THE BATTLE CfF COLENSO.

Colonist, Volume XLIII, Issue 9689, 19 January 1900, Page 3

THE BATTLE CfF COLENSO.

THE ATTEMPT TO CEOSS THE TUGELA. FCLL DETAILS. The following lull account of the battle of Colenso, fought on December 15th, from the ' Cape Times,' written by their special correspondent will give a better idea of the struggle than could be gathered from the disconnected reports heretofore: — General Bailer's plan was as follows— General Hart's Brigade on the left was to cross the Tugela Bridge Drift, two miles up from Colenso, and advance towards Celenso. General M. Hillyard was to move directly in front of the Colenso road bridge, which is found to be. still intact, and occupy Fort Wylie, oa the north bank overlooking Colenso. General Barton, with the cavalry and the mounted men, was to occupy Indlawe Hill, five miles to the east of Colenso on the south side of the Tugela. General Lyttelton to support generally. The column moved forward from Chievely before daybreak on to Fort Nicholson Plateau, a mile and a half from Colenso, with the object of forcing the passage to the Tugela river. The enemy were known to be entrenched on a series of low-lying kopjes immediately north of Colenso bridge, while one. large camp was reported to be in the rear of Ladysmith road, five miles north, and a second large camp in the hills in a northerly direction from Indlawe Hill, to the right of Colenso village. The primary object of the movement was not effected, owing to Sir Francis Clery being unable, without great sacrifice of life, to pass the river and storm the very strong position held by the enemy. The Boer's fighting line extended in a semi-circle of high bills, with the kopjes mentioned in front centre to about ten miles. Their big guns were pointed on the flanks, and on the centre kopjes were a Hotcbkiss and Maxim automatic. They had about ten guns in all. Their practice was erratic at first, but later on the accuracy of fire was remarkable, and caused, with their sweeping rifle fire, considerable loss to our side. The battle opened at 6.40, when the naval guns, under Captain Jones sent shell after shell into the enemy s entrenchments, and covered the development of the day's operations. Four brigades and a composite regiment of mounted infantry took part in the operations. Major Walker with Mounted Infantry was on the extreme right, and next came General Barton's Fusiliers brigade with a division of field artillery General Hildyard on the left of the front attack and English Brigade, and one battery, and General Lyttelton, with General Hart, was supporting two brigades on the left flank with the. Irish Brigade, The two attacks were delivered simultaneously, covered by magnificent shelling by the naval guns and field artillery, especially the former, which fired from the centre line of attack on a ridge overlooking the Tugela and Colenso. Immediately in front the guns .opened with a terrible and destructive fire on the kopje and entrenchment north of Colenso, including Fort Wylie, now occupied by Boers, and one of their principal positions.. The Devons and Queens, who formed the fighting line of the central brigade, steadily moved towards Colenso, and meanwhile General Hart, on the left flank, became hotly engaged. The strength of the enemy's position then developed, and seemed to be exceptionally strong. Their right was formed by a steep, inaccessible hill, and after sweeping in a circle for some eight or ten miles, their left rested on a steep position, while the centre, which was formed of kopjes immediately north of Colenso was entrenched. In addition, dongas and cuttings along the river bank afforded secure shelter for many hundreds of sharpshooters. This position could only be taken with certainly great loss, and Sir Francis Clery declined to throw his men away in doing so. At 6-40 General Hart on the left advanced towards Middledrift, immediately west of

the junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The troops were at once met by a shell fire from the heights beyond, and the Royal Dublins advancing to the Tugela, they were met by a heavy rifle fire. They went on, however, as if on parade, while the Connaught Bangers, Inniskillings and Borderers, with the support of a handful of the " Dubs," got over the river and advanced to take a position on a low kopje, and were within 300 yards of what was believed to contain only a few of the enemy, when a staggering fire was sent into them and they were forced to get back to the river. Shell fire from the heights and a concentrated rifle fire showed the Boers to be in greater strength on the left than was anticipated, and for a time the General had to order a retirement on his guns, while our attack on the left flank was thus retarded. The Queens and Devons of General Hildyard's brigade found tbemselves in a tight place. The General's object was to go straight for the iron road bridge across the river and take possession of the ensconced kopjes. This he failed to do, not because the Deyons or Bneens faltered for al moment, but because the crossed masked fire which they were exposed to was too much for anyone to face and yet live. For two hours the men, who had crept up within a few hundred yards of the bridge, met a large force of Boers in a rifle duel, and for some hours, and at times for twenty minutes at a stretch, the fire rattled like a heavy hailstorm on an iron roof. The centre attack, that is, the fighting line of .Hildyard's brigade, in spite of a tremendous fire from rifles and shells, seized the rifle trenches of the enemy in front of Colenso village, but could go no further. The 66th and another battery of the Koyal Artillery supported them. Captain Goldie, of the 66th Battery, was killed almost at once, and several men were bit. The guns were then halted within 800 yards of the river, and immediately to the east of the railway. The two batteries opened fire on a kopje beyond Fort Wylie, and also on the latter itself. The Boers were so .well under cover that they could not be easily detected, but for an hour and a-half, while the ammunition lasted, the batteries' were able to somewhat keep down

the enemy's fire. All the time, however, officers,, men, and horses, were falling round the guns. Early in the action Colonel Long was seriously wounded in two places, while Colonel Hunt, who was in charge of the division, had a bullet flesh wound in both sides.

