ALLIED BLUNDERS IN THE WAR.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 16895, 17 November 1920, Page 3

ALLIED BLUNDERS IN THE WAR.

LACK OF GENERAL RESERVE-

Very frank criticism of Allied war policy and methods of command is contained in an article, “At the Supreme War Council,” in the September Blackwood’s, by Captain iPeter Wright, late Assistant Secretary. Supreme War Council. Captain Wright maintains that “for a period that can almost be called of years the British were at least seven to four to the Germans on the Western front, and almost double in material.” At the end of 1917: Britain and France alone were, and had been for two years, numerically stronger than Germany . . How much more, and how crushing, had their numerical superiority been when more than 120 Russian and Roumanian divisions were fighting on their side. Yet they had failed to, win the war. This failure, Captain Wright attributes to the lack of unity, both of command and plan, of the Allies. Upon Sir William Robertson he is specially severe. “This plan, and ho had no other, was to raise more and more men. If the two sides were allowed to go o'n killing each other in France indefinitely, when-all the Germans were dead there would still be a few Allies left, and they would win the war.” But at the end of 1917 Gorman divisions were pouring from the east to the western front. Germany might be counted on to fling them against the weakest point in the Allied line, and that pressure might be sufficient to inflict disaster upon the Allies before sufficient help could be brought up from other parts of the front. Hence, • says . Captain Wright, the scheme of a general reserve, to be formed from the armies of the West and to be placed under the control of the Executive War Board—Foch, Wilson, Bliss, Cadorna. This plan was elaborated after Caporetto by Foch and Wilson.

It gave each Commander-in-Chief the * advantages of a Generalissimo. The general reserve was a banking account on which each could draw if he were attacked; his drafts would be fixed by the War Board according to their judgment. On the other hand, ho had none of the disadvantages of a Generalissimo. No Commander-in-Chief could suspect his forces were.being exploited tor the benefit of an Ally’s forces, for each nation had its representative on the War Board. Foch, says Captain Wright, foresaw that the German blow must fall either towards Cambrai or towards Reims. His plan was to concentrate the larger part of his general reserve round Paris ready to be flung in on the flank of the German attack, whether it were towards Amiens or towards Eeims; for “the more successful the German’s attack la, the longer and therefore the more open and unguarded his flank will be.’’ DIVERGENT PLANS. But the general reserve was never foimed. Why? Because, says Captain Wright, Haig and Petain met \at the end of February and formed a plan which was-wholly inconsistent with and destructive of the plan of the general reserve This plan of the British and French Commanders-in-Chief was unknown to Foch. That Is Captain Wright’s belief.

The immediaco consequence was that thq general reserve vanished, for the Italians at once withdrew their assent. Captain Wright does not blame Sir Douglas Haig—his refusal “was natural, for he could not undertake the double liability of taking over more French line (as far south as Barisis) and feeding the general reserve as wellßut the defeat of Gough’s army in March - at once became inevitable if the Germans should attack him.

From the first week of March, when the plan of the 'general reserve was abandoned, Gough’s Army was doomed. During the fortnight that preceded the battle no one on the immediate staff of Foch had a.ny doubt that a catastrophe was inevitable. It came. Reinforcements, which would have been speedily available if the major part of the general reserve had been concentrated as Foch had planned, could not be brought up in time.- And then, in the very midst, ofdisaster after the British had sustained what Captain Wright describes as “the greatest defeat we have over suffered in’our history, measured by any standard,” Foch was at last given hi» chance.

He was only appointed towards the middle of the day on Tuesday. But at a quarter to 5, a few hours' after his appointment, he managed to get tthrough to Debency on the telephone. Ho now had authority to command. He at once ordered him to take all his troops out of the line farther south on a front of six miles, risk leaving a gap there, and send them up in front of Amiens. Against these, on the Wednesday, the last effort of the spent German wave broke itself.

So Foch, as soon as he was given a chance, found in himself at once . the means of retrieving the faults and errors of other leaders, and so saved them, but only just, on the edge of ruin.