LORD JELLICOE AND JUTLAND

Taranaki Daily News, 14 June 1923, Page 7

LORD JELLICOE AND JUTLAND

(By Admiral Mark Kerr, C. 8., M.V.0.) In this article Admiral Mark Kerr gives us an illuminating insight into the naval situation at the time of the Battle of Jutland, and explains with great clearness the object of the tactics pursued by Lord Jellicoe. I am told by a friend of mine from New Zealand that Lord Jellicoe’s tactics at the Battle of Jutland are not fully understood by some people in the country over which he has the honor of being Governor. I was also asked by this friend if I would write an article, making the tactics of the battle quite clear to the ordinary lay mind. I am glad to do this, because I hear on all sides that Lord Jellicoe is as great a success as a Governor as he was as an Admiral. This is natural, because he carries out the old saying: “A healthy mind in a healthy body.” THE OBJECT OF THE NAVY. The object of a Navy is to preserve one’s own communications intact, and destroy those of the enemy. This is what is called “obtaining command of the aea.” The Navy has never won a war, and never can win a war, but without it the Army is useless, for war is an affair of communications. Now this command of the sea had been obtained before the Battle of Jutland was fought. There were only two German raiders left on the sea, and they were making their way hotye slowly and carefully, and so long as the Grafid Fleet remained in being, it was impossible for the Germans to send out their battle cruisers and, wiping away our com-merce-protecting cruisers, cut our communications and re-establish their own. Great Britain’s strategy was then quite clear—to risk nothing which might alter the perfection of the status quo. The German strategy was also clear—to do anything in their power to alter the status quo, as any alteration might be for their good. Lord Jellicoe appreciated this vital point, and acted as a great man should in resisting the temptation for personal glory. Suppose he had not done so, but had fought the German fleet, if they accepted the challenge, and defeated them utterly, what woud have been the gain to the Allies’ command of the sea? There could be no gain, as the enemy had not a single above-water craft on the ocean and the Allies’ communications were not being interrupted by any above-water enemy vessel. On the other hand, if JeUicoe had been defeated in a general engagement, the enemy’s cruisers would have cleared the ocean of the Allies’ transports and supply ships, and the Germans would have won the war. There wad everything to lose and nothing to gain for the Allies in a general naval engagement. Does a wise man gamble with a man who won’t pay if he loses? CRUISERS AND SUBMARINES. It must be remembered that cruisers are a far greater menace to commerce than submarines, because of their greater virion and their greater speed, and also that antisubmarine warfare is an entirely different proposition to the above-water command of the sea. The submarine could only be htinted by aircraft and small surface craft. Every big ship avoided them Eke the plague, and one of the reasons why we were short of destroyers for hunting submarines was that a large number of these vessels had to be kept to guard the Grand Fleet against submarines whenever it went to sea. Some critics tried to make out that the High Sea Fleet was a defence from behind which the submarines went forth to their attack. The absurdity of this doctrine is obvious, when it is known that during the worst part, for us, of the submarine campaign, the High Sea Fleet was partially unarmed, and a great part of the men landed to serve ashore. Mines, submarines, and destroyers are the plagues that threaten the capital ship, and consequently our Grand Fleet dared not approach the enemy’s coast to bombard the submarine bases. Neither are big ships weapons to be used in narrow waters where these plagues abound. Do you think a mounted knight in armour would be happy fighting in a twelve-foot ring, and would he find his sword, mace, and spear useful weapons against an attack of wasps. A QUESTION OF TACTICS. It was known that the Germans intended to carry out their obvious tactiqs, namely, to try and tempt the Grand Fleet into waters infested by their submarines, and also in retiring, they intended to leave behind them a trail of mines for the British ships to strike. Consequently, JelEcoe and his Admirals made an elaborate investigation as to the best method of meeting and resisting a concentrated torpedo attack. The unanimous decision reached was that retirement at a certain angle was the only practical method. Jellicoe listened patiently to the decision and then said: “I accept your conclusion because they are indisputable, but Heaven help the Admiral who in the middle of an action has to act upon it.” We know that Heaven did help Jellicoe with the most admirable results, for only one ship was struck by a single torpedo, and she was not sunk. WHAT AN AFTER-WAR EXPERIMENT PROVED. When the war was over an experiment was carried out against torpedo attack, firing torpedoes with dummy heads. The first attack was met by the battle fleet turning towards the attackers, and sixty hits by torpedoes were received. The next experiment was carried out in line of battle without turning, and forty hits were received. The third attack was countered by turning away, and only two hits were received. This evidently shows that the Grand Fleet would have been practically destroyed if it had not acted otherwise than it did. The enemy cruisers would then have won the freedom of the seas, and the Allies would have lost the war. Why, then, did Jellicoe fight at all, and what was the meaning of his tactics at Jutland? In the words of Nelson: “He would not fight unless the enemy gave him an offer too tempting to be resisted,” in which case he would succumb to the temptation in order to keep up the morale of his men. That is why he fought at Jutland. But he would take ho undue risk, and that is why:— (1) He turned away from the enemy in I sub-divisions when attacked by torpedoes. (2) He did not do what the Germans wanted him to do, namely, to go after them so that the submarines, destroyers and mines, which they left in their track, would take a heavy toll from the British fleet. Instead of that, he side-stepped and sent his own flotilla to attack, which it did with great I success, and he sent his mine-layers to Uy a minefield in the path by which

he estimated the German Fleet would go home. A British submarine sitting on the bottom to listen for the results of this plant, reported 11 explosions in the minefield when the German Fleet was passing through it. RESULTS JUSTIFIED THE COURSE ADOPTED. In consequence of the battle cruisers and some others getting between the fire of the enemy’s High Sea Fleet and battle cruisers, we had suffered very considerable losses before Lord JelEcoe and the Grand Fleet could get into action, and, consequently, through the Germans retiring, the battle was only joined for a very short time. Up to this moment the Germans had had the best of it, and if Lord JelEcoe had adopted the tactics recommended by some of his detractors in the Press, the battle would have ended by the practical annihilation of the Grand Fleet, as we can easily judge from the results that Lord Jellicoe’s tactics had on the German Navy’s strategy for the rest of the war. So many of their ships were struck by mines and torpedoes that their dockyards could not compete with the damage that had been inflicted, and from that moment they gave up any idea of trying to get the command ot the surface of the sea. The result of Lord Jellicoe’s strategy and tactics is now clear to all, and we must be grateful that he was a strong enough man not to yield to popular jeers and pressure. The German Fleet were so roughly handled that they knew’ that further efforts were futile. No German cruiser ever again molested the Allied communications I No enemy ship ever crossed the ocean, and the whole German Fleet eventually surrendered to the silent Power that held the gates to the ocean ways.