The Taranaki Herald. (DAILY EBENING.) WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1912. THE LEADER QUESTION.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LX, Issue 143785, 8 May 1912, Page 2

The Taranaki Herald. (DAILY EBENING.) WEDNESDAY, MAY 8, 1912. THE LEADER QUESTION.

Tlie Eastern Question, like the poor, is always with us. That is to,say, British statesmen have ever confronting them the difficulties which are certain to arise for them if and when there is any disturbance of the balance of power in what is commonly called the East, consisting of the Turkish Empire and the neighbouring States. A curious position arose there lately when Italy, in furtherance of her designs upon the Tripolitan coast, bombarded the Dardanelles. Matters in Tripoli had arrived at a kind of “stale mate” condition. Italy seemed to have reached the end of a cul de sac. She could make no progress, nor yet reap much advantage from the ground she had won in Tripoli. Therefore she struck at Turkey in a more vital part, right at the heart, in fact, without, however, doing any severe injury. Had she been able to maintain the attack for any length of time possibly she might have brought Turkey to her knees and extracted whatever terms she chose with reference to Tripoli, but the closing of the Dardanelles could not be endured by the other Bowers. The wonder was that Great Britain did not immediately protest to Italy against her holding up all the Black Sea traffic. Why she did not do so is explained by Lord Morley’s statement that notwithstanding her close concern with the Mohammedan interests of Turkey she could not forget her traditional friendship with Italy, especially in view of the hitter’s position and relations as a Mediterranean Power. This declaration has been seized upon by the Austrian press, or a section of it, as an indication that Italy might, in the - event of a European crisis, be found on the side of the Triple Entente instead of the Triple Alliance, that is, allied with Great Britain, France, and Russia rather than with Germany and Austria. A writer in the Fortnightly Review, dealing with Lord Kitchener’s Egypt appointment, uses it rather cleverly as evidence of an understanding with Italy based upon a desire of Great Britain to wean her from the Triple Alliance. He declares that Lord Kitchener was sent to Egypt to keep order there during the contest between Turkey and Italy, and more especially to prevent Turkey drawing reinforcements from Egypt, or using that country as a base of operations against the Italian forces in Tripoli. It is probably only a coincidence, but this writer thinks it is more than that, that Italy forwarded her ultimatum to Turkey the very next day after Lord Kitchener took office as British agent at Cairo, and that war was declared on the following day. He contends that before Italy could stir it was necessary for her to have an assurance from Great Britain that Egypt would remain neutral and should not be utilised by Turkey as a base of organisation or operation during the Tripolitan war. He points out also that Germany was the only nation likely to interfere with the Italian plass. His conclusion is that, in order to checkmate Germany and paralyse the Triple Alliance, Great Britain has bought Italy’s favour, the price being ‘‘our active sanction of her seizure of Tripoli.” As against this very plausible theory it may, however, be pointed out that the late Count Aehreuthal succeeded be-

fore his death in materially strengthening the bonds of the Triple Alliance. lie cleared away the misunderstanding that had arisen on account of German and Austro-Hungarian strictures ou Italy in the early stages of the war, while the “atrocities’ campaign in a section of the English press and an outburst of French indignation were cleverly used to check any drifting of Italy into closer relations with those two Powers. It must not be forgotten either that if Britain takes the part of Italy in her struggle with Turkey the Mohammedan races in the British Empire may resent it and give trouble. Altogether it is a situation demanding the display of cool statesmanship.