" Allies were given time to make their artillery even equal to the other side's, the German plan became a danger; to the Germans.

Mr Buchan argues cogently that when an army is taught to fight behind the shelter of a machine, the effect must be demoralising. " Men accustomed to a long- range contest will be helpless when the battle conies (o close quarters. How can infantry trained as a secondary arm' stand against infantry which has been taught that on it primarily rests the decision? The quality can never be the same. At first the defect may be met by greater quantity, but as effectives declius quality will come by its own." He thinks that the Battle of Verdun may be taken as the final proof of the fallacy of German tactics, but, as a matter of fact, British, French, and Russians have always proved sunerior to the Germans, whenever they have been able to come to close snips with them. There is a real prospect of close grips, now that the enemv has been forced to leave

his old trenclles on a considerable front and _ is outgunned, and .French critics do not doubt wliat (lie result will be if tlieir infantry can reacli the .Germans. Neither, we can feel sure, do the British and French commanders. They are convinced that "quality .will come by its own."