SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 16115, 25 April 1918, Page 5

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

ON THE CAM BRA I BATTL& THE RETIREMENT EXPLAINED. Sir Douglas Haig, in a despatch issued from tho War Office on March 4, explains the aims of tho Oambrai battle in November last. He describes the icmarkable initial successes of the tanks and how the collapse of tho Masnioros Bridge over tho Scheldt affected the advance. He dwells on tho reasons for his decision to go on with the attack in order to gam the Bourlon Ridge, tho continued possession of which, ho said, would have opened up tho prospect of taking all the enemy's positions m reverse as far north as the Scarpe; and he lays emphasis on the limited forces at his disposal, some of whom wore “far from being fully trained.” In his account of tho German break through on the right of the battle front, he states that our forces there had been warned of an attack, but that tho enemy effected a local surprise. THE DESPATCH. Sir Douglas Haig, after discussing tho pros and ecus of tiie attack, proceeds: “If, after breaking through the German defence systems on the front we could secure Bourlon to the north and establish a good flank position to the east in tho direction of Oambrai, we should be well placed to exploit the situation locally between Bourlon and tho Scnseo River and to the north-west. Tire capture of Oambrai itself was subsidiary to this operation, the object of our advance towards that town being primarily to cover our flank and puzzle tiie enemy regarding our intentions.” It was calculated that, provided secrecy could bo maintained to the last moment, no large hostile reinforcements ■were likely to reaen the scone of action for 43 hours after tho beginning of the attack. Tho general plan of attack was that, the infantry, tan its, and artillery were to endeavour to break through nil the. enemy’s lines of defence on fh© first nay, and if this developed favourably the cavalry were to bo. passed through to raid the enemy’s communications, disorganise his system of command, damage his railways, and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of his reinforcements. Tiie plans were secretly communicated to the Commandor-in-Ghief of tho French Armies, who readily promised every assistance. SINGLE GERMAN’S STAND. At 6.30 a.m. on November 30 tanka and infantry attacked on a front of about six miles from east of Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord, opposite Bermies, and there wore gas, smoko, and artillery demonstrations on other parts >of tho British front. The tanks crushed down tlib enemy’s wire,..forming groat lanes through which our Infantry could pass; Protected by smoko, barrages from the view of the enemy’s artillery, they rolled on. Both the main system of Hie Hindenburg lino and its outer defences were rapidly overrun and tanks and infantry proceeded, in accordance with programme, to the attack on the Hindenburg reserve line. At Flesquieres Hill a number of tanks were knocked out by direct hits from Genran field batteries in position beyond the crest. "Many of tho hits upon our tanks at FLesq meres,” says the despatch, “were obtained by a Gorman artillery officer who remaining alone at his batery, served a field gun single-handed until killed at his gun. The great bravery of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks.” By 10.30 a.m. tho general advance beyond the Hindenburg Reserve line to our final objectives had begun and cavalry were moving up behind our infantry.

“At tho end of the first day of the attack three Gorman systems of defence had been broken through to a depth of some four and a half miles on a vide front, and over 5000 prisoners had already been brought in. But for the wrecking of tho bridge as Masnieres and the check at Flesquieres still greater results might have been attained. “Throughout these operations the value of the services rendered by the tanks was very groat, and the utmost gallantry, enterprise, and resolution were displayed by both officers and crews. Great credit is due to the Flying Corps for very gallant work under conditions of the greatest difficulty from low clouds and driving mist. “The 48 hours after which it had been calculated that the enemy’s reserves would begin to arrive,” says Sir Douglas, “had in effect expired, and the high ground at Bourlon village and wood, as well as certain important taetical features to the east and west of the wood, still remained in tho enemy’s possession. It now became necessary to decide whether to continue the operation offensively or to take up a defensive attitude and rest content with what had been attained. “It was not possible, however! to let matters stand as they were. The positions captured by us north of Flesnuioros wore completely commanded by the Bourlon Ridge, and unless this ridge wore gained it would be impossible to hold them except at excessive,cost. If I decided not to go on, a withdrawal to the Flesquieres Ridge would be necessary. and would have to be carried out at once.”. BOURLON WOOD'S IMPORTANCE. “On the other hand, the enemy, showed certain signs of an intention Id withdraw. The possession ol Bourlon Ridge would enable our troops to obtain observation over the ground to the north, which sloped gently down to the Sensee River. The enemy’s defensive lines south of the iScarpe and Sensee Rivers would thereby be turned, his communications exposed* to the observed fire of our artillery, and his position in' this sector jeopardised. In short, so great was the importance of the ridge to tho enemy that its loss would probably cause the abandonment by the Germans of their carefully prepared defence systems for a considerable distance ti, tho north of it. “The successive days of constant, marching and fighting had placed a very severe strain upon .the endurance of the troops, and before a further advance could bo undertaken some time would have to ho spent in resting and relieving them.” “Two divisions previously under orders for Italy had on this day been placed at my disposal, and with this accession of strength tho prospect of securing Bourlon seemed good. After weighing these various considerations I

