A GAME OF BLUFF.

Taranaki Daily News, 28 October 1919, Page 5

A GAME OF BLUFF.

JHE DOVER I'ATROL.

WHAT GERMANY DIDN'T KNOW. London, Aug. 12. "If the Germans had only known!" Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon is giving to the world at the present time the "History of the Dover Patrol, 191517," by instalments in the .London Daily Telegraph, and we can only be unfeigncdly thankful after reading some of his passages that the Germans never knew what we are permitted to know to-day. Had they even had an inkling of the true state of affairs in connection with the protection of the Strait of Dover, and I the Channel ports on both sides of the water—well, we might have won the war, but the odds against our doing so would have been a thousand.to one. Had we in England been aware of the real "strength" of the Dover Patrol we should certainly have "prayed without ceasing" that our knowledge should not become German property, instead of girding—as we invariably did on the few occasions when Fritz's raiders got within shelling distance of the Kentish o'casfr—at the Admiral in charge at Dover, And Admiral Bacon to-day, instead of calling us names for our insistent "slating" and our harsh criticisms of his "inefficiency," practically thanks us for our ignorant scoldings. Though we knew it not, we were actually playing his game to perfection, and the more the Press "scalped" him the better pleased was he. For ho shows in the course of his narrative he was strategically at an immense disadvantage, tactically he was largely inferior in force to an enemy with whom he was daily and nightly in close touch, and he had vast interests to defend, of which only the more important could be attempted with the force he had at his call. Admiral Bacon does not suggest .that he should have had more ships at his command, and, indeed, makes it clear that other vital interests rendered it impossible for the Admiralty to have placed at his disposal such a force as would have removed the ugly possibilities which faced the Admiral at Dover right up to the end of 1917, and maybe later.

It would take too long to detail those "possibilities," but the sum and substance of Admiral Bacon's narrative to date is seen in this quotation;— "Any night the enemy could, after secret preparation, have swept the whole Dover force off the face of the seaj the number of vessels required to prevent this was so large, so impossibly large, that the risks had to be accepted. At the same time, so urgently were destroyera required for other duties, that the least possible number to defend the really vital interests of the Strait had smilingly to be accepted. Not a word, not a whisper, of our inferior numbers could be allowed to escape to the Press, hecause that would have benefited the enemy. The result was the whole situation could not be appreciated by the country. The more the Press slated the Admiral for inefficiency, the more insistently they asked 'What was the Admiral at Dover doing?' the better, and the greater the service they were unconsciously rendering to the country. Our reply was merely 'Let them come again; one day they will be caught and punished.' This defiance was more likely to make them careful and less likely to attempt any really great 'offensive, which wo were not in a position to defeat. OUR REAL POSITION. '"ln fact, bluff was the keystone of our immunity. The German was a logical thinker up to the point of viewing every action of ours in the light of what lie, under similar circumstances, would have done, and not what our temperament would cause us to do, and this was his absolute undoing. This wag our great asset. How could he, the military thinker, believe that the .Straits of Dover were at one time held by one 41n destroyer, while he had a dozen nt the Belgian ports? How could he detect that the boats to which wireless telegraphy signals were being made were away refitting at Liverpool, Portsmouth, Southampton and Chatham, and not in the patrol! How could he believe that we would institute a day blockade of the waters of his coast within twelve miles of his ports when we had insufficient destroyers to hold the Straits? He saw the magnificent display of borrowed cruisers and destroyers on the barrage patrol line shortly after it was laid; he probably argued that others were in reserve and within reach. How could he tell that the hundred trawlers anchored off Dunkirk in 1010 were virtually unprotected, and so on? Had his temperament been to act and to argue, blindly and simply, 'There's an enemy; let's go for him,' which any 'day a new officer in command might have done, our game would have been up."

The real effects of a successful raid in force by the Germans on the Cha>nriel cannot be readily grasped by the lay mind, but Admiral Bacon gives us a hint as to what it might have meant—apart from the "moral" effect on the German people and on ouv own pessimists. He says:—

"The inhabitants of the east coast of Kent grumbled at having occasional fiveminute bombardments: Only eight civilian deaths were caused by destroyer raids. I much regretted this loss. As, however, important information would have been given to the enemy, it was impossible to say, 'Which would you rather have, eight casualties and four houses damaged, or that the country should lose £6,000,000 worth of merchant shipping and 3000 seamen?" And the Admiral might have added that a successful raid would probably have meant half a dozen or more German commerce raiders slipping through to the open seas to prey on shipping a la the Emden and her successors. THE CHANNEL TUNNEL There has been much ink spilled over speculations as to tho advantages a Channel tunnel would have conferred on the Allies had such a thing been in existence when the war started. Admiral Bacon has, perhaps, no right to the last word on this subject, but he has placed on record his conviction that we have cause to be thankful that the tunnel did not exist; indeed, he goes so far as to say that if it had been in being we should in all probability Imve lost the war. His argument is that had their been a tunnel the Germans would undoubtedly have secured the French end before going south towards Talis in the [early days of the war. | "They would have considered this a primary objective. At this time the whole coast had been evacuated by us as far west as Havre. Had the Germans made good and held some line from Albert to Abbeville and the coast, thenline would have been shortened, and the whole of the north coast of France and the French coast of the Narrows would hftvi beta in their fgmMion, TMi

would have been a most serious, in fact I almost fatal, handicap to us. 'j "If the Germans had not disregarded' the absolutely obvious strategy- at tea, jj the Thames irallic would have been la»« l possible, and our communications Trft& ; France not only robbed of the ports of Havre, Treport, Boulogne, Calais and ' Dunkirk, but enemy submarines eould, ' have worked from bases close to' the Cherbourg and Breit transport routes.

"Our reply must have been the blocking '■ of Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne, and in- ' creasing the Channel destroyer forej, i thereby handicapping the Grand Fleet. Dover would still have been important 8.8, a base for operating against enemy sub- ■'■ marines, but the value of Portsmouth would have been largely increased. The ■ French Coast, instead of the Belgian ; coast, would liave bristled with Qerotaft ,: batteries. It may, of course, be argued f that if Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne I .' were blocked tlie coast would not h»yt" been of much use to the enemy; but this \ is not the case. Blockings, as expiate-/ ed later, are only a very temporary expedient." The Admiral frankly admits that he is ' not competent to deal with the military . situation, but to him it appears that a tunnel "would have necessitated the oe«;. cupation by the French of their end in ' order to destroy it in case of necessity. ' This would undoubtedly have been pro- 1; tected by batteries and a. permanent gar- ' rison. To Teduce this would have meant delay to the Germans on the- Pari* march, and probably an entire change in the strategy of the advance, which might have had a far-reaching effect on the first phase of the war, by causing less hurry and holding the country as the > troops advanced. In any case, the tunnel would have been destroyed, and'tbetefore useless during the war. This is not written in any way as an argument against the tunnel, as the above remarks • do not apply to' a future war, since it is inconceivable that any country could - again go to war as Germany did is the " late one, without any regard to the value of the proper use of sea-power. But, . so far as the late war is concerned, I am ' glad the tunnel was not in existence, Our Army was never short of either munitions or food, the cross-Channel losses were negligible, and, beyond providing a more comfortable route for soma of the poorer class of sailors, it would only, had it survived, have released a limited amount of shipping, and that is the most it would have done."