THE DARDANELLES.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 144664, 26 April 1915, Page 4

THE DARDANELLES.

A CHECK TO PROGRESS The deduction that a serious check had been experienced by the AngloFrench fleet in its operations against the Dardanelles is being borne out. says the Sydney Morning Herald. The correspondent of the Daily News recently cabled from Athens to the effect that the cheek has been '‘.sufficiently grave” to make a radical change in the plan of attack necessary. It has always been held to be impolite to send warships unseconded by land forces against strong fortiffca lions on shore, and the defences of the Dardanelles have at least proved themselves to he worthy of respect. It is not only the big forts that have to be dealt with by the ships, hut a system of elusive mohde batteries and a series of torpedo tubes at the water’s cdmi, to say nothing of mines, both fixed and drifting. When the allied fleet started out on its attempt to force a wav through the straits n silenced the big forts on either side of the durance without much difficulty, and thou slowly battered its way behind the mino-sweep-ers up to “the narrows.” The latter l presented the proposition of forcing a passage through a great gutter, merely a mile wide, the high walls of which were not only surmounted hy big torts, but were hiding guns which could he moved from one skilfully concealed position to another, and added to this the swift current down the straits allowed the Turks to keep up what practically amounted to a continuous bombardment of drifting mines. By the time the licet had spent sumo days in knocking at this gate of stool the Turks hud fixed up gun positions, and were once more operating down near the main entrance to the straits. When the guns in this region had been originally silenced landing parties were sent ashore, from the ships to demolish the fortifications; but on the withdrawal of the landing parties the Turks brought up now guns and, started afresh. Tims it. been mo clear that unless the ships could force a way through “the narrows” in short order this unpleasant game in their rear could bo continued indefinitely. • And “the narrows” cannot ho forced in short order. Hence the necessity for land forces to operate side by side with the. ships, as it wore, and dear up things pennantly as they go along.

AUSTRALIA’S TNTEREST. And this is where the subject assumes a vital interest front the Australasian point, of view. Practically ever since the disaster to the battleships in the Straits there has been a marked official silence regarding this sphere of operations; and. as the correspondent abovequoted points out, this silence is by no menus the cloak of inactivity, but the present pause is tho prelude to an attack in overwhelming force. This can only he read to indicate that a considerable army is to he landed; for a reinforcement of the fleet could. hardly be expected to achieve much more definite results than those already secured. It lias boon reported that a large mixed French force lias been dispatched from Northern Africa to tho. Levant, and we may almost take it for granted that a big percentage of the Australians who have been completing their training in Egypt, together with sonic of the other British troops there, will be used in the forthcoming operations. Our Expeditionary Force has been definitely pronounced to be fit for service, and tho trend of recent events shows that tho forces in Egypt, both Imperial and colonial, can now l>o largely drawn it|>on with safely. Tims wo may expect to hear almost any day now that our troops have been landed somewhere on the .shores of tho Aegean, and are taking an active part in the operations that havo Constantinople as their objective.

V'REHE WILL THEY LAND? It is, of course, only possible to make the barest suggestions as to Iho disposition of the invading army; but it is almost certain that-the Allies will seek to land a. force from the Gulf of Sams and gain command of the narrow isthmus of the Gallipoli Peninsula, near Bulair. Gallipoli, with the famous “lines of Bulair,“ has always been regarded as one of the keys to Constantinople, and it was this position which the British and French seized as the first step to the Crimean Expedition, in 1854. With the command of this isthmus the Allies will, of course, sever the land communications of the Turkish forces on the peninsula, and, if tho invading army is of tho strength wo expect, it should —backed up by the'warships—bo able to got a complete grip of the peninsula in a comparatively short time. A force is almost sure to bo lauded at the southern end of tho peninsula to advance parallel with the warships. This land and naval attack from tnc south will act as the hammer to the Allies’ anvil at Bulair. Another force .should advance along tho Asiatic shore under cover of the. warships’ guns to complete the work of demolishing tho forts and prevent tho enemy from bringing fresh" guns into action in the rear. This fordo would not need to go any further than Nagara, the northern exit of “the Narrows” : for once the warships are through this neck—and Bulair being in possession of the Allies—Constantinople is doomed. Simultaneously with these operations it is possible than an attempt will ho made to take and hold Smyrna further flown the coast, which is connected witli Constantinople by rail. It has been said that the occupation of Smyrna is an essential part of the Allies’ plan of a campaign in this region; but, in tho absence of any indication of the forces available, we cannot yob count on an attack being delivered here.