derided to continue the operations to gain rho Hourlon position.” ■‘At 10.30 a.m. on November 22 the 40th Division captured the whole of the rvood and entered Bourlon Village. Here hostile counter-attack prevented our further progress. This struggle for Bourlon resulted in several days of fiercely contested fighting. On the afternoon of the 24th the whole of Bourlon Village was taken, but on the evening of the 25th it was lost again to us. The- continual fighting and tho strength of the enemy’s attacks had told heavily on the 40th ■Division, which had borne the brunt of tho struggle, and it was accordingly withdrawn. After five days of constant fighting we. held a.’ strong position on tho Bonrlon Hill and in the wood, but had not yet succeeded in gaining all the ground required for tho security of this important feature.

GERMAN SURPRISE. During the last days of November there were indications of further efforts to be made by the enemy to regain tho positions we had wrested from him. Measures were taken to prepare for eventualities, and to relieve tho troops holding tho Bourlon position by such fresh divisions as were available. “I felt confidant that the defence of the Bourlon sector could be considered secure,” says Sir Douglas. ‘‘Covering our right flank from Oantaing to the Banteaux Ravine, a distance of about 16.000 yards, five British divisions were disposed, and though these had been fighting for several days and were consequently tired, I felt confident that they would prove equal to stopping any attack the enemy could make on them. From the Banteux Eiavine sbutlnvard the division in lino were weak and held very extended fronts, but our defences there were stronger, having been held for several' months. ' “In view of the symptoms of activity observed on the enemy's front, special precautions were taken by local commanders, especially from Villcrs. Guislain to tho south. .Troops were warned to expect attack, additional machine guns were placed to secure supporting points, and divisional reserves were close up. (Special patrols were also sent out to watch for signs of any hostile advance. “Between the hours of 7 and 8 a.m. on tho last day of November the enemy attacked, after a short but intense artillery preparation. “At tho northern end of tho Bona vis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which tho advance of the enemy’s infantry followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed ,our troops, both in line and in immediate support, almost'before they had realised that the attack had begun. "No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the many deep folds and hollows typical of a chalk formation, and shielded from observation from the air by an early morning .mist. Only when tho attack was upon them great numbers of low-flying German aeroplanes rained machine-gun fire upon our infantry, while an extensive use of smoko shell and bombs made it extremely difficult for our-troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battlefield or to follow the movements of the enemy. “In short, there is little doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in these areas of the battle at the moment of delivery the assault effected a local surprise.

OUR DEFENCES OVER-RUN. “None the less, stubborn resistance was offered during tho morning by isolated parties of our troops and by ma-chine-gun detachments. “Taken in flank and rear, tho defences of Villors-Guislain, Gonnolieu, and Bonavis were rapidly over-run. Gouzeancourt was captured about 9 a.m., the outer defences of La Vaeqncrie were reached, and a number of guns which had been brought up close to the lino in order to enable them to cover the battle-front about Masnicroa and Marcoing fell into tho hands of tho enemy. “About midday the Guards came into action west iof Gouzeancourt, while cavalry moved up to close the gap on their right and made progress towards Villers-Guislain from the south and south-west. The attack of the Gxiards, which was delivered with the greatest gallantry and resolution, drove the enemy out of Gouzeancourt and made progress on tho high' ground known as tho St. Quentin Ridge, cast of the village. “In the northern area, from Fon-taino-Notre-Dame to Tadpole Copse, the German attack was not launched until some two hours later. Five principal attacks were made in this area, and on one portion of the attack as many as eleven waves of Gorman infantry advanced successively to the assault. ENORMOUS GERMAN LOSSES. In this fighting the _47th (London) Division (T.), the 2nd Division, and the 56th (London) Division .(T.) greatly distinguished themselves! and there were accomplished many deeds of groat heroism. “All accounts go to show that tho enemy’s losses in tho whole of his constantly repeated attacks on this sector of the battle-front were enormous. Ono battalion of eight machine-guns fired

