POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN WAIKATO.

Colonist, Volume XIII, Issue 1287, 25 January 1870, Page 3

POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN WAIKATO.

(From the Southern Cross, January 20.)

The sincerity of the King's advisers is doubted; fche policy of the Imperial Government in withdrawing the 18th Regiment is strenuously condemned. We are not in a position to say how far public opinion is right in regard to the leaders of the King Maoris, but we entirely endorse the expression of opinion in regard to the withdraM'al of the troops. There are many reasons; however, why the influential men about the King should be opposed to a renewal of hostilities. They have everything to lose by war. Their chance of gain must now be, in their own estimation, a, very desperate chance indeed. To renew the war in Waikato would make the struggle final, and percipitate the end. It would be, once for all, a war of races, in which eventually the weaker side must lose. The natives know, and feel, that theirs is the weaker side. They cannot recruit their numbers from without as we can. They are not members of a race which counts its millions as we are 5 nor do they possess the means, within themselves, of prolonging a struggle with the white race. Their warlike stores must be supplied from without —must, in truth, pass through our own hands, in a direct way or by an evasion of the law. Therefore, however warlike their spirit, however high their courage, they cannot fail to perceive that their chance is hopeless as against the Europeans, who have in their favor all the elements of success. In fact, the " policy" of the King and his advisers, since the cessation of hostilities in Waikato, has evidently been based upon an intelligent apprehension of the facts alluded fco. They have refrained from overt acts of hostility, as knowing their inability to cope successfully with us ; but they have scrupulously abstained from all intercourse with us. It is evident that they perceived thafc their sole chance of independence lay in keeping the white race at arm's length; and they concluded—;and rightly so—that the Colony would have quite enough: on its hands to settle and reclaim the confiscated territory for many years to come, and thafc fchey would therefore remain unmolested,. We are therefore of opinion that the policy which has been so far successful would not bo so lightly abandoned by the King party. Indeed, the action taken by the King and Rewi since the first appearance of Te Kooti at Tokangamutu until now is consistent with this view of fche case. We are inclined to think that the " signs of the times" are not so dark as some would have them. It is true we have Te Kooti and his followers to deal with ; it is true, also, that they have appeared unpleasantly near our frontiers, and that the King has not ordered their expulsion, or sanctioned an attack upon them by his followers. Bufc all this is consistent with the strictest neutrality by the King, whose line of aotion appears to have had this for its end —to preserve the peace in his own recognised territory. Now, it must not be forgotten that Te Kooti has not made his appearance at Tokangamutu, or the neighborhood of Cambridge, of his own accord. He is there because he has no other shelter. He has been driven there by our arms, an outlaw and murderer, with a price set on his head j and the Maori King says, in effect, to his pursuers— "Do not attack him on my land j I want peace." To Te Koofci he says —" Leave this district, and do no evil within it. The consequence is what we have seen,—that Te Kooti, cut off from retreat to the West Coaut by Topia. and Kemp, expelled from the East Coast by Colonel M'Donnell and the Arawas, menaces the outlying settlements iv the Upper Waikato. If he commits atrocities, we must hold him responsible and visit his sins upon his own head, and those of his followers who may be taken red-handed; but sound policy, and a due consideration of all the facts, would lead us to hold guiltless the King party proper. Of course, if it could be established by con». elusive evidence that Te Kooti acted against ub with, fche knowledge and consent of Tawhiao and hia advisers, the case would be different; but the simple fact that Te Kooti has appeared in the King's country is nofc proof of complicity by the King. Moreover, it would be too much to expect that the King shoul act as the special constable of the Government, and arrest Te Kooti. The reason given for not delivering him over to be dealt with by our law, namely, that he had done no evil in the King's dominions, is satisfactory to the native mind; and it must be remembered that in this oase it is their view, and not our view, of Te Kooti's culpability that must prevail. If T« Kooti dew vril in tut King'• territory, he will b^

dealt with by the native authorities, we are led to j understand—in other words that the King will vindicate his own authority, and punish any transgression of his law. Now, this may not be exactly sat isfactory to us, as a civilised people; but it is the very best we could hope for from a race standing towards us in the same relation thafc a large section of the Maoris do. It is fche penalty the colonising race must pay for the privilege of encroaching on barbarous tribes, ana doing its best to civilise them. At the same time, it is in accord with the idea with which we started, that King Tawhiao and his principal men do not desire war, and are nofc allied wi'h Te Kooti. They appear most anxious to get rid of him on as easy terms as possible; and if they nrcomplish that, and maintain their own isolated independence, they do not much care what may happen to him. We dare say, however, thafc they would prefer if Te Kooti got away without loss, and would not be sorry at any injury he inflicted on the colonists which did nofc recoil on themselves. Thus, then, we believe we have to deal with Te Kooti, and not with the great King party; and, if our surmise be correct, there is not so much cause for public alarm.