WHY WE FAILED IN GALLIPOLI

Taranaki Daily News, 9 March 1916, Page 6

WHY WE FAILED IN GALLIPOLI

818 lAN HAMILTON'S DISPATCH SENSATIONAL STORY OF DELAY AT BUVLA BAY ANZAOS' BRILLIANT WORK BRILLIANT PACES TELLING ©F GLORIOUS VALOR OF BRITISH TROOPS.

London, January 7. The eagerly-awaited dispatch of Sir lan Hamilton, describing the fighting on Gallipoli in July and August' last", was issued last night. It describes in detail the tremendous struggles connected with and following upon the landing at Suvla Bay. It exposes clearly the cause which led to the failure of the operations, and is sensational in it s apportionment of blame and praise. General Hamilton pavs a remarkably high tribute to the New Army, which performed prodigies of valor under exceedingly difficult circumstances. Dated December lltli, 1915, and issued from 1, Hyde Tark Gardens, the dispatch begins with a statement of the situation as it appeared early in July On May Kith and 17th Sir lan had cabled that two additional Army Corps were needed. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had been sent to him, but between their departure from England and their arrival at the Dardanelles Russia had given up the idea of co-operating from the Black Sea coast, and this had set free several Turkish divisions for Gallipoli. Eliminating the impracticable, Sir lan had narrowed down the methods of employing his fresh forces to one of the following four: — (a) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows. (b) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a maroh on Chanak. (c) A landing at Enos or EBrije for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair. (d) Reinforcement of the Australian and Xew Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvja Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and, working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the peninsula. The first three were rejected, and, discussing the fourth, the dispatch says: "The hopes of being able to strangle the Turkish communications to tlio southward, whether by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the INfet, had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were well founded. TENACITY OF THE ANZACS. "The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows. "From the naval point of view the auspices were also favorable. Suvla Bay was but one mile further from Mudros than Anzae, and its possession would ensure us a submarine-proof base and a harbor good against gales, excepting those from the south-west. "Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived my mind was made up as to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from Anzae, combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to try and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-pro-tected line of communications starting from the bay of'Suyla." To succeed in making a surprise landing at Suvla it was necessary to eliminate the moon, and unless the plunge could be taken by the second week in August the whole venture would have to bo postponed for a month. "My prospects," says Sir lan, "would have been notably bettered had these same reinforcements arrived in time to enable me to anticipate the moon of July."

FATAL OVER-IMPETUOSITY. The dispatch deals next with the operations in the waiting period; they were worked out on ammunition allowance at the rate of one serious attack in each three weeks. In the action of July 12 and 13, south of Krithia, the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers pressed on too eagerly, carrying the third line of trenches and charging up the hill and beyond the third line until they came under the "fue de barrage" of the French artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross fire from friend and foe, and the K. 0.5.8. had to fall line of trenches captured. The Portsmouth Battalion of ' the Royal Naval Division fell into precisely the same error at exactly the same spot next day, '•'an over-impetuosity which cost them heavy losses." In this two days' battle our casualties were a little over 3000 and those of our enemy about ;'iooo. On .July 17, Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston was invalided home, and Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford was temporarily appointed to command the Bth Corps. On July 24 General Stopford had to set to work with his own corps, which was assembling at Miulros. Coming' to the big operations of Au.gust, the dispatch goes on:— "The moon would rise on the morping of the 7th at about 2 a.m. The first day of the attack was fixed for August 8. ' A certain amount of ' ingenuity had to be called into play s o as to divert the attention of the enemy from my main strategical conception. This was: (1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from land communication with Constantinople. (2) To gain such a command for my artillery as to cut oft the bulk of the Turkish army from sea traffic whether with Constantinople or with Asia. (3) Incidentally to ■ secure SuVla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre." HOODWINKING THE TURKS. The scheme for hoodwinking the Turks included: A surprise landing by a force <of 300 men on the northern shore of the Gulf of Xeros; demonstrations by French ships opposite Mitylene along the Syrian coast; coneentration at Mity-

