HEROISM cm GALLIPOLI

Taranaki Daily News, 6 April 1932, Page 7

HEROISM cm GALLIPOLI

ACTION IN HELLES ZONE

BRITISH GOVERNMENT DELAY TROOPS LACK AMMUNITION TRAGIC. LOSSES SUFFERED By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright. London, April 3. The second instalment of the final volume of the official Australian history of Gallipoli states that at the end of May Sir lan Hamilton had still no news of the British Government’s intentions, the change having recently been made from the Libera! to the Coalition Government. As the Turkish defences were daily becoming stronger, there being 80,000 to 100,000 Turks on Gallipoli, Sir lan Hamilton decided on a general action m the Helles zone on Juno 4. Meanwhile he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener calling attention to the fact that his cable on May 17 had not been answered. In England the newly organised Dardanelles Committee had not yet assembled, and even Lord Kitchener could not make up his mind on which side of- the scale his weighty influence should be cast. The historians, describing the battle of June 4, state that the attack on the front was almost a complete failure. Though the corps were brilliantly staffed and commanded, the proportion of French infantryman was insufficient to leaven the lump of colcured troops which, formed the bulk of the infantry rank and file, wffose conduct under heavy artillery fire again ’proved unreliable. Referring to the general battle, the historians are of opinion that the initial attack on June 4 succeeded, but the casualties were very heavy. This was. the first time the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had been engaged in definite trench warfare. The broad principle of using reserves to exploit a success rather than to redeem failures had not yet been established. Both corps commanders unfortunately determined on a second attempt to capture the trenches which had defied the first assault, and nothing was done to reinforce the section where all was going well. By nightfall the greater part of the ground gained by the 42nd Division was given up, and the day’s fighting resulted only in the gain of 250 to 500 yards on a front of a mile. These meagre results cost the Bth Corps 4500 officers and men out of 16,000. The French losses were 2800. Neither the British nor the French had power to renew the attack for many days, and the Turks again had time to organise a new line.

ABANDONMENT REJECTED. ,

On June 4 the new Dardanelles committee assembled to discuss whether the operations should continue or be abandoned. Lord Kitchener argupd that the consequence of withdrawal would be disastrous and that Germany would gain Constantinople. Britain would be abandoning most important strategic positions which the Australian and New Zealand contingents had helped to win at heavy cost. Mr. Winston Churchill also made an urgent plea that Sir lan Hamilton should-be supplied with all the troops he needed for an early success at Gallipoli, arguing that the capture of Kilid Bahr .would open the Straits and that the destruction of the Turko-German fleet would follow. The whole of the Balkans would then join the Entente. The Gallipoli forces could then concentrate on the Western front. The historians say that had the artillery received howitzers and ammunition in the proportion then available to the British formation in France they could long since have opened the Narrows. The committee decided to send the three remaining divisions of the first New Army with a view to an assault in the second week of July. The Government’s policy veered more and more towards Gallipoli till the end of July, when, too late, it was ready to offer Sir lan Hamilton every man and gun he could use. The last of the reinforcements could not assemble till August 2, six weeks later than intended, owing to the difficulties of transport. ' The Government agreed to allow Sir lan Hamilton to ask Sir John Maxwell for 15,000 British Indian troops, but neither Sir lan Hamilton nor General Maxwell was informed until the end of July. It is difficult to estimate the weight of the burden resting on Lord Kitchener in deciding the rival claims of the Western and Eastern theatres. REINFORCEMENTS TOO LATE. The promise to co-operate with the French in an offensive at the end of August naturally affected the amount of ammunition which could be spared for Gallipoli. Moreover, the Austro-German offensive launched on July 13 added to the terrible page of Russia’s disaster. This situation led the British Government to strain every nerve to bring the Gallipoli campaign to a speedy and victorious conclusion, but the decision to use a large force there came too late.

The united strength of the fresh troops could not be exerted until the second week in August. Sir lan Hamilton was unable to postpone all operations until the reinforcements arrived, so the lamp of victory which was rekindled in the first week in July by troops already on the peninsula was again to flicker out for want of oil and the enemy was given time to recover.

The balance of the last half of July witnessed the dispatch of heavy reinforcements for the Turks while there was steady wasting of the British and French troops from casualties and disease. Then in August, 13 divisions, more than twice the nominal strength of the original British expeditionary force in France, missed by a narrow margin the accomplishment of a task which a month earlier would have offered only half the difficulty. A GALLANT ASSAULT. Brigadier-General Oglander, chief general staff officer during the evacuation, describes the 'Turkish defensive measures fully, also the‘launching of the British holding actions at Bielies on August 6 and 7. The Anzaes

undertook the main operation. The latter was at night. The fury and gallantry of the assault on Sari Bair is fully recognised, particularly the capture of the log-roofed Turkish trenches at the cost of 1700 against the Turks’ 5000. AH the Australians were worthy of the Victoria Cross, it is stated. Brigadier-General Oglander states that the night advance from the Anzac northern flank was marked by the extreme bravery and dash of the New Zealanders. Sir John Monash led personally across Aghyl Dere. Heroism attended the attack on the Nek with the annihilation of the first and second waves in the glorious charge of the Bth Light Horse, which was gallantly but unsuccessfully followed by the 10th, resulting in the loss of 650 of 1200 troops without gaining the crest of the main ridge. The mistake was including Hill 971 in the first night’s objective. General Birdwood would have been successful if he had concentrated on capturing Shunuk Bair and then advancing to Battleship Hill. The fight for Chunuk Bair receives detailed description. Though Chunuk Bair was captured, the enemy outflanked and the waters of the Narrows could be seen agleam, the Turkish garrisons on Battleship Hill and Hill Q Recovered Chunuk Bair. Two Wellington companies died fighting, but Colonel Malone saved the main line before he fell. Hill Q was captured and lost next day -when it was realised that the third attack on Sari Bair had failed. “But the spirit of the Anzac generals was still un- . broken despite the fatigue of the troops, depletion of reserves and apparent stagnation at Suvla.” The Anzaes, however, were then unfit for prolonged physical strain and the British New Army Corps lacked the necessary experience. Brigadier-General Oglander rehearses the complete scheme of the Sulva Bay attack and analyses the reasons for the failure. He pays high tribute to the skill of the evacuation. (Crown Copyright. Published by Arrangemeat with the Stationery Office).