The Taranaki Herald. DAILY EVENING. THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1918. THE CAMBRAI BATTLE.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 16038, 24 January 1918, Page 2

The Taranaki Herald. DAILY EVENING. THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 1918. THE CAMBRAI BATTLE.

One of Colonel Eepington’s complaints against tlic War Cabinet is that it suppressed. Sir IJlonglas Haig’s repdrt upon, the officers who were responsible for tie Cambrai setback. Why not, ho asks, tell the public the truth ? It .would certainly be interesting to know the true story of the Cambrai affair, though it is extremely doubtful whether it would be wise to publish it at present. It may be remembered that some days ago there was cabled from London an extract from the Daily Express on the subject, in which that paper, referring to the official inquiry, stated that the facts adduced “wholly contradict the rumours which have lately been growing fantastic.” Whether the Daily Express or Colonel Eepington knows the ,more of the real facts we of course cannot tell, but it will, be noted that while the latter asks why they are not published the former distinctly states that the facts contradict the faniasiic rumours in circulation. Hence jto may; assume .that there N

is-really" nothing much to conceal from the British public, though it may be unwise to relate,the whole facts. The Cambrai attack was conducted on somewhat novel lines as a surprise to the enrmy. There was no fixed objective and it was to be expected therefore that the troops might at some parts of the line reach points which could not be permanently held. As a matter of fact, the results dxeeedod anticipations, more ground being captured than had been thought possible. The enemy counter-attacked and recovered some of the lost ground, besides taking a number of prisoners and-guns, but the greater part of the ground captured by the Bri-tish-'was held and is still in ♦heir possession. In earlier offensives definite objectives have: been fixed and generally held, but in those cases the British command knew exactly what it was aiming at and of course was able to provide for holding the captured positions. At Cambrai the sectional commanders had apparently a more or less free hand to push as far as was prudent. Some pushed a little too far and were compelled to withdraw, losing men and guns in the operation, when the enemy coun-ter-attacked in force. This is inevitable in an enterprising campaign, and it is unreasom/blc to expect that enterprises of this nature shall he always conducted without the loss of a gun or without some of our men being cut off and captured. There is nothing to show that serious blunders were made by anyone, though one critic, Mr. Trank Simonds, of the New York Tribune, expressed the’ opinion, soon after the event, that General Sir Julian Byug had neglected his flanks on the Scheldt and that his attempt unreasonably to enlarge his success was a blunder. But this criticism was written from the editorial chair in New York and apparently without full recognition of the surprise nature of the attack and the indefiniteuess of , its objectives. It may he that no similar attack will he made, because the enemy is certain to observe the greatest possible watchfulness in order to avoid a similar defeat, hut that is no reason why the whole of the facts, describing the plans and where and why they miscarried—if they did miscarry—-should he given to the Gormans, as they would be if they were published.