FRANCO-GERMAN STRIFE

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 73, Issue 6282, 16 September 1946, Page 3

FRANCO-GERMAN STRIFE

A REVIEW OF THE PAST THE PROBELM OF FRENCH SECURITY In his last talk of the series '‘History Behind the News,” broadcast in the 8.8.C.’s Services’ Educational Series, Professor W. D. Medlicott traces the growth of fear and desire for revenge which now constitute the Franco-German problem. “If we look back over the centuries, we shall find that there really is nothing to justify the view that the French and Germans must always be enemies,” states the professor. “What is the Franco-German problem? Is there no solution to it? Are these two great countries so dangerous to each other, are Germans and Frenchmen so hateful to each other, that they can never live side by si,de in peace and friendship ? It would certainly seem so to-day. “But if we look back over the centuries, we shall find- that there really is nothing to justify the view that French and Germans must always be enemies. Until about eighty years ago, they were, on the whole, good friends often better friends than were the French and the English. “Things changed a lot after the Franco-German war of 1870, and the formation of the new German Empire in 1871. In 1870, the German armies smashed the French in a few weeks, and France had to give Up the two provinces of Alsace and part of Lorraine to Germany. France, after this, dreamed of revenge, and the Germans were determined not to give the two provinces back. “Then, at the end of the 1914-18 war, France was on the winning side, and it was Germany who dreamed of revenge—which she seemed to have secured when she defeated the French so quickly in 1940. Now, France is again on the winning side, quite convinced that Germany must never be allowed to recover her strength.

‘“Let us look back for a moment at the relations of these two peoples before 1870. For 200 or 300 years, France was far stronger than Germany; she was, indeed, by far the strongest country in Europe. In the second half of the seventeenth century, she was ruled by a very magnificient and stately king—Louis XIV; she had the best armies in Europe, and her culture and literature and fine buildings were admired and copied all over Europe. And nowhere was there more sincere imitation of the French than in Germany. “Some of the German states, like Prussio, Saxony, Bavaria and Austria, were bigger and stronger than the others, and the rulers of Austria were also the Holy Roman Emperors. France and Austria were always at war, and in this sense there has been a continuous quarrel between them for centuries. The other German states were always afraid that Austria would giow.too powerful and would attack and absorb them, and, therefore, when the Emperor went to war against the French the north German states were quite likely to side with the French against the Emperor. “And so, for over 200 years, it was quite usual for France to help the north German states against the Austrians. Even, as late as 1866, when Prussia fought Austria, she was helped by the French. During the eighteenth century, large numbers of Frenchmen settled in Berlin; one-sixth of the. entire population of Prussia was, in fact, made up of French, or Dutch, or their descendants. The great debt which Germany owed to French culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was repaid in the nineteenth, when the great German writers, like Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Rilke, and many others were read and admired in France.

“True, there was as well another side to the picture, but the national rivalry between France and Germany was only the sort of thing that seems to happen between al Istates that live side by side, and there were, as I say, long periods of friendship. The fact is that the two peoples did accept one another as being of equal worth and civilisation; the Germans never had the contempt for the French that they had for the Slavs. ~

“But there was a very real change after 1870. There were two causes of rivalry; the first was the AlsaceLorraine question, the second the political rivalry of two great states which had started their careers as modern states after a bitter quarrel. “The Alsace-Lorraine question was really a very old one. When France became a powerful state in the sixteenth century, her rulers began to seek strong frontiers for her. On three sides, the frontiers were clear enough. To the east, however, a clearly marked frontier was hard to find, and for many generations the French hoped to extend up to the Rhine, which was largely a German river. “In the sixteenth century, France was able to push forward some distance, and she took- in some border people who were hot French—particularly the German-speaking people of Alsace and Lorraine. In those days, language was not considered a proof of national character. Indeed, it was not until the nineteenth century that the idea grew up that language and national frontier should coincide.

“By 1870, many of the Germanspeaking peoples of Alsace and Lorraine had learned to speak French, and, what was more important, they liked French civilisation and wanted to remain French. But to many patriotic Germans these were German provinces which had been taken from Germany when she was weak, and must be returned now that she was strong. There is no doubt, too, that if France had won the war in 1870 she would have annexed some more German territory in the Rhineland. “These frontiers disputes now had added to them the much greater problem of national rivalry. Germany had taken the place of Austria as the strong Central European rival of France. Success came to Germany too late and too suddenly. It went to her head. The army had won the great victory in 1870 which had made Germany strong after centuries dT weakness; even the more liberalminded Germans now hero-worshipped the soldier. It was all very alarming to the nervous Frenchman. “France had other reasons for alarm after 1870. One was man-power. France’s great successes in earlier times had been largely due to her big population. But by 1939, France was the smallest of the European great powers, and Germany was far ahead—-

with something like 75,000,000 to France’s 40,000,000. “Germany was going ahead, too, as a great industrial power, while France was still mainly an agricultural country until the beginning of the twentieth century. “France knew after 1870 that the old France was dead; it was the new France, uneasily conscious of the greater strength of its enemy, which struggled through to victory after terrible losses in the 1914-18 war. Someone has said that although she was on the winning side in 1918, she had the mentality of a defeated nation. “We must grasp all these points if we are to understand the FrancoGerman problem to-day. The basis of the problem, is fear: France fears a stronger nation which, in her opinion, can never be trusted with power. “When Hitler came into power in 1933, France stubbornly refused his demand for-the right to re-arm: in the end he took the risk of re-arming without the consent of the other powers, and France had to decide whether to attack him, or acquiesce. This was why the occupation of the Rhineland by German troops in March, 1936, was so important. It was important as a symbol: it was a direct threat to the French frontiers, and when France and England took no steps to prevent it, Hitler knew that he could go ahead. “So for two years—l 936-1938— France’s policy was almost entirely defensive. She strengthened her frontiers and waited, not very hopefully, to see what would turn up. What did turn up was German intervention in Spain in 1937, and her occupation of Austria and the Sudeten districts of Czechoslovakia in 1938. “When the German seizure of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, made it abundantly clear that all hope of a peaceful Germany must be finally abandoned, France joined Britain in opposition, but it was obvious to everyone that she did so with little enthusiasm—that she was half beaten before the war started.

“With all this in mind, France faces the future. The war has caused many changes in France new political parties, the emergence of a tougher generation, new friendships and enmities with other European states. Germany is now helpless enough; Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are playing the main part in occupying Germany, and as long as their occupation lasts France no doubt feels that she is safe enough from another German attack. “But, at heart, the Frenchman is still faced with the agonising ailemma of the last eighy years. Can Germany ever be trusted if she regains her full strength again? Every Frenchman says no. But can Germany be kept for ever in weakness, in political subjection and economic dependence? To this every Frenchman would like to say yes, but is haunted with the dreadful fear that, sooner or later, the effort will be impossible to maintain: France or France’s allies, will lack the resolution to go on with the job. “This is the problem of French security, and the future of Germany and of Europe depends very largely on how it is solved.”