The Somaliland Campaign.

Timaru Herald, Volume LXXIX, Issue 12111, 4 July 1903, Page 4 (Supplement)

The Somaliland Campaign.

A BRIEF HISTORY.

•-■-■' Exactly four years ago (says the London "Dairy Mail" of April 24th) the Mullah who has.just caused such .a serums.re- . yefse to.the British troops in Somaliland was first heard of. This is how Consuli: General Sadler wrote from Berbera_ on • April 12th, 1899, to the Marquis of Salismy return from Zeila in the" middle of last month I found conflicting reports current in Berbera concerning the doings of a Mullah, by name Haji Muhammad '" Abdullah, in the Dolbahanta country* who, * WW said, was collecting arms and men with a view to establishing his authority over the.southeastern portion of the protectorate. It-was also freely rumoured that his ultimate object, should he find himself strong enough, was to head a reh- , eious expedition against the Abyssinians. " This Haji Muhammad Abdullah belongs to the Habr Suleiman Ogaden tribe; he ' married into the Dolbahanta Ah Gen, among whom he now lives. His place '*<* residence is Kob Fardod, a village rn.;'*baiited by mullahs, a day's march from Kerrit, and distant about one hundred_and seventy miles from Berbera. He is a man in the prime of life, and in person 'is described as dark-coloured, tall ami.-thai, with a small goat beard. He has made several pilgrimages to Mecca during the last" three years. At Mecca he attached 'himself to the sect of Muhammad Sahli, whose deputy;he claims to be m Somali- " There is no room to doubt but that he is organising a religious expedition antagonistic to the administration." . Such was the man who formed a religious and quasi-national movement, and bade defiance to the authorities in Somaliland. For a number of months nothing was . done by' the British Government, 'and it "was thought the best course would be to ' leave the Mullah alone and to let the movement subside, if it would. It did not : .subside. ■ ~ „ , As the year 1899 wore on the Mullan advanced on Berbera with 1500 men. The Foreign-Office hastily discussed the ergamsation of a force. There was much hesitation and delay, and little was done, even during 1900. Then the Abyssinians attacked, and in a very sanguinary battle at. Jig-Jigga, in the Ogaden country, defeated the Mullah, from whom they had received - much annoyance, single-handed. The fight•Hing, however, threw the Mullah back •against the British authorities, for he again turned his attention to the Berbera .district, and after the whole colony had been in a state of uneasiness for a long period it was decided to start with a > strong expedition in 1901. Colonel Swayne took command. One or two sharp skir- : mishes took place, but owing to the British force not being sufficiently strong, and apparently not having real backing from the Foreign Office, an opportunity was lost of inflicting a crushing blow, for ultimately the Mullah got away south across the Haud (June, 1901). This brought events up to the end of December, 1901, at which period the Mul- " lah again resumed offensive operations against the friendly British tribes in So- ' maliland. Colonel" Swayne accordingly reorganised his forces locally, and after a slow advance throughout, the whole of the year, fought a severe engagement in October last with the Mullah at Erego, near ''. Galkayu. Unquestionably this was a British surprise for Colonel Swayne lost two officers killed and two wounded, fifty men ; killed and over a hundred wounded. This '-'. encounter caused Coloney Swayne to fall back to Bohotle, and the Foreign Office, ; seeing that the campaign could no longer •'. be run "on the cheap," as it had hitherto .been, resolved to fit out a force which ; -would adequately cope with any opposition. ':'.' which might be forthcoming, and which, it ; was hoped, would dispose of the Mullah •V once and for all. Troops were transported '" from' India, the local levies which had proved so unsatisfactory were disbanded, ; and trained native regiments were brought up from Central Africa. The situation before General Manning advanced was succinctly 6ummed up in a "" memorandum drawn (up in Rome between the Italian and British authorities. This reviewed the situation and came tq the conclusion that an exclusively defensive scheme against the Mullah must almost inevitably have serious results in the future both for the Italian and British Governments. The report continued : " The situation in Somaliland is closely analogous to that which existed in the Soudan after the establishment of the influence of the Mahdi. His Majesty's Government then tried for ■ many rears" a defensive policy, which led to so "great air increase of the Mahdi's power that a series of campaigns on a large scale had to be undertaken before he was finally crushed. The Mullah is undoubtedly following in'the Mahdi's foothe has already conceived large designs of absorbing all "Somaliland, and eventually' building up an empire in NorthEast Africa. Politically, therefore, immediate action seems necessary, „and while . it is impossible to eliminate every unfavourable chance, the plan submitted (which was the present campaign) appears to the military advisers of His Majesty's Government to offer the minimum risk, having regard to all the circumstances of the-case." A great secret of the Mullah's strength i» his mobility. He can travel at about a hundred miles a day in case of need. His followers are inspirited by his unquestion- . able successes in recent times, and they are very well armed. He can count five to ten thousand men armed with rifles—oil secretly and illicitly imported into the country—and about 20,000 men prowded with spears only. The country is aa in his favour—water-is scanty, and the land is mostly sterile in the extreme. To deserts of rock and sand succeed the densest mimosa bush and scrub, where—as for instance at lrego—the jungle growth is so high that one can hardly see his neighbour. ' Food is scanty, and the sun as a rule /burns witV pitiless force. Then, too, the Somali's, though physically less powerful than the Dervishes, whose methods of fighting they somewhat favour, are born warriors, and by no means despicable foes. They are "absolutely without fear of death. They are quite accustomed to face rifle fire, and .in previous campaigns have never wavered before Maxims and rifles. On every possible occasion they have attempted to storm the British zareba, and in some cases they ' succeeded in partially breaking the lines, but never with much success. They shoot fairly well, but as a rule rather high, and this alone on previous occasions hae saved the British force from heavy loss. They use their spears both for throwing and stabbing purposes, and in addition occasionally employ stones and wooden clubs. They show greater cleverness in ambushe* and earthworks than did the Dervishes. No quarter is ever given by them in fighting/'nor is any ever expected by the troops who face them. The wounded are always ■nassacred, and, as a rule, mutilated. There is no doubt that the Mullah was at an early date thoroughly warned" of the present British plan of campaign, which, - by arrangement with Italy, is being con-

ducted on what is nominally Italian Jemtory/ inasmuch' as the enemy have [been accustomed to make the inaccessible hinterland their headquarters arid then to descend in raids into the Biitish sphere. Accoidinglv the Mullah steadily fell back before the "Biitish advance, apparently ju»t asi lust year, waiting to strike a blow, and this lie has at last done. ' ' . The outlook for the future is, of-course, undecided. It is an expensive campaign, and, as Mr Balfour once lemaiked at the Mansion House, is costing us far rnoie m money and men than the Venezuelan aflair j Even if the operations aie continued it is difficult to see what can happen unless bv some fortuitous circumstance it should be possible to capture ; -the Mullah. He is not likely to take ithe offensive, and one talk "of ''smashing* him is not supported bv those who know the country. On- the other hand,- the Mullah has started , a religious movement tlie end of which is.'diffieult to foresee, -and liis'"present victory is likelv to increase his prestige among the tribe's, and to facilitate the extensive importation of arms which is still being_ carried on: He has. at any rate, conclusively demonstrated the falsity Of the strange em-: thet of "mad" which was applied to him : much earlier in his campaign against the British.. His military tactics are admitted by those who have, come in contact iVith' them to be eminently astute, while as an organiser lie has proved his ability by •establishing his rule over vast, tracts of - country. ~,.,-.. ■-,. ~:', - ■' - : " :