RETREAT FROM MONS.

Taranaki Daily News, 23 August 1930, Page 17 (Supplement)

RETREAT FROM MONS.

GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN.

(By

"Scriblerus,”)

Tales of the great retreat from Mons and of Le Cateau are brought to mind by news of the death of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, the commander of the famous Second Army Corps of the First Expeditionary Force,’’.the rock on which the tall wave of German invasion first broke, .

The story of August, 1914, is a tangled mass of disputes. The Allies, disconnected in’ their defence, were driven back byi the .onrush- of. the. German armies. Mistakes were made, and thousands remedied them with their lives. Every movement was "discussed l in the short time available,, but there has been a deaL more discussion since’. This argument, after it is all over, is the “terrible” risk the “red tabs” . take. Infinitely worse, of course, than a day in the front line.

There appears to have been a disagreement at first between the commander of the force, Sir John French, and Lieutenant-General Smith-Dorrien. The latter was appointed to the command of the second Corps at the death through heart failure on August 13 of General Grierson, The new commander was a South African veteran whose brigade in that difficult campaign had been recognised as one of the very best. He was a typical Imperial soldier in the world-wide character of his service, for he had followed the flag, occasionally even preceding it, in Zululand, Egypt, the Soudan, Chitral and the Tirah before the campaign against the Boers. A sportsman as well as a soldier he

had succeeded in winning the affections of lueT Aidershot division by his system of trusting to their honour rather than to compulsion in matters of discipline. It was seldom his confidence was abused.

And the fame of this man rose from the dogged stand of his Corps at Le. Gateau. Owing to the fact that the French Fifth Army, which was on the right of the English army, was retiring, Sir John French, the British Commander, felt that the forward position he now held on the Conde Canal might quickly become very precarious. The retreat started, but the First Army Corps under Sir Douglas Haig on the east, though they encountered opposition at Landrecies, was able to effect its retreat with less effort than the Second Corps under Smith-Dorrien, which continued to bear the brunt ,of the enemy pressure it had encountered at Mons. To add to the discomfort of- the situation a wide and dangerous gap had formed between the two corps.

The heads of the column of- the Second Corps arrived at Le Cateau at 3 p.m, on August 25, but the rearguard were fighting into the night, and came in eventually in an exhausted state. Smith-Dorrien was in the position that his troops were scattered, weary and in danger of losing their morale through continued retreat in the presence of an ever-pressing enemy. Even with the best soldiers such an experience too long continued may turn an army into a rabble.

'One historian of the action, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, graphically outlines Smith-Dorrien’s action. “He therefore made earnest representations by telephone to the Commander-in-Cliief pointing out that the only hope of checking the dangerous German pursuit was to stagger them by a, severe counter’ at-

tack. “The only thing for the men to do when they can’t stand is to lie down and .fight,” said he. Sir John assented to the view, with the proviso that the retirement should be continued as soon as possible..” Bright sunshine filled the rain-wash-ed sky on the morning of August 2G, but the thin mists rising from the wet fields gavo promise of a sultry day. As the sun rose the flashes of the German guns tore through the haze, and the first light showed the grey masses of enemy infantry pushing forward in dense firing lines. Von Kluck was opposing no less than 140,000 men against Smith-Dorrien’s weary 55,000 which had stood the incessant attack for over three days of retreat. The enemy attacked on the front and tried to envelope the isolated force with its great wings. * Le Cateau was Kluck’s most conspicuous and most indefensible failure. As for Smith-Dorrien and his “Old Contemptibles,” they had achieved the patently impossible at the expense of some SOOQ casualties and the loss of 30 guns,

It is impossible to doubt that the Germans in spite of their preponderating numbers were staggered by the resistance which they had encountered. It was an action, though almost disastrous, which could not have- been avoided. There still remains the question of ' whether or not Smith-Dorrien disobeyed 1 orders when he said at the critical mo- ’ inent, “Gentlemen, we will fight.” However, if he thought it imperative ty> stand and fight, we may well accept the necessity.. Sir John French's first remarks on the action were of praise; “I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of August 26 could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been I present to conduct personally the operation.” Sir John, unjustly it is thought i by many, subsequently revised his opinion. He says that it was impossible i until much later to appreciate in all hits details the actual situation on the i morning of August 26. “In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons,” he continues, “it is alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at headquarters at St. Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the Second Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my staff to say that there is not a semblance of truth ill this statement.”