MANPOWER POLICY

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 66, Issue 5596, 24 March 1943, Page 2

MANPOWER POLICY

THE NEW ARMY RESULTS OF CHANGE z The Herald’s military correspondent says that from the recent Parliamentary debate on the man-power problem and the plans upon which it was based there will emerge a new home deience Army. It will consist of permanently mobilised cadres, or nucleus bodies, plus a reinforcement pool of part-time soldiers who will receive one month’s intensive camp training a year and the equivalent of two days’ parade training a month Men who can expect to be released from camp—that is, those who are not retained for the permanentlymobilised cadres—may be sadly disappointed if they think they are all going to return to the employment which they left when they entered the Army. Their return to civilian life will not be just a matter of marching out of camp and going back to their former offices, shops, factories, and farms. DRAFTING TO INDUSTRY All releases will be made through the various man-power committees, and men will be drafted out of the Army into the industries which these authorities consider need their services. The basis of all releases is the man-power survey recently made throughout the Army by the National Service Department, and the conclusions formed by the Department in Wellington will no doubt form the general policy lying behind the releases and the transfers into industry. At the moment it seems impossible to clarify some points left obscure by the Parliamentary debate. For instance, although the Prime Minister clearly stated the Government’s intention to allow 18 and 19-year-olds, other than those awaiting call by the Air Force or Navy, to resume their civilian vocations or studies if they wished to do so, no instructions for an en bloc release, or any date by which it is to be made, or the procedure to be observed, appear to have been received in the Northern Military District. MEN OF 41-45 GROUP Before the Prime Minister‘made his statement, the general expectation was that the release of these youths would be on the same selective basis as all other releases, and that unit commanders could seek the retention of any they wanted for cadre duties. Some persons are also doubtful whether the release of these youths will automatically mean their return to pre-enlistment vocations or whether they will still be subject to compulsory industrial drafting. Of similar uncertainty, in the absence of an official clarification, is the future of the balloted but still unmobilised men of the 41-45 age group. Although some of these men are inclined to think that the reduction in the standing Army will release them of their military obligations, it is much more likely that they will be called for the month’s camp training and regular parade training set down for all the other civilian or part-time soldiers. Another issue which was not determined during the debate was whether grade 1 men now in industry are to be replaced by grade 2 transfers from the Army so that they can stand in line for Expeditionary Force drafting. This is of verv great importance, and, while it has been reported that manpower committees have the machinery ready to effect such a turn-about, no official declaration of policy or guidance for the naturally interested employers has yet been issued.

SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY It is difficult to discuss all the implications and pending results of the intended Army reduction without disclosing figures which should be kept secret However, certain general observations can be put forward. One is that the debate offered no satisfaction on the point whether the Navy and Air Force have been similarly combed for men who might be released for industry or transferred to more active duty.

The fundamental security factors presented by the intended reduction of the Army suggest themselves as three in number. The first is the military soundness of the appreciation of the Army Chief of Staff that New Zealand can depend on three months’ warning of an attack demanding re-mobilisation. Although this may seem generous, it must be accepted as the considered opinion of a man well qualified and in the best of all positions to judge. The* second point is the speed with which re-mobilisation can be effected if an emergency arises. The Herald’s correspondent is satisfied that the arrangements made for this are as complete as they can be, and no dangerous risk should be entailed on this ground.

TRAINING STANDARD The third and most important point is the training standard, or degree of readiness for action, of the Army if re-mobilisation has to be carried out. This is the point which provokes the greatest uneasiness. Training is not a static thing. It does not await the convenience of men. An Army demobilised to-day may be out of date on re-mobilisation, say, in six months’ time. Similarly, men’s fitness and endurance have disappeared in the meantime. They cannot rely in six months’ time on picking up where they left off to-day. Rather will they have to start all over again to learn and equip themselves to do many of the things which they now know and can do. It is intended that all men—recruits and about-to-be demobilised soldiers—should do the one month’s intensive training a year and the two days’ parade training a month. This means that men will be going into and coming out of camp at four-week-ly periods throughout the year, probably starting in a month or two. No matter how enthusiastic they are, who can say that this amount of training can make recruits into soldiers and keep existing soldiers fit and thoroughly trained THE REAL RISK Here lies the real risk of the whole scheme. It is being taken to benefit industry. On the face of it, industry

should benefit substantially because of the numbers to be released. But does closer examination support this view ? No figures have been made public to show how many additional men industry will have at its disposal over a season’s or a year’s period. Gross releases would obviously disclose the numbers to come out of the Army, but a statement on the net annual number—that is, the total left after other men have been taken out of industry for Expeditionary Force, Air Force, and Navy—seems to be on a different footing, and would enable judgment of the complete situation.

This is the crux of the plan. If the net advantage to industry., having regard for withdrawals during the year for active service and for the disorganisation which must result from the monthly camp 7 scheme, is going to be so small that the risk involved more than offsets it, then the plan would apepar in a very different light.