THE FORM OF ATTACK.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15449, 11 September 1914, Page 2

THE FORM OF ATTACK.

i THIN OR DENSE LINES P THE GERMAN VIEWPOINT. Repeatedly reference lias boon niado in tin* cabled war new.-; to the ciose-order ta'-tics of the Gorman troop-; when they an- advancing. As was to be expected, it- has been Usual l'or the Allies to meet the heavy onslaughts with troops fairly t-\j»clv placed, but recent news eonlain-' a statement that General .Joffre has advised the adoption ot' more open Urinations. One of the inost-dispiued questions in infantry I actus is the comparative density whieli the attacking line ought to possess. Thin lines were n.sed in the South African War, and also in the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the most expert Gorman opinion is, however. in favour of dense:' linos. l'lii passages which follow are from the text-book on Tactics, by Colonel Balck. of the German army (translated bv Lieutenant Walter Krucger, U.S. a l iny). Cohesion and older are best maintained, ami the least time is lost in action, if efficient. dense lirinjj: lilies are led forward as units up to the moment of opening lire. Unt on open terrain such dense lis-in;; lines would begin to suffer 100 great a hv-s at ranges at which they could not reply to the tire. Nothing remains, then, but to cover the available front with a very tldn living line, followed at irregular distances by thin .skirmish lines which ploy for the pui'i>o.so of utilising cover or for <>ix>ning lire. Skirmish lines of this description will hardly justify the opponent's expenditure of ammunition, as lie can only cover broad spaces with volley t'tre. On the cither hand, these skirmish lines are in theni.seives too weak to laeilitate the approach of the following: echelons by their lire. Besides, it must not be overlooked that the soldier, separated by a considerable interval irom his comrades in line during the advance, and withdrawn from the influence of his officer.-', succumbs more easily to temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to remain behind than th:- skirmisher in a dense firing line. The advance in several .successive, tliin skirmish lines is therefore only an exjiedient. In each case the leaders will have to decide whether, in view of the close proximity of the enemy, a united advance with dense, powerful skirmish lines is possible or advisable (for instance. .when entering at once upon the decisive stage of the action'!. Before opening tire the filing lines must be i sufficiently reinforced.

PI SHING ATTACK HOME. 'lbis advance in thin skirmish lines stood the teot both in the Boer War and in the Russo-Japanese War. but we riiust not forget that thin skirmish lines are only manoeuvre formations in an attack that is to be pushed home, and that the mistake made by the British of attempting to make an attack with such weak skirmish lines .should not be imitated. The .Japanese also used this formation after they had once opened fire with a dense skirmish line. It might lie weli to mention here that, thin and dense skirmish lines. hli -ii under lire, lose an equal number of men in proportion to their strength, provided the front occupied by them is the fame. The superior effect- of fire on the douse skirmish line, as expressed by the greater number of hits, and in consequence thereof by the gradually growing number of figures hit, is apparent. It is worthy of note and at first glance strange that-, presupposing the two lines considered occupy an equal front, the percentage of figures hit is the same. The explanation of this I'es in the fact that in correctly distributed fire any specified front space is equally covered with hits so that it is immaterial for the relative proportion of figures hit whether an equal number of figures is removed or added. While, however, the dense skirmish line still lias 131 effectives, the weaker lino has only G3 left. The casualties are. therefme. far more perceptible in the smaller forceTHE OTHER ARGUMENT. I he "New Zealand Herald" puts the other argument us follows The enormous losses sustained by the Germans through attacks, in close order emphasise., -the lesson learned by the British in the Boer war—that to use close format ion for attacking a modern position is to invite wholesale slaughter. By the end of the Boer war the British used to attack the lines extended to as much ax 20 paces between each man. Successive ,-lines would gradually be pushed up until there was a moderate concentration of men in the firing line t(. make the final rush. European •M'floors never believed that an attack of this sort would bo sufficiently concentrated to succeed in a European battle, and quite a number of English military moir hold the same view. On the other hand no troops will stand m:>re than a certain amount of carnage, and the o.d attack in close formation may *yei prove m> expensive that even Germany may have to modify its methods. '1 here is good reason to behove that the British soldier is more capable of an advance in open formation than many foreigners. It certainly bus never seemed to matter very much to the average Tommy Atkins whether he is one yard or 10 yards, or 2u yards from his neighbour when bullets are flying. It is not so with all men.