REVIEW OF THE WAR.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 144857, 8 December 1915, Page 7

REVIEW OF THE WAR.

Ociobor 7. Tho public interest during '.-bo past ton days has shifted from the operation in tho eastern theatre to the western, where the popular imagination was stirred by tho almost unheralded offence of the Allies north of Arras and in Champagne. Tho western battle line, except for intermittent’ artillery duels, had been lying doumait for months, ns artillery duels cot followed up by infantry attacks can bo productive of no change in position, was utterly devoid of interest. All during tho week ending September 26 iho artillery of both tho Gormans ami tho Allies was more active than it had been for months. It was evident that a movement by tho Allies was in too air, since they wore the aggressors. On tho morning of tho 25th the fire of tho Allies concentrated in tho Champagne and in tho section north of Arras, showing clearly that these were the points of attack. In order that these movements may bo clearly understood in their relation to tho entire ‘front, _ it must bo realised that no general drive against tho German lino is possible. Tno lino is entirely too strong, the disparity in numbers is not so groat as to give such a movement a sufficient S reliability of success, and tho loss of fe would ho all out of reason compared to the results achieved. For ovon if tho Germans were driven out of Franca by an army which when the German border was reached found itself exhausted and depleted to the point where a further offence was impossible, the Entente would find itself no nearer a satisfactory solution of the war than before—os has been repeatedly stated by military critics not only in relation to this war but to all wars, the objective of every field army is not territory but men—tho army of tho adversary. If after any operation vast territory bo gained but tho opposing army itself is still intact, still capable of resisting and striking back, tho operation has not been a success in its relation to tho object for which tho war is being waged. The present situation in tho eastern theatre is ample proof of this contention. Tho inability to drive over tho entire lino being recognised, the next point is tho determination of an alternative. Again lot us turn to tho eastern thoatro to seo how a similar condition has been met. A front containing some important and greatly desired post is selected, and by making use of available highways and railroads a concentration of men and artillery is effected at each extremity of tho selected front. An attack is then launched, the flanks of the opposing lino are bent back and the creation of a salient results. It is obvious that if the advantage can be followed by striking against the. side of this salient, the troops holding it must, if the side giyo way, retreat or be captured. This is the German strategy which has won for German arms so many square miles of Russian territory. And this is tho strategy which the French will use in their efforts to dri-o out the invadorsTHE BRITISH ADVANCE. Tho town of Lens, tho great coal centre of France, a point of crossing

of important roads and highways, was the desired post. The front selected was between Vermelles and Neuville St. Vaast. After a terrific ariullory bombardment, exceeding in violence even tho British attack against the trenches of Neuve Chapelle, the Allies rushed forward, tho British from Vermelles, Marin garde, and Grenay, tho French from Souchez and Neuville St. Vaast. Passing through Loos, after terrible hand-to-hand fighting in the streets and in the cellars of tho demolished housed, they took possession of Hill No. 70, just a mil© and a half north-west of the city of Lens, which completely dominates not only tho city hut all its northerly and easterly approaches. At the same time the French infantry also charged forward, advancing through and beyond Souchez to Hill No. 119. and from Neuville St. Vaast to Hill No. 140 and the heights of Petit Vimy. Tho situation thus created is that a deep salient has been created, the tips of which, measuring from Hill No. /0 to Hill No. 140, are only six miles apart. Both of them are, moreover, commanding positions in every sense of the-word. If those points can bo held against tho German counter attacks which are being directed against them with all tho energy and strength the Germans can bring to bear, nothing can prevent the Allies from occupying tho territory embraced by this salient. Tko approaches are under constant fire, tho German lino itself is subject to a plunging fire from flank, front, and rear, and part of it is enfiladed. Tho Allies have the advantage of position, as they hold practically all of the higher hills, and any forward movement thev mako will be downhill, ns oast of their lines the ground slopes rather rapidly to an almost flat plain. At the first indication of an advance from either or both sides of tho salient, the Germans holding it must retire or face inevitable capture. Tho Allies loss has boon great, it is true, but the German loss has been greater; and tho Allies have the greater reserve in man power. The ultimate object of the Allies must bo tho railroads paralleling the German front, which on this part of tho ''ino run north and south, ns it is by menus of these lines that too Germans effect their reinforcements and their con centre Goes. An anajysis_ Of tho railroad situation from this viewpoint will he made at a later date.

HIE PROBLEM IN CHAMPAGNE,

In Chnmpngno tho moans employed in tho advance wero entirely different duo to the difference iu objective. Here there was no one point winch was coveted by tho Allies as of strategical or economic importance. Rather there was a lino which was wanted—tho railroad Hue from Chnllorango near the westerly edge of the Arponne Foroatto Bazanconrt north-east nf HhcimB v Jpo strength of tho German position in the Argonno and in Champagne has been in great part .at least duo to tho facility with which troops con Id ho shifted from one point to another as occasion demanded. Titis wn3 dee to tho railroad running in roar of and parad'd to their line between these points. It also greatly simplified tho # problem of eunplics of food and munitions. This railroad is that mentioned above and is tho only road for a distance of 15 or 20 miles that can fill those functions. IWI this railroad in French bands, there is no wav for tho Gormans in tho Argonno to tench tho Champagne line except by way of Sedan, and by a very roundabout way to Vouziors. f iho distances involved over this route arc so great that for strategical purposes tho road to Sedan mav well bo considered valuoU*.< to the Germans in their present position. In this connection it is well to remember that this is a war for railroads Tho demands made on transportation aro so enormous, because of tho vast quantities of artillery ammunition that modern fighting requires and also because nf food and other sunplit* needed for tho vast armies employed, that railroads as a means of effecting such transportation aro not a relative but an absolute necessity. Tho Gormans, of course, thoroughly appreciated tho advantage to them that lay m tho possession of the Challorango-Razau-court line, and the section of their front in Champagne was. ns tho French had found out in the fighting of last February, ono of tho strongest on tho whole front. So heavily was tins section manned that tho, Trench captures alono averaged 1000 men for each milo of front they attacked. Not only that, but it was so heavily fortified and so well defended by field works to which Gorman engineers had given the character almost of permanent fortifications that it was considered impregnable. Nevertheless tho French stormed it, first with a deluge of shell and then with infantry, and advanced to within two miles of tho railroad, where they dug tlieiiisolvcjs in and aro now apparently thoroughly entrenched. In one place, in fact, they actually crossed tho rood,' but were driven back. As a means of German communication, however, tho usefulness of tho railroad has been seriously impaired, though not totally destroyed, as it now comes under French artillery firo at short range. In tho Champagne, as in tho Arras section, tho French have done much to justify thfe losses they havo sustained. Their objective in neither caso has been attained, but their advance has been sufficient in both cases to bring tbo object of their attacks if not actually within reach, at least within their control. Tho Gorman press for political reasons has been inspired to discount tho value of tho French advauco. This is not. only natural but expedient. If the Allies can hold what they havo taken, however, tho value of their advance will soon become apparent.