70,000 rounds of ammunition into tho ten successive waves of Gormans. Long lines of attacking infantry wore caught by our machine-gun fire in enfilade, and were shot down in lino as they advanced. Great execution also was done by our field artillery, and in the course of the battle guns were brought up to the crest line and fired direct upon tho enemy at short range. “The greatest credit is duo to the troops at Masniores, Bourlon, and Moeuvrcs for the very gallant service performed by them on this day. But for their steady courage and staunchness in defence, tho success gained by tho enemy on the right of our battlefront might have had serious consequences. WHY WE FELL BACK. “The strength which the enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks made it evident that only , by prolonged and severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right flank on tho Bonavis Eidgo. Unless this was done, the situation of my troops in the salient north of Flesquieres would he difficult and dangerous, even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended. I had therefore to decide either to embark on another offensive battle on a largo scale or to withdraw to a. more compact lino on tho Flesquieres Eidge. “Although this decision involved giving up important positions most gallantly won, L had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions. Accordingly, on the night of December 4-5 ihe evacuation of tho positions held by us north of tho Flesquieres Eidgo was commenced. Much skill and courage wore shown by our covering troops in this withdrawal. ' “Tho material results of tho three weeks’ fighting described above can ho stated in general terms very shortly. We had captured and retained in our possession over 12,00)0 yards of tho former German front line from La Vacfjuerio to a point opposite Boursies, together with between 10,000 and 11,000 yards of the Hindenburg Line and Hindcnburg Eeservo Line and tho villages of Eibecourt, Flesquieres, and Havrincourt. A total of 145 German guns were taken or destroyed by us in tho course of the operations, and 11,100 German prisoners were captured. Oh the other hand, tho enemy had occupied an unimportant section of our front line'between Vcndhuilic and Gonnelicu.” * “NEAR TO SUCCESS * Sir Dougins Haig concludes: “I am of opinion that on November 20 and 21 we went very near to a success sufficiently complete to bring the realisation of our full programme within our power. “Tho reasons for my decision to continue tho fight after November 21 have already been explained. Though in the event no advantage was gained thereby, 1 still consider that, as tho problem presented itself at the time, the more cautious course would have been difficult to justify. It must bo remembered that it was not a question of remaining where we stood but of abandoning tactical positions of value, gained with great gallantry, the retention of which seemed not only to be within our power, but likely even yet to lead to further success.' “On November 30 risks were accepted by us at some points in order to increase our strength at others. Our fresh reserves had been thrown in on the Bourlon front, where the enemy brought against us a total force of seven divisions to three and faded. I do not consider that it would have been justifiable on the indications to have allotted a smaller garrison to this front.

“Between Masnieros and Vcndhuilic the enemy’s superiority in infantry over our divisions in line was in the proportion of about four to throe, and wo were sufficiently provided with artillery. Tiiat his attack was partially successful may tend to show' that the garrison allotted to this front was insufficient, either owing to want of numbers, lack of training, or exhaustion from previous fighting. “Captured mans and orders have made it clear that the enemy aimed at far more considerable results than were actually achieved by him. Three convergent attacks wore to be made on the salient formed by our advance; two of them delivered approximately simultaneously about Gonnclieu and Masnieros. followed later by a still more powerful attack on the Bourlon front. The objects of these attacks extended to the high ground at Beaucamp and Trescault, and the enemy’s hope was to capture and destroy the whole of the British forces in the Camhrai salient. “This bold and ambitious plan was foiled on the greater part of our front by the splendid defen.ee of the British divisions engaged; and though the defence broke down for a time fn one area, the recovery made by the weak forces still left and those" within immediate reach is worthy - of the highest praise. “I desire to acknowledge the skill and resource displayed uy General Byng throughout the Cambrai operations.”