The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1908. THE KING AND POLITICS.

Timaru Herald, Volume XIIC, Issue 13684, 28 August 1908, Page 4

The Timaru Herald FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, 1908. THE KING AND POLITICS.

The Radical* in the House of Commons, who interne! t« direct- , the attention of }'arliamen■' ,to King Edward s peisonal activity -in foreign affairs,, appear, tfl be working in a circle. Before. His Majesty left England on his , recent! visit, .to the Czar >t Reval, they madf strenuous protests against 1110 journey on 'llie ground that friendly intercourse between the two sovereigns was tantamount.- to an. endorse- ■ menfc bv Great Britain of the 'tyrannical system' of government existing" 111 Russia. Qf course it Tfas'" nothing of the fiort. The visit had nothing to do with the internal affairs of Russia, but, as Sir Edward l Grey was careful to explain, il was undertaken for reasons of State at the express desire of his Majesty« constitutional advisers, who accepted: the full rnspoii.sihility for - it. Bui. in spite of this explicit., declaration-by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, -some of the Radical members .continued .to attack the .King s visit, to I'eval, and on his return to England some of -them, of whom Mr Keir Bardie is the most notorious, were omitted from the list of- lactations issued for a, garaen-paitv or some such - function, the Labour Party at. once .resented! this omission as a studied attempt on his Majesty's pari; to intimidate members of Parliament in the exercise of their right of criticism, and l the announcement made this morning of their intension to bring the King s aclivitv in foreign -affairs before the notice of the* House is. no doubt the 'direct outcome of the ( garden-party incident. As we have, shown, the blame, if there is ■Jo ne anv blame, for the visit- to Reval. should fall upon the' shoulders 1 of the Cabinet, rather than upon those of the King, but the .results which have flowed from it? should, warn Ministers and sovereigns alike that a very real danger lurks in the despatch of his Majesty upon international mission's which may be conceived in the best possible intention arid which ni'ay even be carried out ' with happy results to both' countries concerned'. I't was almost: inevitable 'that sooner or later t-h'ero should! ,be trouljle in England over the -personal activity which King Edward—perhaps more in appearance than in reality—has -displayed »n the relations •: of Great Britain with other nations. He has been credited with inita-ting the'sys- ' t-em-'-of.--"ententes." which began with France, and' ,which concluded recently' Willi Russia. , His personal popularity .lias been acclaimed as one of the prime factors in securing the increased esteem in which England has been held! abroad since he came to 'the jhrone and exercised the influence which '"lie is generally cre- , dited.'Viili having exercised. AH t-hiS lie may have done, and vat, while lie was ; doing it. he was sowing the seeds of discord which havo jusb taken root. The danger of • what has • how '.occurred '"fas aptly- expressed'-.--in a. commnniontiop ; add'ressed by Palmerston, to the late Queen ; Victoria, when The found: ib necessary <0 '. assert 4he virtual supremacy ,of Ministers ovrt- the -sovereign. In. disposing of the ■ view that, m regard'- to' military matters . the Crown acts without having any official adviser responsible for its acts, he wrote to tho Queen .Such a. condition of ; things, if ir. could- exist-, would be at variance with the fundamental principles of the British, Constitution, anil' would be fraught, with -danger to the Crown, be- . cause, then the sovereign would be held personally responsible for administrative acts, ■"and would' be brought personally in conflict, in possible casffi with- public moss dangerous condition for a sovereign to be. placed 'in. Tho maxim of the British Constitution -is."thai the sovereign can tin no wrong, but that does not rivwn t iiut 110 wrong can bo done by the Royal authority; it- means that if Hie acc- be done, - the■; public servant who advised the-act, and' not'the sovereign, tnusfc .be .held answerable for .the wrongdoing." This is only possible in the long run if the acts are really the Minister's and! not the King's, so -thati whether the Kjing has voluntarily assumed , an . active share in directing and arranging his - country's, foreign policy, or -whether Ministers have simply used' liirn as. a. superior type of diplomat, the risk fore-" shadowed by Palnierston of ..a .conflict between ttie sovereign and a. section at ileast of public opinion was <1 danger which .ought to have been recognised! and avoided. Many years ago Mr Gladstone expressed the .transformation of Britain's system from Royal to Ministerial government ; afi a "beneficial .substitution of influence for power," an*} for more thaw , a . generation, constitutional; writer.'? 1 have followed Bagsliofi's • familiar .description of . tlie personal functions of the sovereign as the right to, be consulted, the right to encourage, and the -right to warn. Even, this .restricted sphere leaves tlio constitutional monarch room for the exercise of a powerful influence, .especially in securing continuity of policy in foreign affairs. At a time when ho had seen a good' deial of .service in the Cabinet, Mr Gladstone .admitted: that the influence of' the Crown on tlie counsels and, proceedings, of. Ministers was considerable in amonnt, and that- it 'tended to "permanence and Solidity of action, and conferred much benefit' upon' 'the country without in the least degree, relieving- the advisers <)f the Crown ;-|fron». their undivided responsibility." Obviously, howevei 1 , , thei-e is always the chance of a collision of views between the sovereign and l the Minister, which is a serious enough possibility \vithoutadding to It, .''the risk of a- collision between the sovereign and public opinion, a,s has now occurred