lene; inspections at Mitylene by the Admiral and Sir lan; making to order of a whole set of maps of Asia in Egypt, as well as secret service work, most of which bore fruit. "Thanks entirely to the reality and vigor which the Navy and the troops threw into them," says the dispatch, "each one of these ruses was, it so turned out, entirely successful, with the result that the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were caught completely off their guard at dawn on August 7." Remarking upon the extraordinary complexity af the staff work entailed by the operations, Sir lan Hamilton says:— "To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, aimals, and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking, demanding not only competence, but self-conli-dence; and I will say for my Cieneral Staff that 1 believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter lie studied >is models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awk.vardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals, or vehicles rapidly—all these made it essential to create a'special, separate organisation for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule corps to supply 80.000 j men had also to be organised for that specific purpose until such time as other transport could be landed." WATER SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES. The water supply entailed extraordinary preparations. An enormous quantity had to be collected secretly, and as secretly stowed away at Anzae, where a high-level reservoir had to be built, having a holding capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted out with a regular system of pipes and distribution tanks. A stationary engine was brought over from Egypt to fill that reservoir. Petroleum tins, with a carrying capacity of SO.OOO gallons, were got together, and fixed up with handles. | The sheet-anchor on which hung the whole of these elaborate schemes was the Navy, and it did not fail. Sir lan Hamilton stationed himself at Imbros, which was forty-five minutes from Helles, forty from Anzae, and fifty from Suvla, and wa3 the centre of the cable system. "At Helles the attack of the Oth was directed against 1200 yards of the Turkish front opposite our own right and right centre. The infantry assaulted at 350 p.m. On the left large sections of the enemy's line weje carried, but on j our centre and right the Turks were encountered in masses, and the attack, pluekily and pcrseveringly as it was I pressed, never had any real success. The j Ist Essex Regiment, in particular, forced I their way into the crowded enemy trench opposite them, but were subjected to the heaviest musketry fire from both flanks, as well as in reverse, and were shattered by showers of bombs. Two separate resolute attacks were made by the 42nd Division, but both of them recoiled in face 'of the unexpected volume of fire developed by the Turks. After dark heavy Turkish counter-attacks were being pressed against such portions of the line as we still retained. Many of our men fought it out where they stood at the last, but by nightfall hone of the enemy's line remained in our possession.

IMPROVED TURKISH "MORAL." "Our set-back was in no wise the fault of the troops. That ardour which only dashes itself to pieces against the enemy's strong entrenchments and 1111-4'-merous, stubborn defenders on August 6 would, a month curlier, have achieved notable success. Such was the ojiiuion of all. But the "morale'' as well as the strength of the Turks had. - had time to rise to great heights since our last serious encounters with them on June 21 and 28 and on July 12. On those dates all ranks had felt, as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude. tint they had fairly got the upper hiniLaOJw, "Vfipy ,-onrti MiaVe -gout? ''on steadily advancing. Now that self-same, half-beaten enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing. For this recovery of the Turks there were three reasons: One. moral, one material, and one fortuitous. (1). The news of the enemy's advance on the .Eastern front had come to hand , and had been advertised to 11s on posters from the Turkish trenches before .we heard about it from home. (2) T.wo. .new divisions had come down south to Hclles to replace those we had most severely handled. (3) The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to lie packed with troops and so were their communication trenches, the reason Bein», as explained to us by prisoners, 1 that the Turkish commander had meant to launch from them an attack upon us. We had, in fact, by a coincidence as strange as it was unlucky, anticipated a Turkish offensive by an hour or two at most! y "I persevered on the 7th with my plans, notwithstanding the counter-at-tack of the Turks which was actually in progress. My objective this time was a double line of Turkish trenches on a front of about 800 yards between the Mai Tepe Dere and the west branch of the Kanli Dere. From the outset it was evident that the enemy were full of fight and in great force, and that success would only be gained after a severe struggle. On the left but little ground was gained, and by U a.m. what little had been taken had been relinnuished. But in the centre a stiff battle raged all day up and down a vineyard some 200 yards long by 100 yards broad en the west »f the Krithia road.

