GERMANY’S MOMENTS

Taranaki Daily News, 25 September 1928, Page 14

GERMANY’S MOMENTS

COULD SHE HAVE WON WAR? MARSHAL FOCI! SAYS “YES.” -A CANDID INTERVIEW. (By Dr. Andres Revesz, Foreign Editor of the Madrid A.8.C.) I was privileged to interview Marshal Foch at the Hotel des Invalides and was agreeably surprised at the frankness with which he answered my questions. “You ask me if Germany could have won the war,” he said. “Well, that, is a quite unexpected question, but I will give you a candid answer.” For a moment he reflected, then continued:— “I will answer—yes. That opinion will probably surprise you, coming as it does from the ex-Generalissimo of the Allied armies. Yes, Germany could have won the war; not only at the beginning, but in the spring of 1918. She could have won if her plans, which were very good indeed, had been carried out with more ability. To-day I still wonder how it was possible that Germany, after having prepared so long for the war, failed so lamentably in the technical execution of her strategic schemes. “I wonder, for instance, how it was possible that the German Central Staff neg lected its right wing. I know that General Count Schlieffen, who planned the march against France through Belgium, unceasingly insisted on the decisive part which should have been played by the right wing, which had to besiege Antwerp and to occupy the coast of the British Channel at least up to Boulogne. But *he right wing, extending from Belgium t< the North of France in the shape of a fan, had to ue continually reinforced, and on his deathbed Count Schlieffen ’ exclaimed: ‘Provided that the right wing may be strong, enough!’

“But the German Central Staff committed the great and unacountable mistake of weakening the right wing at the most decisive moment, in favour of the link wing situated in Alsace-Lorraine, and in removing from it three divisions to send against the Russians in Eastern Prussia, where the battle between Hindenburg and Rennenkampf had, however, already been won. The German right wing consequently remained too weak and too small to extend itself up to the sea. It failed to secure strong support, and could thus be turned. That is what happened to the army of Von Kluck when it arrived close to Paris. Some months later the Germans endeavoured to repair their error, and occupied the coast, but at Ypres they were defeated. Ypres was the direct consequence of their initial error. The right wing was too weak.” Asked whether he thought that the German retreat in the first battle of the Marne was necessary or too hasty, Marsha] Foch replied:— “It was both. From the strategic point of views (on account of the faults which I have mentioned) the German army found itself before Paris in a rather precarious position; for we had turned its right wing and a gap had formed between the first army (Kluck) and the second army (Bulow). On he other hand, the Germans could still have recovered, instead of retreating wtih so much haste. To-day one may clearly see that the intelligence service of our opponents was very defective. Only thus can be explained the part played by Lieutenant-Colonel Hensch, whose pessimistic reports determined the general retreat on the whole German front. A psychological explanation is given us by the letters of General Moltke, Chief of the Great Staff, to his wife—letters in which the pessimistic nature and the very advanced sickness of the general are clearly revealed. It can consequently be affirmed that on the Marne the Central Staff of our adversaries completely failed; it proved very inferior to its task.” In reply to the question as to whether the Germans ought to have followed the other scheme—that which advised the defensive on the western front and an overwhelming offensive against Russia —Marshal Foch said: — “This plan certainly had its supporters —among others Waldereee and Hans von Delbruck—but I do not think that it would have been a favourable decbion for the Germans even in the event of brilliant victories against Russia. THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1918. “I have already mentioned that in the spring of 1918 the Germans could still have won. H they had arrived -t Amiens the English Army would have been cut off from the French Army, and, even after the offensive of General Mangin, on July 18, 1928, the position of the Germans was not desperate. I confess that, from the military point of view, I do not very well understand why, towards the 20th August, General Ludendorff did not retreat to the line Metz-Meuse-Brussels-Antwerp. My preparations were made to attack the ‘Hindenburg Line,’ and if the German Army could have retired to the straight, short line mentioned, I should have had to recommence everything- This strategic retreat might have prolonged the war by one year —and, in critical times, many unexpected things can happen in the course of a year. On the other hand, I . derstand that Ludendorff could not persuade himself to order this strategic retreat, because it would have meant the confession of an. evident inferiority, and the abandonment of very important war materials which could have been easily replaced. I will even go so far as to say that in November, 1918, Germany could have resisted behind the Rhine. If the German people had had a Gambetta the war would have been prolonged—and who knows . . . Here I reminded Marshal Foch that the example of Gambetta proves that heroic resistance of a militarily, vanquished people only serves uselessly to protract war. France lost the war at Sedan on the 2nd September, 1870. Everything that happened after that date only prolonged the agony. “All this is true,” answered the Marshal, “but I believe that a people which does not want to be vanquished need not be. Of course, in November, 1918, Germany had no further chance of success, but if her army had resisted behind the Rhine many things would have been changed. “Of course, I speak from an entirely military point of view. On the other hand, I know that Germany, abandoned by her allies, and cut off from the rest of the world, "had not enough food to maintain herself, and that :’ie German people, who had suffered severely, called loudly for peace, immediate peace. There we must let matters remain ”