SUPREME COURT

Colonist, Issue 1165, 4 December 1868, Page 5

SUPREME COURT

SITTINGS IN BANCO

TUESDAY, Decembkb 1,

meat:, appellant, v the waste lands boaed of

TIIE PROVINCE OP MARYBOROUGH, BKSPONDENT3. Tnia was an appeal against a decision of the Waste Linds Board upon an application made by the appellent, under section 83, of " The Mirlborough Waste Linda Act, 1867," for a lesse of the lands held by him under a depasturing license, and known as t!ie Waipapa run. The act provides that the holder of any such license, upon complying with certain conditions (which in this cine were admitted to have been complied with), sliould be entitled to a lease of the lands held under such license. Tho boundaries of the Waipapa run, according to the license, were on the southward, a line extending from the sea in Half-Moon Bay to the base of Mount Tapuneuka, and on the westward Mount Tapuneuka. The Waste Lands Board decided that these boundaries were too indefinite, and proposed to grant Mr. M'Rae a lease of land bounded on the south by a line drawn from Half-Moon B;iy, in transit with the peak of Tnpuneuka, until it reaches the boundary of the Jam run, thence on the western side by the Jam run. From evidence given by Mr. J. 0. Western, surveyor, and various plans produced, it was contended that this decision would entirely ignore the western boundary of tho run as originally licensed ; that the boundaries as defined by that license were sufficiently definile ; that the area of the run would be diminished by 9800 acres, and its natural boundury, the river Clarence, taken away; and that the object of the Board in giving a decision which was not in conformity with the act, was to avoid tho necessity of giving compensation to the occupiers of the Jam run, which run was nltnost entirely included in the land previously licensed to the appellant. Mr. Cojror.LY and Mr. Pitt were counsel for the appellant. The respondents did not appear. His Honob took time to consider his judgement. .TEFFERY, APPELTANT, V. HUTCHESON, BKSPONDENT, This was an appeal from the Resident Magistrate'B Court, Blenheim. The case was, that a farmer at Tua Marina, named Honeywell, had, on the sth day of July, 1867, sold his horses and farming implements to the appellant, and on the same day entered into an agreement for the use of the same, for a period of eight months. The horses were taken to Picton and delivered to the appellant before the purchase money was paid, but taken back by Honeywell on the same day, after tho agreement was drawn up. An ordinary bill and receipt had been made out and signed by Honeywell. About a year afterwards the horses were taken in execution upon a judgment obtained by the respondent for a debt; and the appellant had obtained them under section 72, of " Resident Magistrate's Act." The Court below decided that, although the horses were brought and delivery taken by the appellant, yet, under the c'rcumstanoes of the case, it should have been done by a deed of transfer, and duly registered, in order to protect the appellant from an execution creditor. Mr. Pitt, for the respondent, argued that this udgraent was right j referring to " The Bills of Sale Registration Act, 1856," Miller ani Collier on Bills of Sale, und the cases of Simpson and others v. Wood, 21 Law J. Exch., and Flory v. Denny in the same volume, and Thompson v. Barrett, 1 Law Times. Upon these authoritifs he contended that the receipt and agreement entered into between Honeywell and the appellant were documents which required registration under " The Bills of Sale Act," in order to make the sale valid as against an execution creditor. His Honor, without calling upon Mr. Con >i/ly, who appeared for tho appellant, said that the judgment below must be reversed. Two of the eases cited by Mr. Pitt were cases in bankruptcy, and were therefore on a different footing, AUeop v, Day, 31

Law J. 2 8., and Halo v. the Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co., 28 Law J., Chane, were distinct authorities in point that a receipt for goods was not n bill of sale. The property in'the horses did not paas to the appelluut by that document, but by parol contract and delivery; and it was evident that the objection of the Justices wns only formal, and that no question of fraud was intended to be raised. In Thompson v. Barrett, the holder of the goods appeared to have relied upon the instrument only. Judgment reversed wiih costs.