GRIT OF THE LANCASHIUES. "Tie Hast Lancashire men in this part of tlic field gallantly stood their ground here against a succession of vigorous counter-attacks. The enemy suffered very severely in these counterattacks, which were launched in strength and at short intervals. Both our Brigades (l'2">th and 120 th) had also lost heavily during the advance and in repelling the fierce onslaughts of the enemy, but, owing to the fine endurance of the (Ith and 7th Battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, it was found possible to hold the vineyard through the night, and a massive column of the enemy which strove to overwhelm their thinned ranks was shattered to pieces in the attempt. "This unceasing struggle (of two more days) was a supreme test for battalions already exhausted by 48 hours' desperate fighting, arid weakened by the loss of so many good leaders and men; but the peculiar grit of the Lancastrians was equal to the strain, and they did not fail. Two specially furious counter-at-tacks were delivered by the Turks on August S, one at 4.40 a.m. and another at 5.30 p.m., where again our bayonets were too much for them. Throughout the night they made continuous bomb attacks, but the (ith Lancashire TSegiment stuck gamely to their task at the eastern corner of the vineyard. By the morning of August 0. things were quieter, and the sorely-tried troops were relieved. On the niglit of the 12th13th the enemy made one more sudden, desperate dash for their vineyard—and g£t it! But, on the 13th, our bombers took the matter in. hand. The Turks were finally driven out; the new fire trenches were wired and loopholed, and have since become part of our line. "These two attacks had served their main purpose. If the local successes were not all that had been hoped for, yet n useful advance had been achieved, and not only had they given a fresh, hard-fighting enemy more than he had bargained for, but they had actually drawn down Turkish reinforcements to their area. And how dan a commander say enough for the troops, who, aware that tjieir task was only a subsidiary one, fought with just as much vim and resolution as if they were storming'the battlements of Constantinople?" PRAISE FOR GENERAL BIRDWOOD. Sir lan Hamilton next describes the assault on Chunuk Bair, under General Birdwood, who worked out the entire details so excellently that he had no modifications to suggest. "On the nights of the 4th, sth, and (ith August the reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzac very silently at the darkest hours. Then, still silently, they were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes or observatories in their prepared hiding-places. The whole sea route lay open to the view of the Turks upon Aclii Baba's summit and Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac's open beach hostile riflc-men were looking out across the Aegean no more than twenty feet from our opposing lines. "Every modern appliance of telescope, telegraph, wireless was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which, were attended by Brigadier-General Skeen, of General uirdwood's Staff) were such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch. WONDROUS FEAT OF CONCEALMENT. "The preparation of the ambush was treated as a simple matter by the services therein engaged, and yet I much doubt whether any more pregnant enterprise tlw'n this of landing so large a force under the very eyes of the enemy, and of keeping' them concealed there three days, is a record in the annals of war." The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round numbers to .37,000 rifles and 72 guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. On the afternoon of August 0 an assault was made on the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment, which attack, although a diversion to draw the enemy's attention from the grand operations impending on his right, was a distinct step on the way across to Maidos. It commanded one of the main sources of the Turkish water supply, and was a work for the safety of which the enemy had always evinced a certain nervousness.

