NEW TACTICS.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15455, 18 September 1914, Page 2

NEW TACTICS.

OX TIJF. .MODERN BATTLEFIELD. HOW THEY EFFECT INFANTRY. AN ANTE-BELLUM PICTURE. Artillery li;is played so e.-iiispicunus ;t p:irt in all recent operations of European arimes :n manoeuvres as well as i.n lintuoli.-lds that a singular de-.usion notes the Paris "Gaulois." has grown up lately respecting present-day tactics. It is taken for granted that infantiy lias been displaced as "tlie k.ng of battle." 'J'here could ho no more egreg.oiis delusion. Artillery, indeed, says thi> military expert who d.seusscs the topic in our militarist comtemporary. remains strangely helpless by itse'.f on the held of battle. It aeeoinplishes nothing independently, a statement ilint cannot he made of cavalry. Those who attach such importance to artillery in modern war. who go so far as to regard it as "'the king of bat.'e." know nothing our authority says. <jf military opeiiitions as. a science. War may. no doubt, bo an "ait"' to the romantic novelist. 'l'-, the soldier it :.-; the most exact of sciences, .and no more convincing truth exists for him than that in real war infantry is supreme. It battle, it is tile infantry which conquers the iiekl which conducts the battle, and in the end decides its destinies. All the revolutions in equipment, every invention in the domain of ordnance, confirm the sovereignty of infantry. NOT LIKE OLD BATTLES. Tactics, have.'indeed, changed. Gone for ever are the solid 7.nes of troops ranged bke a wall, deployed in wings or in battalions, and hurling themselves iipoii an enemy drawn up m like fashion. Nor are modem treops trained to lire in volleys, simultaneously or m any recognised .order. Since the invention of rapid-lire guns of long range the infantry must abandon its "old regularity and prec.sion in the ranks. "Infantry no longer advances along the field of battle m step nor by any conventional organised movement. it seems to wander ain'.essly, in fact, it scatters and dissipates itse'.f in units a much as possible. Tile troops crawl apart alone, the ground. Then "sneak" over and around the undulations of the sod. Infantry nowadays mav be seen separating itse'.f into 'littlo ' bands of men more or less compact, more or le?s separate, who. taking advantage of the si ghtest shelter, disappear all at bnee to allow a shot to pass through their ranks. The men. Hat on their stomachs, their face-; close to the ground, turn their backs perhaps to the shells shrieking in a. storm abovo them. Then, when the ioasL pause oi-curs in the firing, these iii-.-n leap tip for u minute hurl themselves forward not as a body, but individually and independently, in bounds, and begin afresh their bunging of the ground. "The tiro of thrso men is Intermittent and irregular. It-can bo heard but it can not be seen. It breaks out here in a sudden volley that lasts for seconds only. A reply from the enemy, a preparat'oa tor another haphazard bound forward—and that is ail. It is the pr.rt'cular business of the artillery to protect this forward progress and to reduco to silence the batteries of the enemy busily striving to' 1 'impede'"it.' As for the r.'flcs. they aro of no particular usp vet except to help clean up a little «>f the ground just ahead. If they suffice to pick off a few of the enemy's sharpshooters, so much the better. If not. they are not fired icst tiny serve to reveal a fee and to provoke a reply. There will li> tme enough for their use in a little while when tli3 men arc face to fate." HOW THE ATTACK IS MADE. Meanwhile, on the battlefield ploughed Up by projecti.es, littk> serpents are I sp;tt:ng lire. Were w t . nearer thev I would be revealed as of infantry preparing to follow those ahead. In the rear are other groups more or less thick. One wcuid siunect that they are enormous pythons. "Then arr.yvs the. moment when tho fractions <>t the lirst I' nc, unable to advance iiM-ther witliout the support and aid of their weapons, leap up, come together, and form a lino which is ,it up Horn end to end. Those who follow hasten their pace and press close up n.hmd these m front until thev arelost .n the long 1 'ne. The rifle-shots , ring out. Ihe artitferv deafens. The critical moment has arrived. If t| lo men fail to hold firm, if great «nps are torn in their long line and if these gaps be not at once filled up, if a happv counter-attack bo made aood. all \s over—at least for that time. ' Tiiero must b e a retreat, and this retivat is equivalent to an abandonment of that particular effort. INTO THE ZONE OF FIRE.. And now come up the reserves who a< yet have been he'd under shelter. I hey race lonvard. They shoot, down the necessary number of the ejientv and by their timely inU-rvcnt.on restore tonlidence and inilitarv aidour. Their separate tiactions, their rapidlv individualised un.ts. push from the rear iorwanl, impelling tho combatants already in the zone of fire further ahead. Ihe.-e combatants arc already excited [iy the of their object hiuncdiate- '.)' "» front and by their knowledge that the moment for a supreme effort ha<! come. Now the d.n :'s formidable. Ihere is a steady roar of the artillery to create a tempest There is a shriek of exploding projectiles each second. Ihere is a snapping >f rifles, a hiss of bu.lels. Kivrv Mjund Mends with <rerv other to precipitate the pandemouiiuii el hell. The time, has" cuine for sanguinary saerifio-s and for heavv loss i»t lite. Happily this period is the'briefest ol all, for the climax is pre. paring. A last volley from the troops, a .ast rush pell-mell of tho men in a i-r.:wd. a rapid making readv of the layoiiet lor its thrusts, a simultaneous roar Iri.iu the ani'.'iery finding the true if.nge for the smoking pieces, a da'-h ■ I the cavalry from eover emittin.r the iyid yell of victory and the assault is lelivered. The hiavo nun spared l )v [he shot and shell will pant their tat end hag on the -round covered wirl[he eorpo ol the defeated ciiemy. ••Such is the pan played l.v inl'antrv ■ 'ii the held ot battle to-da.v. It i s \ .-mbinat'on or" courage, «f devotion! of indomitable w.l! : but there must !i| v - c .- iv .->-• ho experience and knowledge of :h>» soldier s A r;-gimeinT W e'l cr»ams-.'d. \\c.l disciplined, and well dticeied. which, knowing its "-round an take advantage of its surface mehoilically and with ccolness. will suffer iifinitoly lower losses than one, no less l.rave, but 1.-ss well trained from the tiiiulpo lit 01 military education, which -lioiil.l I.- Ir.gu.y scient.lie. JUnco the >'..',!-(rained regiinnit will face tho o h_ itae.e presented by the euemv with -i mire complete co-operation.''' THE FUNCTION OK ARTILLERY. It will be noted that the artille—in. no other iunctnin that that of ai'ji.j. the iiiliinlry in cveivthiii" Uv jt •■■« artillery dc-pitc : dl rec"nt :n>\> v ; i.e. imm the Halkau war. is ■,!>*,- Hl.-i\ helj.los. -mpoli-lit. useless' \ r . .1.. ry has no ~ihu-.k.klc 01 action'than :"i- lire It neve,- „| ,i,,,i,' .„„, , jt _ ■ell decide-, the late of a battle' l„. aiis- t.i decide that. f; U e two thin-* ir me. >.-;iry wh.ch artilierv 1-i-ks-■i.iiqucr.ii- mobility and the "ca.p-,ci< v o » v.. sbc.-k Its action j.s „ot ,- lu | tv ;i he 1.-s valuab - and indispensable- on be-;.- accounts. Artillerv shatters ob liicle.. i. terror/it overwhelms mm idai. A powerinl a rtijle. v j s ,! lUn

