THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Thames Advertiser, Volume IX, Issue 2467, 10 November 1876, Page 3

THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

. {From the IWd.) At a time when European complications threaten, and whilst the policy of tho British and Russian Governments appears to be utterly divergent, a short reviow of tho present condition of tho Russian army cannot fail to have ail abnormal interest. But when we speak of the present state of tho Russian forces wc must remember that the organisation of the army of the great Northern Power is being remodelled, and thatconstant andimportantchanges are being made, all tending to a considerable augmentation. Moreover, the actual cadres

which are here given represent the army of two years ago, as there is no authentic record which will enable us to follow the constant additions that are being effected But before entering upon the actual details of organisation, it may not be uninteresting to consider the general national type and characteristics of tho Russian soldier. Whether as a consequence of a system of serfdom or from intrinsic habits of obedience, there can be no doubt that the Russian army is the most romarkable in Europe for that high military quality whioh the Germans have designated as fire discipline—a stern, passive, obstinate obedience that ignores disaster and defeat in actual battle. The great military genius of the first Napoleon was usually shown in the completeness of his victories; but, although almost invariably successful in his battles with Russian armies, he could never produce those annihilating defeats and routs that he was accustomed to deal upon Austrian and Prussian troops. As this peculiarity has marked the Russian army at every period, ne must look for some national characteristic to account for it, as there is nothing special in the disciplinary system that could create so marked a distinclion between her army and those of her neighbours. Russian officers attribute this passive courage mainly to the pre-esistence of serfdom, and profess to believe that its abolition must have a seriously injurious effect upon the morale of the army. But so important a change as the liberation of the serfs was sure to produce soreness amongst the higher classes of autocratic Russia; and we must accept with some caution the judgment of such prejudiced authorities. Certainly there is nothing in the conduct and appearance of the young Russian soldier that would seem to warrant the supposition.

But if the Russian army stands pre-emi-nent in Europe for the valuable qualities of obstinacy and endurance, it still seems to lack that special element which leads to victory. Indeed nothing can be more striking in a study of Russian military history than to find how little result the dogged bravery of her soldiers has produced when she has been pitted against the other great armies of Europe. Whether we look to the times of Frederick the Great, the first Napoleon, or to the wars of later years, when we were ourselves arrayed against her, wc find that samo slowness in her military arrangements in the field which has deprived her of the solid results, in the shape of victory, which should have accrued from the undoubted bravery and devotion of her army. Even when opposed single-handed to the Turks in 1829, it

took two campaigns before the Russian

generals could reach the neighbourhood of Constantinople, although mainly contending with Turkish irregulars.

That faulty generalship has had a large share in this peculiarity there can bo littlo doubt; but the defect runs through all ranks, and we seek in rain for that mili-

tary brilliancy which has marked both the French and German armies in the successful periods of their respective careers,

Eussia herself seems to be awaro of this want in her military character, and she has

lately been urging forward the education of her staff in order to counteract it; but those who have had good opportunities of judging believe that the want would still be as apparent as of old if opposed to the highly-trained armies of modern days. Eussia has not been behindhand in the great race of military improvement which has been so general in Europe in later years, and she is now spending more money upon her army than any Power of the Con-

tinent, if we except the large sums that France is devoting to theremantlingofher fortresses. For Eussia has adopted tho compulsory system of Gormany, and her large population wiill tend to make that system in time especially formidable.

Military service is obligatory in the twen.

tietli year, and 110 less than 700,000 youths annually attain tlie prescribed age, And Eussia has gone ahead of Germany in the military claim that the State lays upon the people; for every man is subject to military service for twenty years, viz., six years in the ranks, nine in the reserve, andfiveintheOpolchengi orsecond reserve, Of the large number of young men who annually attain the proscribed age 420,000 are found available for military service. At first only about 150,000 really passed into the army, but the six years of active service was found to press so heavily that it is being reduced. The effect will only be to pass more men through the ranks, and to increase in the course of time the formidable numbers of the .Russian army, Any calculation founded upon a system that is constantly changing must evidently be uncertain, and as the new Eussian system has only been recently introduced, it must take eighteen more years to give it a full development, But there can be no boubt that, unless political difficulties should call for its action before its organisation.is completed, the Eussian army will become the most terrible embodiment of military power that the world has ever seen. The cadres before the new system was carried out were by no means adequate for the large number of trained men that will be produced, and fresh cadres are being added. Eussia bad then a field army of 612 battalions, 56 regiments of cavalry, 1400 field guns, and 400 mitrailleuses. This did not include her reserve battalions, garrison battalions, and frontier forces, which number 56 squadrons, 153 battalions, and 16 batteries in addition. Nor does thia include the large number of Cossacks and irregulars who are employed iu maintaining the extended Eussiau frontier, and are computed at over 400,000 mountod men, And we must not imagine that the Cossack is a mere wild irregular horseman, for many of these frontier Cossacks are amongst the finest and bestdisciplined men in tho Eussian aorvico. They do all the orderly work both for the civil and military officers, who supervise with such marvellous precision the immense and stertile territory which owns tho Eussian sway. They are planted in largo aud growing colonies all along her extended frontier, and thus military ideas aud habits are nurtured from their earliest youth. Noar the old Circassian boundary their services have become almost a dead letter, and Eussian officers complain that the specialty for the performance of outpost work, which resulted from constant practice and incessant watchfulness, is passing away in the new generation. In fact, tho organisation of this mass of irregulars is one of themost serious questions now occupying tho attention of the Eussian staff; for it is felt that they may become a cumbrous body of iudifferout

cavalry, instead of the active and useful horsemen that have been of such great service in tho past military history of the country.

■Russia is faking successful Germany as her groat model in tlio new organisation; but a military system is not built up in a day or two, and Russia, liko France, requires time. The difficulties which existed in introducing obligatory service over widely extended, and in many instances recently conquered, dominions have been surmounted with great judgment and considerable success.

But there is a political, danger, which though now but a small and distant cloudi is felt by deeply thinking liussian officers. Will Germany, with her military force completely organised, quietly tolerate the growth of a force that must, from its numbers, be overwhelming when developed P All the near domestic ties of the two Courts, and the apparent friendship between the two Sovereigns, will probably prove of no avail when national instincts of safety make themselves felt. Nor do the present complications in the Eaßt promise that long period of peace which the Russian army requires to bring it to formidable maturity. It has been urged that this is one of the great safeguards that the quiet of Europe will not be seriously disturbed; but political difficulties have a persistent habit of refusing to be controlled.

Russia has long planned and carefully matured the Eastern complication, which is some day to end in the discomfiture of the Turk and a Russian occupation of Constantinople. But it is just possible that the difficulties which she has so persistently tended may come upon her before her great military growth is equal to the occasion, and thus be the means of checking a Power whose restless ambition and mania for territorial aggrandisement is a constant menace to the peaco of the world.