tne enemy s nre. jaii we nine, uowevei , officers r men, and horses, were falling round the guns. Early in the action Colonel Long was seriously wounded in two places, while Colonel Hunt, who was in charge of the division, had a bullet flesh wound in both sides. When the supply of shells gave out and there was no sign of the ammunition column waggons arriving, the inferno of fire from the enemy's right and left was repeated, and those who could doubled back with the wounded into a donga twenty yards in the rear of the guns. There the men were more or less sheltered, and after a time the enemy ceased directing their fire at the donga. Colonel Bullock then arrived on the scene with two companies of the Devons and a few of the Scottish Fusiliers, and assumed command. It was about this time that several heroic attempts were made to get away the guns. The General and his staff galloped down the field, and Surgeon-Major Bate rode through the shell and rifle fire right into the donga, and saw two wounded there. Some of the artillerymen took refuge in a trench, others ran the gauntlet of a shower of bullets till they escaped out of range, the Boer Maxim and Nordenfeldt playing on them with deadly effect. It was a dreadful sight to see the men being swept down by this terrible machine, but it was grand to see the gallant attempts of the survivoi-s to rescue their fallen comrades. Captain Congreve, the press censor, Captain Reed of the sth Battery, and Captain Schofield, A.D.C, and Lieutenant Roberts, A.D.C., to the General, all came to the ' donga, and tried to lead the detachments and horses back to the guns, with the view of bringing them out, This, however, owing to the hail of bullets and shell, was impossible. Captain Schofield was the only one who succeeded in getting the two guns of the ' 66th Battery away, and that without being bit. Captain Reed failed because all the

horses were shot before the guns could be hitched on, and he himself was shot through the thigh ; while Lord Eoberts' son, in making his equally gallant attempt, was badly wounded in the upper part of the thigh. Captain Congreve, who previously had several marvellous escapes was also unlucky, for just as he dismounted to make the attempt he was hit in the leg, and hob-

bled in the donga. Shortly after the firing seemed to abate but when anybody showed himself above the donga he was instantly made a tavget of. Captain Goodwin, of the Devons, nevertheless led his company with a fine rush into the donga, and was hit in the ankle as he got there. Captain Elton, of the fi6th Battery, was shot, through the shoulder and lung. He subsequently got away, but waa brought back by the Boers. The unwounded officers and men of the Battery tried again to get away their guns, and in makirg one attempt, Captain Schreiher was killed, and Lieutenaut Grylls was wounded From a second donga Lieutenant Inkson, R.A.M.C., made several plucky rushes and brought in wounded 'men and attended to them and others who crawled through the fire into the donga. It was here also that Captain Hughes, R.A.M.C., attached to the General's Staff, was mortally wounded as he rode in to render help. Captain White Thompson, adjutant of the two batteries, made a rush back to secure some picketing gear to shelter the , wounded in the front donga from the blazing sun, and in doing so was struck by a fragment of a shell in the right side. Subsequently both Captain White Thompson, Captain Congreve, and one or two other officers, along with some men, got away, either in the confusion or because they were wounded. Colonel Hunt/although wounded, was detained by the Boers, when a strong detachment of them came across the river well on in the afternoon, and subsequent to firing having ceased, and surrounded the ten guns and party in donga, and captured the lot. When the Boers rode up, and although it was seen that any attempt to render the party succour was impossible, Colonel Bullock declined to give up his sword. The Boers then threatened that if the surrender was not prompt and unconditional they would shoot all the party, and Colonel Bullock gave in. Such is the story of the capture of the ten guns. Several officers and a number of men were killed and wounded in trying to rescue the batteries. While the Devons and Queens were finding it impossible to get across the bridge, but were holding their own man to man against the Boer marksmen, Hart's brigade was obliged to retire at 8.30 on its supports, when some naval guns turned their special attention tn the left flank, and found the enemy's schanzes and hill positions with great accuracy. Before she guns here were silenced, however, they had dropped many shells amongst the retiring force, and had knocked off the carriage wheel of our field artillery gun on the right. General Barton advanced his brigade under cover of a depression along the right of the railway line, and sought to support Lyttelton's brigade on that flank. The firing again became very hot around the road bridge, and- General ; Barton, who found very little shelter for his Fusiliers, was obliged to retire concurrently with part of the Devons and Queens. As this movement was proceeding, the '■Dubs" and Connaughts, on the left, had another essay at doubling up the Boers on to their centre, and, as before, they lost somewhat heavily in the attempt, despite the magnificent shooting of the Naval Brigade and Field Artillery. It was deemed advisable not to press the attack more determinedly, and at about noon the order was given to retire. On the extreme right flank, and before the order to retire was given, the Mounted Infantry and Field Artillery fared badly. Major Water's orders were to take Indlawe Hill, plant guns there, and shell the central kopjes. Unfortunately the Boers were stronger than was believed in Indlawe, as when the composite regiment was riding towards the hill it found itself exposed to a merciless

fusillade, hacked by a hot shell fire from the top and slopes of the Indlawe. They took cover immediately, but so telling was the Boer rifle fire that they dared not raise their heads until the order was given to retire, and when the orderly arrived with instructions to retire the guns, there were no gunners left to execute the order. At least eight of their guns had to be temporarily abandoned. Troops are en* trenched watching the guns, and it is not believed the enemy will dare to cross the river and attempt, their capture. The battle was a drawn one, as few Boers attempted to leave their entrenchments or the shelter of houses and trees of Colenso, but galled our troops with big-gun fire, while we, on our side, continued to pour a perfect avalanche of shells into their central position and wherever they happened to show themselves. We silenced their guns on the left and raked their centre with lyddite and shrapnel, but failed to get effectively at tbeir Maxims and Nordenfeldts on the kopje embrasures, or to make headway in silencing their guns on the right. The loss of the enemy as they continued to hold their positions is unknown, but they must have lost heavily, especially from lyddite fire. The troops, who fought coclly as if on parade for eiget long hours under a blazing sun,' are impatient to meet the enemy in a decisive b&ttle.