THE NAVY IN WAR

Taranaki Daily News, 21 November 1929, Page 18

THE NAVY IN WAR

‘' ' ' ' ; " ' '■ ■,. ..■ ' WORK OF GRAND FLEET . fe'-.”• ' _ . ? “THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE.” v ? BATTLE OF JUTLAND. ’’ 7 British and' German Naval strategy ■: *' ' iuring the Great War formed: the,basis an address, given by Commodore G. Blake; C. 8., ,D.5.0.,"’R.N.; ’.■wlieo. speak-, inn'at the New Zealand Club luncheon at Wellington.; last week. Commander Blake served under Lord Jcllieoe hr the j - Iron Duke during the period of his' command, and saw at first hand what occurred. < Many people, he said, during the war were asking the, question, what is' the >:' :: ‘'.f?Btvy doing! When is it going to sink the German fleet 1 In spite of the fact i; that-the British Navy had always been, ■ and, 1 always would be, bur first line of 7, defence',, people generally seemed to liave : possessed little knowledge of .ivluit '-/•- Were the functions .and the -limitations ■ ■ -'Qf .the fleet in war. The particular .funcjtion of the Navy in the vast national /■:' eft'ort of war was to operate so that we could, and the eneriiy could not; use ' \th(i sea for . any purpose; The -security ®|;/oi/our.,’sea,. communications, vital to the Empire as a whole, was the Navy’s first 7 charge.' At the same time, the Navy ■*’ must deny that security to the sea - communications of the enemy, thus 1 bringing to bear on him the maximum economic pressure (stoppage of all ovec- ' ieas supplies).. Obviously, the quickest - and surest manner of attaining that. ' t object was - the destruction of all enemy > naval -forces which could dispute our ///control ■ over the sea communications. • The public expected a Trafalgar, and 'they didn’t get it.' Why? Because it took two to make a fight. History of Cea warfare showed that it was seldom that both sides were anxious to fight. 7 ; . In the last war history repeated, itself. German fleet was held back by ■ /’'direct orders from the Kaiser, and their cdmmarider-in-chicf cautioned that no psks were to bo taken. “THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY.” 7t, ’’. ■ ' . \ ‘ ‘ ’ h 1 ‘ , .“Well.” continued the commodore, -Z : . may say, ‘why didn’t we force the German fleet to accept a decision?’; and therein lies the inherent .difficulty of •/'’Bea warfare. In land warfare if you ?' attack the enemy, he must’cither stand and fight, or, by retreat, give up what !?• : you want-—that is, territory. In sea ■ ■ warfare, although you may meet the ; .enemy on the open sea, unless you can intercept him from his base he can re- ? fuse action and return to his defended base. That was the situation that developed as soon as war commenced, and -7. the Grand Fleet in the North Sea had •'Ji-, to' use what means lay in its power to jnake the enemy go to sea. In default of a fleet action, we had to exercise / ’ such-control over ,the sea communica;4ions as.would enable us to maintain / our food supply, the supply of munitions J bf war, the transport of troops, and to 7<. deny all supplies to the enemy—i.e., to • ? apply economic pressure on him. In this' \Vork the navy had as its ally the •S incomparable Mercantile Marine. Even / at the height of the submarine menace no . captain of any merchant ship hesi--7; tated to take his ship to sea. We, in ;the navy, and the British Empire as take off our hats to those - • gallant and intrepid seamen who fed us. . wfib maintained our essential supplies 7; of munitions of war and material, and who transported our troops from distant 7 porners of the. Empire, and who paid ’’ a heavy toll in the loss of many lives for their steadfast devotion to duty.” / 'When war broke out the Grand Fleet \ c . was concentrated at Scapa, the Channel Elect was at Portland more or less as ft strategical reserve, and the east coast was protected by local patrol flotillas. Rosyth was the best stategical centre, and that had'been realised prior to the iwar, but due to economy in peace time ■ it could not contain the. whole fleet. 'A modern fleet, the commodore pointed put, without a defended base could not operate. “That, as you know, is one of the. reasons for developing the regources at. Singapore," ho said. “Although we trailed our coast up and down 'the North Sea for the best part of two months, nothing happened. The enemy refused to risk a decision, and remained in his defended base." We arrived at the situation where wo could not get at the enemy forces to bring them to action, and we therefore had to turn to the alternate method and pursue those other subsidiary operations. which “ had for their object the weakening of ,the enemy’s resistance by the application of economic pressure and the consequent possibility of forcing the enemy to sea in order to throw off the stranglehold. But cover—or open blockade—cannot prevent the enemy from making sporadic attacks or getting ships put on the trade routes, and we therefore had to endeavour to give protection to those sea communications which were vital to us, and be in a position where, should the enemy main fleet come out to sea, we could intercept him 'before he could attain his object. It was not till the economic pressure which we : ■ exerted in the manner which I have Indicated by attack on the enemy’s / .trade that the situation became so desperate that they decided to come to sea :. and fight it out. I am referring to tha projected operation of the High Sea Fleet in October, 1918, which never took place. The reason that it never took place was because the inaction in harbour and bad food had so undermined ■ the morale of the fleet that the sailors refused to raise steam or weigh, their anchors.” In regard to German naval strategy, Commordore Blake said that it was not ; till the Germans found that they were *up against if’ that G.H.Q. took much interest in the doings of the

fleet, and then they decided to knock out England by means of a single surprise weapon—the submarine, disregarding all forms of international law. Briefly, German strategy aimed at offensive raids with a view to causing dispersion of the Grand Fleet, and by such dispersion the Germans hoped to catch small detachments of the Grand Fleet without risking. the High Sea Fleet in a decisive actioii. ; When this was found to have failed it was considered that tho best strategy which the High Sea Fleet could pursue was to support the submarines and to control the Baltic. In consequence, submarine warfare against merchant shipping was put into action as an alternative to fleet action. When this was found to fail and the situation became desperate it was decided to risk a decision, but it was then too late. ; Commenting upon the battle of Jutland, Commodore Blake said it was an indecisive action because only one side wished to fight, and also because action was not joined till so late in the day. At Jutland, Sir John Jellicoe had manoeuvred the Grand Fleet into a position which, if the sun had stood still, would have enabled him to reach a decision. The Grand Fleet was directly between the enemy and their base. “Although we know all the facts,” said the Commodore, “and are clear about the movements wliicli took place, wo can never know and reproduce the conditions which existed at definite times; nor what was seen from definite parts of the line. The visibility alone varied from moment to moment; ono minute you could see ten miles, and the next you could not see three miles. As an example of the uncertainty of the situation, Sir John Jellicoe on the morning after the battle asked me what ship I was firing at, and I told him tho leading ship of the German line. He replied: ‘Are you sure it was not the Inflexible?’ which was one of our battle-cruisers. I assured him I was not firing at the Inflexible. One must remember that he had at his disposal tho fullest information that could be obtained.

“As regards tho future,” concluded tho Commodore. “Who knows? Disarmament is in the air, peace and goodwill are advocated from all sides. It is said, settle our disputes by arbitration. Nobody who went through the last war wants to repeat it. Surely, they say, there must be some other means than massacre, and the last war was only a taste of what may happen in the next. These high hopes cannot bo realised at once. Progress must necessarily bo slow, and world education towards peace is just beginning. In tho meantime let us remember the words of Lord Jellicoe: ‘The sea is our life. By the use of it the Empire was formed; by holding it the Empire has been preserved; if we fail to appreciate its value the 'Empire will perish.’ ” *