THE MACHINE-GUN.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15447, 9 September 1914, Page 3

THE MACHINE-GUN.

WHY GERMANS SUPERIOR. PURELY A MATTER OF TACTICS. GERMAN SYSTEM ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. Ail accounts from the war appear to agree on one point—the super.onty of tho German machine guns. Only one of many references need ee quoted, that by 'The Times" coiT?sp ..tJcut, to the terrible action at Mons: — "Tho German shrapnel was mmkodly bad. "but the machine guns possessed deadly efficacy, and were numerous." It might be supposed Trom this that the Germans possess a better machine gun. but this is not tho fact. The Germans are armed simply with Maxim guns of a rather heavy type, but with mechanism the same ' as t'hat of our Maxims. Tho latest pattern of British Maxim .SUSir.ch weighs 36.b. as compared with the 601b of the original pattern. Tho German Max m for cavalry detachments, weighs 611b, and its carriage llDlb: for infantry detachments, aS.b and carriage 70".b. The lighting carriage is a. sort of s!edge provided with four logs, for lire in tho lrgficst positions. Tne tledges can be dragged across country or carried by men, stretcher fashion, and sometimes ssveral sledges are coupled and drawn by a horse. The British infantry Maxini of the latest type weighs—total weight of lighting equipment---S4lb only. All the later infantry machine gun equipments are for pack transport, and have no shields. The French use the Puteaux and Hotchkiss guns of 501 b and 70il> weight in use. Both s'des carry ma-ch-no guns on motors, but apparently the Germans have perfected their system mere thoroughly. SECTIONS OR SEPARATE UNITS. The essential difference between tho Germans and the Allies as to machine guns lies in the organisation of this formidable weapon of modern warfare. Op.nions in Europe varied a great deal before the war. Sonic arums ensure co-operation of machine guns by making tho machine gun section an integral part cf the infantry reg.mcntal organisation. Among these aro the Br-tish and French armies. Each cavalry regiment and each infantry battalion has a section of two guns under an officer. Other armies ensure co-operatic.ii of the machine gun as an arm by using them absolutely free of infantry control, o;: batter.es. This is what the Germans do. and this is what teems t.v const.tute their admitted superiority w.th the ma. chine gun. The German machine gun tints are civ.ssed as cava.ry ••detachments'' and infantry ''companies'.'-' The. "detachment'' consists of 6 guns and 1 waggons, the vehicles being ' oi a light artillery pattern, drawn by four horses. The "coiupatiies" have a.lso 6 guns and 4 waggons, but the equipment is lighter (two-horse), and the guns are carried on sledges as already described. MAIN PURPOSE O: MACHINEGUNS. The comparison cf the two systems inevitably brings up the question of'the main purpose of machine-guns, which arc considered equivalent in. lire effect to fifty .or s'xty idles a piece and take up the space m the line, equal to that occupied by only two men. and possess by turns v.ic speed of a mounted man and the freedom of movement of an infantry man. The inrichine-gun forms a mob.le reserve of fire. The greatest. difficulty attending the employment of a reserve of any sort is the selection of the right moment for its intervention in the struggle and the experience of manoeuvres of all anus in Germany, where "machine-gun detachments" began to be formed in 1902. appears to have been t'hat the machine guns always came into action too late. On tin other hand, the conditions of cavalry versus cavalry i ombat were more favourable- Here there was every inducement to augment lire-power without dismount'ng wluVe regiments for the purpose. Thus, thanks to niachinegunc. the eternal problem of inereas'iig t'ho lire-power of mounted troops is at last practically solved, and the soltit'on has appealed strongly to arnros exceptionally well armed in eavnlry like the G'eiman army. The principal of difference between the tactics of the stronger and those* of the weaker cavalry in this matter is that it is generallv advantageous for the former to act by batteries and for t'he hitter to dispel so his niaehine-gues irregiilarly by pahs. The Germans are admittedly strongor than the Allies in cavalry, and the t!st> :;f the machine-gun in batteries is obviously of great assistance to them. DIVERGENCE OF DOCTRINE. It is German tactics as a whole that impose the "Lattery'' motlir-d of us ng machine-guns. A German force in action possesses little depth that is, reserves, exceot on the flanks, where the enveloping attack is intended to be made. Consequently a German commander needs a reserve of lire in a mechanical, concentrated from mere than a Brit : sh or a French commander, 4 _and. further, a.--, regards the dccls.vo atraclc on the llanks, it is intended not merely to be sudden, but even more to be powertul and overwhelming. Those considerations tend to hnpc.se bctli the massing and the holding in 10501 ve of machine-guns. The French and British doctrine is fundamentally d.tfercnt. He;e, whether the guns be masked or not, llure is rareiv any question if tis:ng the machine-guns as a special reserve. In the decisive attack, and especially at the culmination of the decisive attack, when concealment has ceased and power is everything, the nnchlno-giiiis can render the greatest service when grouped and b.ldly handled. Above all-, they must reach the captured crest in a few minutes so as to crush the inevitable offensive return of the enemy's reserves. Tile dees! ve attack, moreover, :"s not a. prearranged jilfa'r, as in Germany, but the culmination at a selo.'-i r, d point of gradually increasing pressure relent It sty applied to t'lie enemy at all points- Tito holding attack, as this "pressure" is called, is net a mere feint. It is launched and developed as a decisive attack. though no;- completed as such, as it lacks ibe necessary reserve* strength. Here, then, the machine gnu is best employed in enabling relatively small 'mives to ad van; 1.' —net- to assault without undue lcs\ that is. in ec.iuoink'ng ritle< along the- non-decisive It'out. It may be added t'hat all observers arge-- 1 ami combatants also, as te. the tremendous moral effect produced on the c< nil.atants by tho unni-s----takabl.-.> drumming sound of the machine gun. an effect comparable even at certain stages of the tight to the boom of the artillery itself, SIR. 'JAN HAMILTON'S OPINION. In conclusion, it is an interesting point to note at the present juncture l ine . while in u ir machine guns will freGonnaii critics res;i,'ct I:ig'n!y a,s a si.'.dier. holds v.ews un the employment i.l machine guns dh'ierent from those generally held in Kngland and already oiitl'iied. Sir lan believes in a nio.liii<at.im of the Gorman >y> tern. and wishes to see machine guns combined into brigades and used independently, instead of lie'ng distributed in pairs among the baltahuis as at present—the I'lngl.sh system described previously. He eons'deis thai the present system

is unfavourable to training in peace tmie. while in vrar machine gun will frequently be at places where they are useless. It" they were emp.oyed in masses they might produce vaiauble cifo:t, 'lhis was the fruit of General Hamilton's observations in following the Japanese campaign in -Manchuria, rnd it seems to be borne -out again by the present war.—"Wellington "Evening Post."'