"MITTEL EUROPA' V. NATIONAL RIGHTS.

Colonist, Volume LVIII, Issue 14364, 16 March 1917, Page 3

"MITTEL EUROPA' V. NATIONAL RIGHTS.

WHY THE ALLIES FIGHT ON

. The following thoughtful article was published in tho "New Statesman" !n ■way of reply to President "Wilson's -amazing assumption in "his celebrated Peace Note.that the objects for which the Allies and tho General Powers aro fighting are substantially the same. Though primarily intended to assist in removing certain American misconceptions, it may be read with not lesvS profit ;by participants in the Allies' cause:— The significant .passage in President Wilson's Note to the belligerent Go <r•ernments is that in which he points to the apparent identity of the objects for which both sides profess to be fighting. This passage, whatever impr'>s■£iori we may derive from it as to the President's personal views, was obvi-

ously intended as a challenge; and it is a, challenge which tho Allies should very willingly accept aud reply to, unofficially as well as officially, through every channel that is open tcr them. It ls not after all &o very surprising that «-oiue Americans ishould.be in doubt as to our objects. They were told that Great Britain entered the Avar to pro- . teet Belgium. They .believe—very likely on good authority—that Belgium's I future is How secure, that Germany is ' willing to retire fi'om Belgian isoil, and | oven possibly to offer some compensa- j tion for damage and solemn guarantees ' for the future. Why, then, they natur-1 ally ask, should Great Britain go on j fighting, unless it be for ulterior i motives which will not bear public j avowal? The answer, of course, is in itself simple enough, but it is not altogether easy to explain to people whose knowledge of the realities of European politics is no greater than the

average Englishman's or Frenchman'a1 knowledge of the realities of American politics. And the difficulty is increased by the fact that we have never had to explain it to ourselvesI.' We have never, a* it were, been called upon to elaborate, our own simple and sufficient conviction that.we are fighting to beat the Germans, that we have not done it yet, and that if we make peace before we have done it, then, no matter what Treaties and Leagues of Peace hv,man ingenuity may construct, we or our children will have to fight them again or accept a German hegemony. Belgian independence may be saved now,, but on terms which would render it impossible for anyone to save it 20 years hence. And in very much less-time than that—if Germany domes out of the war with undiminished power—Balkan independence will be a memory of the past.

The course of the war up to ,now 3 so far from having inclined sober and informed opinion in the allied countries towards an early peace, has tended more and more to drive home the conviction that no sacrifice can be too great if thereby a decision.can be "obtained. For the war has definitely revealed and established . certain facts concerning the balance of power in Europe. The most important of these facts may be .stated as follows:

(1) The war in the west has made it clear that the possession of an overwhelming .striking force prepared to the lust button for instant action

is the only form of military ''preparedness" that is worth' "having. .The nation which can mobilise tiie largest army in the .shortest time after the declaration of war (or, belter still, mobilise it before the declaration of war!) has only to invade its enemy's territory as far as it can, and when it is brought to a halt dig itself-in. That being accomplished/ the invaded country has no alternative but either to resign itself to a war of attrition lasting probably for several years or eke to admit itself beaten and make peace on tho in-, vader's terms. The premium which' this fact places on the enlargement of standing armies and- of all the machinery of war needs 110 elaboration. •

(2) The war in the East has macte it clear that Itu-ssia, though uncoir- . querable as ever, is not,, unsupported Ly the Allies, a military,' Power <of tne first rank, and,for a generation or two at least cannot become one; for under modern conditions military power is completely dependent on industrial power, and industrial i-uwer cannot be created in a day or in a decade. Consequently Germany v ill no longer bo held in check ly ai.y serious fear of the "Russian hordes." (3) The war in the South-east ha*

proved that France a.nd England cannot fight Germany in the Balkans, cannot, in fact, intervene there effectively ajb all by direct action, because of the enormous and permanent natural advantage which Germany (with Austria)-possesses in the shape of good communcations from B. rlin to tiie Bosphorus.

(4) The war, as a whole, has shown that Germany is a mu,clv more powerful military State than we had supposed, perhaps1 even than she herself had supposed, and that subject peoples, though regiments composed of them will not be as valuable, us German regiments, can yet be reh'td' upon to fight,, and, on ■the whole, to fight well, u-ndeiv German command-, ers. In this connection it is to be noted that, despite all rumours' of friction, the-Turks have proved theni> selves willing, faithfui,; and valuable auxiliaries'. ' : ':■."■:■'

