The Artillery in South Africa.

Taranaki Herald, Volume XLIX, Issue 11662, 23 January 1901, Page 1

The Artillery in South Africa.

Throughout the campaign in South Africa the Artillery Department, so far as the personnel are concerned, has (the London World writes) enjoyed an immunity from criticism which has not been extended to any other branch of the army. With the exception of the Colenso occurrence — the tfoth about which remains obscure, and has not been made less bo by Sir Redvers Boiler's ex cathedra censure of Colonel Long — the conduct of the artillery hai been the subject of uniform praise. Not only has the conspicuous courage of the officers and men been a leading feature of all the battles of the war, but there has been an allround testimony ameng the experts to the tactical ability and power of command of the battery leaders. At the Talana Hill, Modder River, and in the series of actions around Colenso and Ladysmith, the generals in command invariably praise the manner in which the artillery majors handled their batteries. Even when reverses occurred, they brought credit to the artillery. At Stormberg and Sanna's Post the guns not only saved the honour of the day, but materially helped to extricate the defeated forces from total annihilation. The facfcjfoat Sir Redvers Buller declared he would have won the battle of Colenso — we are merely repeating the general's statement, not endorsing his opinion — had his "guns not been lost, is a testimony to the value which he, in common with other commanders in the war, placed on the tactical support which he expected from his artillery. The success alluded to above is; primarily due to the regimental organisa- j tion of the artillery, which, unlike that! of the cavalry and infantry, gets the| maximum work out of all ranks. Thej battery of six guns — the tactical unit of artillery — commanded by a major, is divided into three divisions of two guns, each commanded by a captain or lieutenant, and these divisions are again sub divided into two sections of one gun, each commanded by a sergeant. In this way, every lieutenant or sergeant under him have a definite charge committed to their care under the controlling direction of the battery commander. From his earliest days the lieutenant acquires habits of responsibility, and, when he is piomoted to command his battery, he finds that responsibility increased in degree but not changed in character from that which he was required to exercise before promotion. As a consequence of this system of training, artillery officers, in marked contrast to their infantry colleagues, are habituated to act without waiting for orders, and to trust to their own judgment instead of haning on that of those above them. The effect has been observable all through the war, the batteries always arriving in action at the right time and place, and never failing to give effective support to the plans of the commanding generals. While unstinted praise is due to the regimental officers of artillery, the experience of the campaign has brought to light many administrative defects, which are certainly not "nebulous and fictitious," and must now be remedied. These defects extend both to the supply of material and to the administration of the personnel. That our guns were outclassed during the earlier battles of the war is an established fact, which has been verified'beyond doubt, and which no arguments, excuses, or explanations can alter. Though the inferiority of the British field gun to the French field gun possessed by the Boers was not very marked, it was sufficiently so to neutralise, the advantages whioh weald have otherwise accrued, owing to the better ammunition of the English arsenals, the superior skill of the gunners, and the greater tactical knowledge of the British artillerists. A worse shortcoming than this consisted in there not being available a proportion of heavy mobile batteries armed with guns of longer range and larger calibre than the field guns sent out to South Africa. As an excuse for this shortcoming the War Office alleged that the Boers made a novel use of their heaw guns, and that batteries of position have" never before been taken into the field. This is not the caso. During the Indian Mutiny such batteries were frequently used, and at the present moment a proportion of these batteries is [maintained by tho Government of ludu I for emergencies such as arise during tln\ Boer war. The energy shown by tho navy in disembarking their heavy guns ! improvising travelling carriages, and

[dragging them into the field cannot be too admired ; but the work wps out" ■ side the proper role of the naval service, fund had the Military Intelligence Defpartment been better informed concerning Boer artillery preparations, and the artillery authorities in Pall Mdl — whoever they may be — more up-to-date with their own preparations, there would have been no necessity to fall back on naval help. One of the chief duties of the War Office will now be to organise a number of these heavy batteries for service in the field, and keep them horsed and equipped as mobile units for immediate use.

