The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1903.

Timaru Herald, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 12022, 23 March 1903, Page 2

The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, MARCH 23, 1903.

Tha " Spectator " has taken the Admiralty to task for its alleged policy towards the colonies in connection with, the question of naval defence. One of our London cablegrams this morning refers to our contemporary's article, and gives the following short extract: —" The Admiralty's policy regarding the colonies is radically bad. British statesmen grumble because the colonies are apathetic, yet they will not allow the colonies to make a contribution towards naval preparations which they are willing- to make. If the statesmen ceased dinning into the ears of the colonies that only cash contributions are worth having, and that contributions in kind are worthless, they would soon find the colonies raising naval reserves from their seafaring populations, and -equippingsmall local squadrons." Those three sentences apparently constitute the key-note of the " Spectator's " article, but the situation is not fairly stated, and there is exaggeration, to say the least of it, in the assertion that.British statesmen are "dinning into the ears of the colonies" any policy with regard to naval defence. Suggestions on the subject Jthere certainly have been, and they have not been uncalled for considering the attitude of the colonies, but especially of the Australian Commonwealth towards the question of naval defence. Let us first say a 'few j words about the 11 Spectator's" assertion ! that if British statesmen would accept " contributions in kind " small local squadrons would soon be equipped. What is meant by local squadrons 1 We believe i that the " Spectator" means war ships owned by the several colonies, or by the Australian Commonwealth, and officered and manned by persons in the pay and subject to the instructions of the respective colonial authorities.- Such ships would <pot form a portion, of the Royal Navy, though', intended to contribute to Imperial naval defence. But it would be Imperial only in a limited sense. To defend Australia by an Australian Navy stationed in local waters would be an Imperial proceeding in as much as Australia is a portion of the British Empire; but the Admiralty, as representing the unanimous opinion of the naval experts, does not '■ favour the separate safeguarding ,of the various ljnits of which the Empire is made up. The experts base their judgment on a good deal more than theory. They can refer confidently to British history, and .they can show that it would have been impossible to do the magnificent work which was done by the British Navy in the latter part of the 18th century and (he early part of the 19th, if each unit had been separately defended. One of the great secrets of British naval success in war-time has lain in the fact that the Royal Navy has been under one supreme head and has been guided by a central and Imperial policy which embraced all the units and gave the best, and indeed the only true guarantee of their individual safety. The introduction of steam as the great motive power has modified, perhaps, we may almost say revolutionised, naval tactics, but has left naval strategy pretty much where it was in Nelson's day. There it is likely to remain, and cannot be tampered with because the Australian Commonwealth or any other outlying portion of the Empire has a hankering after a local navy. If the time comes when a British Admiral has to fight a battle for British supremacy in the Pacific, either North »r South, of what benefit to him would be squadrons belonging to Australia or New Zealand, tied down to remaining in local waters, the enemy perhaps being a thousand miles away? But apart from that difficulty there is the question of control. If the local ships were allowed to leave the coasts which they were specially designed to defend, would the local Governments abandon the control of their movements to a British Admiral acting, to the best of his judgment, so as to carry out the general naval policy dictated by his superiors at Home? We cannot say that we are very hopeful on the subject. At the best, the assistance of the local squadrons would be obtained only after negotiations, in each case, with those who owned the ships and paid the men. A state of affairs would bs created differing widely from the control exercised by the Admiral and tha Imperial authorities over the Royal Navy: It ought not to be expected that British statesmen should countenance a system which, however much it might minister to the pride of the colonies possessing navies, would inevitably have a highly deleterious effect upon the true strength of Imperial naval defence. Even what is known as the Australian squadron is, in our judgment, a weak concession to false colonial sentiment, although the ships form a portion of the Royal Navy and the officers and men are members of the Imperial naval service, and are precisely on ths same footing as officers and men not serving in the Australian squadron. There is the mischievous proviso that the move- , mants of the squadron shall be confined to Australasian waters, a limitation which way b» th# causa of trouble in the future, a*d Might »Ton lead to disaster. As for what tho "Spsctator" says about naval resarvM, it ia a. mistaks to suppose that the Admiralty, or any British statesmen, or naval experts, are hostile to their formation. Such organisations would be welcomed by all who take an interest in the subject of Imperial naval defence. But there are great difficulties to be overcome in determining the basis on which such reserves shall rest. There are questions of pay, and of control, and of length of service, etc. These matters cannot be ar- - ranged off-hand ; but far from being hostile, British statesmen would be well pleased if a satisfactory arrangement, could be arrived at.