PIMPLE AND JOHNSTON'S JOLLY. ''The work consisted of a strong point d'appui on the south-western end of a plateau, where it confronted, at distances varying from GO to 120 yards, the salient in the iine of our trenches named by us The Pimple. The entrenchment was evidently very strong; it was entangled with wire, and provided with overhead cover, and it was connected by numerous communication trenches witli another point d'appui known as Johnston's Jolly on the north, as well as with two other works on the east and south. The frontage for attacks amounted at most to some 220 yards, and the approaches lay open to heavy enfilade fire, both from the north and from the south. "The assault had been entrusted to the Ist Australian Brigade (BrigadierGeneral N. M. 'Smyth), ultaheously, and were closely followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular race. against -death, _ which came in the shape of a hail of" shell and rifle bullets from front and from either Hank. Hut the Australians had firmly resolved to reach- the enemy's trenches, and in this determination they became for the ,moment invincible. The barbed wire entanglement was reached and surmounted. . . . •, • "Then came a terrible moment, when it seemed as though it would be physically impossible to penetrate into the trenches. The overhead, cover- of stout pine beams resisted ail individual efforts to move it, and the loopholes, continued to spit fire. Groups of"our men then bodily lifted up., the beam? and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-dark-ened galleries amongst the' Turks. By .5.47.p.m. (the attack began at 5.30 p.m.), the 3rd and 4tli Battalions were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their parados and driving out, killing, or capturing the occupants, made good the whole of the trencher "At once the Turks made it plain, as they have never ceased to do since, that tliey had no intention of acquiescing in the capture of this capital work. DESPERATE COUNTER-ATTACKS. "The enemy allowed small respite. At 1.30 that night the battle broke out afresh. Strong parties of Turks swarmed out of the communication trenches, preceded by showers of bombs!' For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time consolidation VB.S being attempted, although the presence of so many Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger. • In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very , heavy casualties were suffered bj the Australian*.

"At 5 a.m. on August i) the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm from the cist and south-east after a feint of fire attack from the north. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shook, and handled the attack so vigorously that by 7.45 a.m. there were clear signs of demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. Hut though this marked the pud of counter-attacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping continued, though in less volume, throughout .this day and night, and lasted till August 12, when it at last became manifest that we had gained complete ascendancy. During the final grand assault our losses from artillery tire were large, and ever since the work has passed into our hands it has been a favorite daily and nightly mark for heavy shells ami bombs." The dispatch gives superlative praise to the Australians: ''One whole brigade," numbering 2000 at the outset, under Bri-gadier-General X. M. Smyth, carried out the w»rk under the eyes of a whole enemy division. Nor was a chance last by the New Zealand gunners under Major Sykes. The hand-to-hand fighting in the semi-obscurity of the trenches was prolonged and very bitterly contested. In one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found lying as they had bayoneted one another. To make room for the fighting men the dead were ranged. in rows on either side of the gangway. After the first violence of the counter-attacks had abated. 1000 corpses —our own and Turkish—were dragged out from the trenches. Enemy losses were much heavier than ours, and the Lone Pine success, "more than any other cause," was the reason why the Suvla Bay landing was so lightly opposed. The first step in the real push was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Hair ridge, the crest of which line of lifty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, with spurs coming down towards the level beach, and separated from one another by deep jugged gullies choked with dense jungle. Twe of these leading up to Oliuriuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Ka/.li Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to T\oja Chemen Tope (Hill SO'h, the topmost peak, and is called the Aghyl Dere. Our object was to effect a lodgement on the crest of the high main ridge with two columns oi troops. The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of ■ Major-General Sir A. .J. Godley. and was composed of a Right and Left Covering Column, with a Divisional Reserve. A SEARCHLIGHT STRATAGEM. "Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. Colne, had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at !) p.m., H.M.S. Coln'e threw the beam of her searchlight cn to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes'. Then, after a ten minutes' interval, came a second illumination and 'xmibardment, cmii'mmcing always at 9 t'O and ending precisely at :> ?(i p.m. "The idea was that, after successive nights of sui'li pr ictice, the enemy wnuld get into the Habit/if taking the stsrehlisht as n hint to clear out until the shelling was at an aid. But on the eventful night of the fith, the sound oij. their footsteps drowned by the loud can nonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes a searchlight's, beam—eame the right covering column. At .0.30 the light switched off, and instantly our p.ien poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours! "Oi'ee the capture of Oid No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on with their attack upon liauehop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machinegun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hiil. a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

