THE JAPANESE

Taranaki Daily News, Volume LV, Issue 47, 13 July 1912, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE JAPANESE

THE PACIFIC PERIL. The Japanese danger was the subject of an interesting article in the Montreal Star of April 12. The writer says: The gravity with which the American Senate and the American President have treated the shadowy suspicion that the Japanese might be contemplating the establishment of a naval base at Magdalena Bay —in spite of the stout denials by the Japanese Government and the high improbability of such a manoeuvre—serves as an illustration of the supersensitive tendency of the people on this continent to look for danger from across the Pacific. We find the same tendency in Canada; for it was only the other day that a British Columbian was telling the people of England that we must 'have a battleship fleet on our Pacific Coast as a part of any plan for Imperial naval defence in which Canada will share. If this apprehension can be felt at all when there is no nation across the Pacific with real hitting-power except plucky little Japan, what will our attitude be toward this possible menace when China is awake, armed and—if we pin-prick her enough—aggressive? There is—as we have frequently said—the slimmest possible excuse for imagining that Japan contemplates anything like an attack on this continent. Nothing could be more insane than for Japan, with her heavilyburdened finances, and her huge task of colonising Korea right at 'home, and the immense Chinese problem confronting her i hourly, to dream of going to war with i the wealthy, distant, and inexhaustible United States. And Japan has shown no signs of insanity. The Japanese Alliance turns the "spear head" of the Japanese Navy automatically away from us and towards our enemies who may arise. "But will the Japanese Alliance last?" you ask. Let us see. . On what does it depend? It depends absolutely on British sea power. If the British command of the sea were to be broken; the British Alliance would instantly become worthless to Japan; and, under the callous code of international ethics, Japan would very soon find a way of escape from a worthless al-) liance. The alliance may not last as long as does British sea power, but it certainly will not effectively last an hour longer. So the first requisite for keeping the Alliance in force is to help maintain the supremacy of the British Navy in the North Sea. Now, if that supremacy is maintained, what is likely to be the duration of the Japanese Alliance? Well, it sprang—on the side of Japan—from the fear of Russia. Russia is just now recuperating every day; and it looks as 1 if there might soon be juicier morsels than Korea to attract the attention to tha Far East. Are these conditions which will render Japan less afraid of Russia than she was when she renewed the Alliance on the morrow of her successful war? Not exactly.

Then Britain and Russia have become exceedingly good friends—they are obviously inclined to think that it is to the interests of both to be found in the same international camp, an entire change from the days when the first Japanese • Treaty was written. Now this implies two things—first, that so long as Britain is the friend of both parties, she will probably have influence enough to keep them from attacking each other (which fact gives the Japanese Alliance a new value to Japan); and, second, if Japan quarrels with Britain, and either tries to set up alone in the world or joins the German camp, she will do so in the face of the knowledge that Britain might find herself compelled to help Russia attack Japan. And if Britain still commanded the sea when this crisis arose, Germany would be helpless in the Far East, while the naval conditions affecting the transport of troops would be the exact reverse of the last war. Russia could bring up her men at leisure and ferry them' over to Nippon under the escort of British battleships.