ITALIAN SITUATION.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 16050, 7 February 1918, Page 5

ITALIAN SITUATION.

CAUSES OF DISASTER. LED TO RUIN BY BLIND. CONFIDENCE. An, article entitled : “Cause and Effent of Italian Disasters,” appeared in M. '. Clameaceau’s Parisian paper, f'L’Hommo Enchaine,” on November £3. It waa signed “XXX.” The writer said: . “Without touching the question of treason —always an easy, but often short-sighted, explanation of disasterlet us consider the military aspect of the Italian situation. To begin with, the principal error of the Italian high command —-alcne sufficient to bring about the catastrophe—was the faulty disposition of its armies. The Second Army, after crossing the Isonzo, was drawn up facing northward on the high mountains of Mali, Monte Nero, and Vrich, wntliout having. reached the meets, which wore still in possession of the enemy. The Third Array, on the other hand, had conquered the crests and held Cucco, Monte Santo, and Vodice. It faced eastward, and had advanced across the Bainsizza Plateau toward Laibach. But between these two armies the Austrians held a.whole sector which formed from Tolraino to Santa Lucia a kind of outpost separating the Italian forces. “Military critics had already drawn attention to the danger of this situation, and pointed out that the strategic arrangements of both Italian armies might be thrown into confusion by tbo enemy if the latter, holding the intermediate high ground, should decide to attack on both sides with sufficient forces. Thar, is precisely what happened when tbo Germans were able to transfer part of their troops from Russia to the Italian Alps. ERRORS DUE TO BLIND OPTIMISM. “The second error; Behind these armies, drawn up iu go perilous a position, ibero wore at least reserves ready in case of a surprise. In May, 1916, in the course of the Austrian offensive in +bc Trcntino, General Oadorna bad profited bv a moment of respite to constitute the Fifth Army a reserve. It was the intervention of this force at the critical moment that forced the enemy to retreat. For reasons that we are unalde to understand, this Fifth Army was dissolved one fine day. Not that mao-power was wanting; it was and still is plentiful in Italy. The reserves of man-power were numerous enough to furnish othsr armies as well. But the Italian Generalissimo has always seemed unwilling to keep them rear the front. So, when need came, thev could not intervene, and thus tho rout of tho Second Army, followed by tho beating up and precipitate retreat of the Third carried everything away. “This error is connected with .several others, all of which are to be explained by blind confidence in tho splidity ofthe conquests made. Otherwise, what excuse is there for tho mistake of massing all the main supply depots at so short a distance from the front, between Isonzo and the TagliamentoP To take the case of wheat alone: Afore than 300,000 tons thus fell into the iifitlds of the famished enemy. . “How. too, are wo to excuse the complete lack of infrehchments. in view of a possible retreat, and the fact that not a single road of retreat was prepared, or a single, bridge—beyond five old ones—thrown acros.s the Taglinnicnto? The congestion produced almost from the outlet by the enormous mass of men and material on tho river banks, trying to cross at the same moment cost the Italian Army almost ns dearly as iho sudden loss of its supply sources, which had to ho left to the enemy. “Those who have visited the Isonzo front must havo boon surprised that, despite all errors, positions es strong as those of the Second Army before Plczs-.o and Tolmino gave way so easily. The fact is that ovoi the best fortified positions nro worth just what the men holding them are worth, and the men’s value is in exact proportion to that of their leaders. GENERALS RETIRED WHOLESALE, “Now. the state of mind of the Italian leaders was obvious to all who penetrated into their inner circles. Of all the armies in the war the Italians alone could boast that they had always kept the same commander since Die beginning of the struggle. But this appearance of permanence at the top vanished as soon as one came'to the ranks of his subordinates. As far as they wore concerned, incoherence, change, and uncertainty were the invariable rule for each commander of a unit. In Italy retired generals were to bo counted by the hundreds. Down there they called them ‘silurati’ (the torpedoed ones) to indicate the suddenness' with which they used to be smitten. Too often the reason for their disgrace did not seem extremely serious, but the phraseology of their dismissal was always as cutting as a knife-blade: ‘You will immediately hand over tho command to So-and-So, your successor’; and the successor was already on the spot to take it. “This method may bo'excellent if.it is. not overdone and is applied wisely. That was not always tho case, for a legrettable kind of. oligarchy had gradually grown up are—.id the Generalissimo. First-class Raders were often its victims. It would he difficult to find in Italy, outside this narrow Cortes, any one who would criticise generals like Ragni, Ouorrini, Lucrnri, and Mamhrotii—and how many others?— all mercilessly ‘torpedoed,’ but still popular in the army. General Capello, who was the first to enter Gorizia, had his command taken away a few days after his victory, and was reduced to a mere division commander and sent hack to the rear as a subordinate to a colleague who had until then been subordinate to him.

“Capello carats back into favour last tanninier and led his troops to victory on the. Bainsizza Plateau. But his success again proved fatal. , Hardly had ho given orders to his army, tho Second. .to consolidate tho positions won, when ho was onco more thrust, aside in company with others. His successor, General Montuori, had haroly taken over the command a' few days nhen the Gorman attack broke upon him. Others, as brave and capable as he, have realised in this war the truth of Napoleon’s saying; ‘You can’t win if you haven’t got your men in hand.’ But there had not been time to make this contact between the men of the Second Army and their new leaders, and so, under the terrible shook of October 20, that Second Army broke.”