BRAVE MAORIS. "The attack aiong the Chai'ak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—n:adc. indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of storm?rs found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river-bed—that is to say, the only practical entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a >tr,mglylield enemy trench running right ai-ros? ' the opening of the Clwiluk Dei ". Il«r«the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost, some or their bravest and their best, hut in the .end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, n passage van forced Oough the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous. and cool coui'iU;v by. r..plain' Shorn and a party, of New .Zealand Engineers, supported ny the Maori s. who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the riafo !'a Tlius was tin: mouth of the f-b 1 i* ik Dere op .»- ed m time to admit of the nnnpi *'.< ed entry of the right assaulting column "Simultaneously the attack 011 Table Top (connected with Old No. 3 Post by a razor-back) had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. Colne. No general on peace manoeuvres would a&k,troops to.attciu.u.t of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valor can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognised in our regulation as 'impracticable for infantry.' Hut neither Turk nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealandcrs that night. "There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were sealed, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at, an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only: 'magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men.' There arc exploits which must be seen to be realised. - "The right asaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chaiftik Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 a.m. began a hot'iycontested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur (the under, feature of Sari Bair); whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy." The rapid success of the left covering column was due to the bth South Wales Borderers under Lieutenant-Colonel Oillespie, "a very fine man." Every trench wa 9 instantly rushed, and by 1.30 a.m. the whole of the hi(J was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole Anzac attack. "Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Amy, under good aus-

pices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless anil still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier." The left assaulting column effected a complete surprise, capturing two Turkish officers in their pyjamas. ''The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had graduated' over the. goat tracks,of . 4nzae. The darkness "of the night,'thf density of the scrub, hands and ' knees progress up the sputa,. sheer physical'fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hair-breadth escapes from tlln liail of random bullets —all these;combined'.to take the edge, off the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Here, the column split np into two parts. Dawn broke and the crest line was not yet in our hand*, afi,hough, considering all things t the left assaulting, column had made a marvellous advance. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the tropes) the auspices were propitious." The right asau Iting column found the hopeless country the main hindrance, but eventually they entrenched on the top of rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bail'—i.e., of Victory. By T a.m. the sth and Wh (.lurkhas, of the left assaulting column, had approached the main riuge nurtU-cast ol Chunuk Bair. CKECKKD! '•But by this time the enemy's opposition hail hardened; and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by !l a.m. the attack of the right assaulting eilumn on Chunuk Hair was ehejked, and any idea of a further advance on Kop Clieuien Tepc had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that cottU be done was to hold fast to the Asniak Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridg" north-east of Chunuk Bail, an aito be supnorted by >■ l'r. sh assault launched against C'hun.ik M.-i: itself. . "Ai a.m., the two as .rrlting columns pressed forward while i: r guns pounded the enemy moving :.h i.g .the Battleship Hill spurs. But, iu .pile ; of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion as opposed to the -gathering strength of the enemy'i troops began to tell—they ha.l shot their holt. So all day they clung to what they had captured and strove to make ready for ' the night. By the afternoon the position of the two .assaulting columns were unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation u\ Cable Top, Old Xo. :i Post, and Bauchop Hill, which Cencral Kussell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted;;, so that he might have two other lvj'imeuts.aiid as required. The left covering force lie-Id flamakjelik Bail'. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Ar.zae line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was Leing furiously disputed. All had suffered heaviiv, and all were very tired.'' Thus endtd the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge, without our aims being fully attained "..'.d without the expected help from J-'uvla. But Sir lan aerees 'with (Jeneral Pni'wood, "The troops had performed a feat which is without pa.vllel." (To be eon timed.)