essential. Without ir the best infantry would b.» destroyed <ia the battle-field.. This explains why as its effect grows more destructive its numerical relation to an army increases continually, in the two of the great Napoleon it sufficed to supply three pieces of artillery for every thousand men. To-day tlvs proportion is almost trebled. In the latest of all European wars, the Halkan peoples were wise to sustain their young, sokkers with artillery as numerous as it was formidable. GROUPED IX 'PARKS." We have seen that infantry no longer operates in the old "mass'' forma, tion. Artillery, on the other hand, lias abandoned it., former independence. Jt acts in "mass'" —a great departure from tradition. '•Grouped m the 'park,' artillery concentrates its fire upon, a point to be attacked, either to siienoe tno enemy's batteries or to'overwhelm the menacing infantry. The moment the battle is on, the action of the artillery is twofold. Jt must not only destroy the enemy's position, but also cover its own infantry wall adequate protective fire from the time of tbo first advance of the loot soldiers until the final assault—inclusive. The devotion of the artillery r>u<t be carried to the last limit. It matters little- that it be overwhelmed jself prov.ded that it can protect the nlniltry until they arrive at their destination. . . . Thus the artillery—tht intervention if winch at every stage, of a battle must be incessant—runs very great risks. It possesses, however, a. precious moral advantage. Amid the shower of shot and shell ah-the men are occupied. The. infantryman has his moments of cruel anxiety when, motionless under firo and -waiting the signal to advance, he receives a ball, without being able to reply to it. Tin's terrible test —wh:ch may, if prolonged, prove too severe for the bravest of tho brave —is spared tho artilleryman. He serves his gun, devoting all his time and attention to it. The horror of the actual field of battle he does not experience, and. his m net being on something else, he is not disconcerted by it. That is why panic, spreading at times among the most heroic infantry, so seldom affects tho artillery. Tiie new tactics tend more and moro to throw responsibility upon tho individual soldier in the ranks. The infantry wins tho battle. The artillery protects the advance. The cavalry pursues the. defeated foe that ho may not JuTvk time to form his lines anew "when driven off the field by a-supreme assault, which, the infantry alone can deliver.