AS OTHERS SEE US.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 144850, 30 November 1915, Page 7

AS OTHERS SEE US.

ITALIAN VIEW OF BRITAIN. In the September number of “United Empire,” the journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, there ia printed a translation of an article published in the Italian paper II Secolo on August 4 last:— ‘•Whenever England has found herself at war,” the writer says, “she has always muddled through and has always como out victorious, owing to the inexhaustibility of her resources and the tenacity of her people, who are admirably cool and collected, and who stiffen with adversity, with difficulties, with the obstacles, and with tho Assistance to be overcome.” And he goes on to state what Britain has done already and is now doing. ‘•lmagine what would have happened if England had remained neutral, and what the German fleet would in that event have done. Superior to the French and Russian fleets combined, if she had been able to put to sea, she would probably have been victorious and would have dominated the seas, landing troops in Europe and in tho colonies, capturing and paralysing enemy traffic and intimidating that of neutrals. Possibly the war would have been over in six months, but Europe would have been under tho heel of tho Kaiser. Let us, therefore, bo grateful to tho British fleet for the inestimable service which it has rendered, and us rendering, to all tho Allies. And we hope that it may continue to fulfil Us functions—essential for our cause—with good luck and good effect. Nor must we be affected by tbo doings of tho submarines; thoir influence on tho results of tho war may be discounted; the number of merchant ships they sink is insignificant in comparison with tho number which daily enter andleavo British ports (193 British neutral as*against a total of 31,3&>5 in six months). They do pecuniary damage, but they have not succeeded m establishing any blockade. They destroy the lives of non-combatants and neutrals; they ■ break every convention, written and humane; but they have never succeeded in seriously upsetting England’s oversea traffic, much jess in prejudicing the efficiency of her fleet.”

As to the British army: “It is enough for us to emphasise this fact, that when o year ago, the French and the Russians found themselves, fortunately, on England’s side, they could not expect from her more than_ the assistance of her little professional army of 200,000 men. England gave these 200,000 men, and sacrificed thorn on the battlefield. Only a small percentage of them remains. The total English losses hitherto amount to 330,995 men. They have everywhere fought like lions. And in tho famous retreat from Mons to Saint Quentin when, having lost touch with the French troops, they had to face alone four limes their number, they taught tho enemy, who affected to desniso them, to respect and fear them. But this, it will rcadilv he understood, was not sufficient. In her own interest, and in that of the Allied cause, England had to do more.” And to-day British soldiers are fighting “everywhere.” They are in South Africa, where they have recently wrested from the Germans tbe-last and most important of their colonies; they are in Egypt, in the Gallipoli peninsula, in Mesopotamia, where they are fighting alone, or with the _ French against the Turks; they are in India, and in the other colonies, which they have to garrison and defend from dangers internal and external; some of them are still training in England, and, lastly, the greater number of them are m France. In France? But in France the British occupy a front of scarcely’ 30 miles I Yes, but everyone knows—the French know, and ’ ail Italians who have been in France know—that oehind this front are massed *OO,OOO to 800,000 British soldiers, and that tho French coast has been transformed into a British colony. But if this is tile case, why do these seven or eight hundred thousand men remain inactive, and not take the offensive? Get us premise that tho conduct of the campaign in France is controlled not by the British but by tho French. It is the duty of Joffre to give tho French tho order to advance. Nor is it possible to believe that Joffre is delaying on account of the English, now that they have been abundantly supplied with munitions. It is indeed true that tho problem of munitions has .been, and still is, partly the cause of a regrettable delay. But this problem was not foreseen, and has arisen from the a-s----nect which tho war has assumed. What, as a matter of fact, has happened in Franco? To say that two hostile armies have entrenched themselves opposite each other is to give no idea of the actual facts. Tho two svrmies have really transformed their lines into two interminable fortresses, which no manoeuvring can circumvent. When, in early spring, the English and French sought to destroy tho enemy fortresses, they found that their shrapnel was of no use against cement and armour-plated shelters. It became necessary to manufacture high explosives; for only lyddite and melinite are of any avail against such a target. The English were in realising’ this fact than tho French, and they have had great difficulties in replenishing thoir supplies. But now, thanks particularly to the activity of Lloyd George—tho whole of England is engaged in manufacturing explosives.” Referring to the comparative inactivity of the army in Eyance, the writer says, in effect, “Trust Joffre.” “We must not forget that the trump card in this groat game will be played in Prance and that groat will bo the responsibility of the man , who, although possibly from tho best of motives, plays it at tho wrong moment, compromising in his haste the issue of the Allied cause. ” And, in conclusion, after remarking that of all the countries at war Groat Britain is tho only one which has preserved and respected as far as possible her normal liberties, ho says; “Tho British—like the French, the Russians, the Italians —have their faults and have made mistakes. At the outset they were too optimistic. They did not' all, perhaps, at once realise the gravity and the immensity of the war. They are built like thus; they are neither intuitive nor impulsive. They are slow thinkers; they will not be hurried; they want, each one of them, to see things with their own eyes and to use their own judgment. But qualities, which in tho first phase of a campaign may have been productive of delav and disappointment, become highly valuable as tho campaign develops. because the British are tenacious, indefatigable, and inflexible. It is they who will say the last word.”