No central organisation at present exists at the War Office able to cope with the necessities of a huge technical department such as is the Artillery Corps with its personnel .of more than 50,000 officers and men. The duties of administration are so distributed among the various branches of the department that responsibility becomes lost, and effective control impracticable. The Director-General of $ Ordnance — and admirably has Sir Henry discharged his functions | during the war — is responsible for material, but not forjpersonnel; the AdjutantjGeneralfor discipline; the Military Secretary for promotions; and the other War Office " heads " for something else. What is wanted is an Artillery head quarters bureau, presided over by an officer of high rank in the corps, to whom the Com-mander-in-Chief could turn for technical advice, and who would be charged generally with the duty of administering the Artillery Department of the army. Such a bureau exists for the Engineer Depart ment, and formerly existed for the Artillery; but for some unaccountable reason it was abolished by Lord Lansdowne, and the outbreak of the Boer war found the higher organisation of the Artillery in a condition of absent-minded chaos. Owing to the fine standard of efficierfcy of the regimental units there was no breakdown in the field, but for this Lord Roberts has to thank his batteries, not the War Office. •

The great lesson of the campaign fot the artillery service is the necessity for a Reserve to provide for augmentations during time of war, ammunition trains, and casualties at the front. Formerly such a reserve was ready to hand in the garrison brigades of artillery, which are maintained to garrison the naval bases at home (Portsmouth, Plymouth, &c), and coaling station abroad. During time of peace and, for the matter of that during [war, as long as we have a "fleet in being 7 ' the duties of this force are only nominal. To defend our shores is the roll of the navy, coast fortifications with their garrisons being maintained for moral purposes — as Lord St Vincent once put it "to quiet old women's fears" — rather than for any practical value they maj possess. Until lately the officers and men of the Garrison Artillery brigades were trained in the field, and temporarily detached to do duty in the coast fortifications until required for active service. The period passed in a maritime fortress was regarded as a time of rest for invalids from India, for married men, for officers who wished to study for the Staff College, and for those who preferred scientific pursuits to the duties of fighting soldiers. Under the former system, however, officers were not allowed to vegetate too long in this easy linej but were required after a time to return to their field duties, and were always available for active service.

Some half-dozen years ago the Wail Office decided to alter this system andl create a Coast Defence Corps composed! of artillerymen, whose lives were to beß wholly passed in maritime fortresses.Jl Owing to the natural disinclination ojffl young Englishmen to join such a corpsj; extra rates of pay were offered, not f oi J extra services expected, but as bribes to[ induce young officers to accept service inp this new corps. At the same time a|l number of quasi-staff appointments with, no real duties, but carrying with then j high rates of pay and important s»und \\ ing titles, were invented as additional^ baits. A more demoralising scheme can' r 4 hardly be conceived. The result h.i-J. been that when the Boer War broke oou r ] and every available artilleryman was re !4 quired for duty in the field, some eight o '» nine hundred officers and twenty thou^ and men — the flower of the artillen corps — were practically demolished, and instead of being utilised as a reserve for the force in the field they were left in idleness at home, watching the tide coming in and going out ; while their brethern, shorthanded and unsupported, were fighting at the front. Such a system stands self- condemned, and ought not to be permitted to continue. In time of war no fraction of our small army may remain idle. This Coast Defence Corps costs the country more than a million pounds a year, and for all the use it does, or is likely to do, the money might as well be thrown into the sea. The militia and volunteer artillery regiments are more than sufficient to garrison the naval ports at home, and the custody of the coaling stations abroad should be entrusted to marines. To employ regular troops of the army, es)ecially highly-trained artillerymen, as local garrisons for passive defence is a waste of military strength. Tho services, of the artillery batteries at present forming these garrisons could best be utilised by their conversion into field going units, some as heavy batteries of position, Mtnc as ammunition trains, and others as depots for feedivig'the field artillj-ry with reinforcements. One of the first duties |of the new Commander-in-Chief will

h doubtless be to stop this waste of troops ilwho are frittered away in local garriMobility should be the keynote to f,'the military organisation of the Empire, ''and while the navy is entrusted with '"the duty of defending our shores from 1 attack, the army must be i-repared for , 'foreign service, every unit hv\ng kept in ' a high state of mobiht}, and able to be resent aboard in the shortest possible time any point wliei" our luipovinl domiuioa wmay bu threatened.