THE LIBYAN DEBACLE

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 65, Issue 5494, 6 July 1942, Page 3

THE LIBYAN DEBACLE

CAUSES ANALYSED SUPERIOR GERMAN TANKS LESSONS TO BE LEARNT “ Our tank force in Libya,” writes the war correspondent of the London Times under date 23rd June, “ included a number of new General Grants carrying an excellent 75-millimetre gun, but the bulk was made up of Matildas, Crusaders, Valentines, and Honeys, all armed ■with the little twopounder which has again and again proved almost entirely useless against the German tanks, which are all equipped with at least a 47-millimetre gun- Some are using 75’s and others a converted 88-millimetre anti-air-craft gun .on a vehicle with speciallyhardened armour. “ Even Italian and French tanks, with 50-millimetre and 47-millimetre guns, out-ranged and out-gunned everything on our side except the General Grants. The military authorities deleted these facts from an article I wrote after the last campaign. “ It was due to his contempt for our tanks—but certainly not for our men inside them—that the German commander made his audacious and confident sweep north in the opening days of the battle. He was not aware that we had General Grants, but although these tanks gave him an uncomfortable shock they were not sufficiently numerous to prove decisive- “ In fact, victory then seemed within our grasp due to our greatly improved recovery of damaged tanks and our commander’s skill and courage in individual encounters.” ADVANTAGE IN ANTI-TANK GUNS “ The enemy also had the advantage in anti-tank guns, and showed considerable cleverness in their use. The bulk of our guns were only two-pound-ers, although the new six-pounder, which arrived only shortly before the campaign opened, and in inadequate proved an excellent weap-

“ The way the battle went teaches the lesson that in a modern tank battle in vast desert spaces, in which there is almost limitless space for manoeuvring, liaison between tanks and antitank guns must be very close. The enemy’s- tanks were always accompanied by a formidable concentration of anti-tank artillery. His tactics, which were fatally successful, were to draw us into a trap by using a small number of tanks as decoys- “ Our tactics in the co-operation of all arms and the concentration of armoured units were better than in the previous campaign, but they were far from perfect. That lesson must be driven home to every tank general. There might have been a chance to recover from the debacle of 13th June except for the fact that those of our armoured units which escaped from the German trap split into two columns, and never joined again. They were attacked and beaten separately by a powerful enemy force- “ Even during our gradual withdrawals small numbers of tanks could be seen wandering forlornly over the desert. If these could have been gathered together we should still have had a strong enough force to check the enemy and hold our advanced positions at least long enough to get the bulk of our troops to safety, instead of allowing them to remain in isolated boxes such as El Adem, Acroma, and Tobruk.

“The remaining outstanding lesson given by the enemy’s victory is the imperative need for speed both in decision and manoeuvre. Guns, unless they can be rapidly transported to the nosition where they are most needed, lose 75 per cent of their effective- “ Our air support tactics were excellent. No fault can be found there. The Bth Army’s air forces concentrated on supply columns and did fine work smashing enemy bases and delaying the arrival of reinforcements.”