COURT OF APPEAL.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXI, Issue 144082, 29 April 1913, Page 3

COURT OF APPEAL.

SUGAR TRUST CASE, Per Press Association. WELLINGTON, April =2B. In the Appeal Court, at the con- . elusion of his review of the evidence'ia connection with the Sugar Trust case, the Attorney-General made some general observations on the construction of the Commercial Trusts’Act, 1910. He said that the statute was not aimed against ordinary normal business transactions, but against artificial attempts at destroying ordinary normal competition. Its object was to check monopolistic combinations and to oppose the keeping up of prices by artificial means. ■ It was to prevent a combination of individuals from obtaining complete .control of the business relating to any : of the commodities set out in the ,tschedule, to the exclusion of possible -competition from, outside Now Zealand, it such exclusion being harmful to the 'community. Sir John Findlay,: who followed OH ‘‘behalf of the Crown, submitted that the ordinary rules of construction were ,■ applicable to the statute, which was remedial in its nature, and must therefore be interpreted pro bono' publico. He said that the mischief was a monopoly tending to stifle free competitions: He contended that the transactions of the Sugar Company and a ring would' have beeh indictable in England prior to the passing of the 1844 statute, 'and, further, that the combination would be illegal in England as a monopoly at the present day, but would not be penalised. He impressed upon the court that the basie principle of the Commercial Trusts Act was the protection of free competition. He put the tests of a monopoly as follows ; (1) Did the agreement operate contrary to the public by (a) restricting competition, or (b) obstructing die ordinary course of trade ? (2) Apart from its operation (a) was the agreement in its interest .or in the nature-of a restraint of trade, or (b) had it for its true purpose the restraint of trade? The use of the term “partial monopoly” showed that the Act was aimed at any interference with free competition. If discount was given because a person , was a member of a commercial trust an offence was constituted, even if the public were not prejudiced. He went on to show, that the facts in this case showed that offences had been com- , mitted under sections 3 and 5 of the Act. ■ Ho Said that it -was admitted that the methods of the Sugar Company, prior to the Act would have been illegal under the Act, and’he cgntended that the company had reconstituted those methods since the Act. He had not concluded this branch of his argument when the court adjourned. ! ' . Argument will bo continued to-, morrow at 10.30 a.m. TO-DAY’S EVIDENCE. WELLINGTON, April 29. - In the Appeal Court this morning Sir John Findlay elaborated his contention that the transaction between the Sugar Company and the ring was a breach of the Commercial Trusts Act. The last scale was deliberately framed to prevent any firni or combination, except that which Levin and Company represented, from earning the _ highest discount; also to prevent Fairbairn, Wright and Co. from earning the highest discount and so put a stop to that firm’s competition with the ring. The case is proceeding.