(5) 'Finally, tiie fact must be .recorded that the faith and the terror

inspired by the German tiame hus been enormously enhanced by the war

all through South-eastern Eurone

These facts, it will be observed, ,\re in no way dependent on the nature of tho terms of any peace that might be negotiated between the Allies and Ger,many on the basis of the present military position. In any event, they wilt remain true, find will govern the European situation so long as the military 1 power of Germany remains unbroken. That is what the Allies mean when they declare that they are fighting not for I terms but for victory. . For let us see what these facts imply. Let us suppose that Germany was willing at this moment to evacuate France and Bolgium, to pay the latter some kind of indemnity, to evacuate Russian Poland and the Baltic" Provinces, to evacuate Serbia and force Bulgaria to retire from Serbian and Greek Macedonia, and to induce Austria to yield to Italy tho Tronfcino. Suppose even that she wore

"to go still further, and were to offer to 'divide Alsace-Lorraine with France, to give- Italy Trieste, and to forgo tho »«- turn of some of her colonies. Thoso terms are, of course, far beyond- anything that Germany-T-though she1 is, 3:o 'doubb, prepared to be very "generous" in the West—has yet contemplated, but even if we coii'ld extract so much as this out of her, in .return for the boon she crave* of an immediate peace, she would still beyond all question have won the war.. For she would be potentially, if not actually, the mistress of the Continent of Europe, without prospect of ever again having her supremacy challenged.

With one fear of the Russian millions no longer oppressing her., and with her • western frontier fortified by continuous> trench systems', her word, would be law from 'the Baltic to the Black' Sew. "MittelEuropa" would come iirfco boling a-3 surely and ..almost as easily as did the German Empire after the war of 1870; and nothing could prevent its effective expansion through the Balkans tg El Arish and Bagdad, for the littlo Balkan States have learnt well that it-| does not pay to obstruct the , wishes; of Berlin, and that' for those who do so there is no succour; and as for Turkey,' beset by Christian enemies, she has no hope of-life except such as Germany may. graciously secure to her. It is quite probable that throughout this vast area the Kaiser's suzerainty would be formally acknowledged; but whether that-were so or not his authority would be supreme. With such n strategic position and &v.,ch resources Germany would be in a position, within even a decade, to dictate, not indeed to the world, but to Europe. Great Britain would remain independent and comparatively secure, for it would not be worth Germany's while to challenge her upon the sea, and the exposed Egyptian frontierI —the only point of direct land contact—might be adequately fortified. But the rest of Europe would be at Germany's mercy. France, having shown how dangerous a fighter she is, might be ignored. Russia, too, so long as she did not attempt to interfere, might be left alone. But what of the small- States ? How long would it be before- Germany decided to-occupy. What ' "she regards as her "natural frontiers" and to possess herself of the mouths of the Rhine? And • what treaty would then stop her, what league of nations?

To American ears all this1 may sound j an impossible nightmare. But if so, j that is only because Americans are too far away to have learned; the plain lessons of this. war. The European future ; is half seen and unreal to them because the European present is only half seen and unreal. Is there not hope, they may ask, in the coming of democracy in Germany ? Perhaps there is, but there again the experience of this war! is '•■not encouraging. Militarism and democracy arc incompatibles, and in the "Mittel Europa" which would come as a result of an inconclusive peace militarism would be more firmly established than ever by the recorcV of its marvellous success and by the manifest need for a military organisation, proportionate to so vast an expansion:/ As for the ' project' of; the League-to EnI force Peace, in a Europe where there was some .semblance of a balance of. power .it " might become - one oi: .of the most beneficent instruments ever devised to promote peace and civilisation, but in face.of a supremo "Mitt-el Europa," independent of oversea communications, it woujd be merely a league pour rire. It is thus plain to us who are -fighting the Germans that there is only one way in which the liberties, of Europe can be preserved and secured, and that is by such a victory as would discredit militarism and reinforce democracy in Germany itself, and at the same time enable the Allies to limit German rule to those territories in which the German language is spoken. There is no desire on the part of the Allies to infringe the integrity, of Germany in the least degree or to set limits to the legitimate aspirations, of the German people. Our soldiers and sailors are not giving their lives1 to establish a trade boycott or to hinder German ships from sailing the seas. In so far as- any such programme has been adumbrated, Americans may rest, assured that it has nothing like-.general support in London or Paris or, Petro- j grad, that sv,ch support.as it has would not .survive an allied victory, and that in any case it is economically impracticable. "What we are unanimously determined upon is to set limits to Germany's illegitimate aspirations, by which we mean her desire to impose her authority and her kultur upon other European nations. /The foundation of her power to do this is the existence and subservience of the Austrian Empire, in which a minorty of Germans and Magyars rule move than 60 millions of people. Accordingly the Allies desire to reconstruct the Austrian pire on tho basis of its component nationalities, and thus to prevent the creation of that still .greater Empire which has more and more become for Germany tho conscious and accepted object of the war. That is why Germany wants peace, for if she can get it now on any terms her object is achieved. And that is why the Allies will fight on. '~