NAVAL POWER

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 64, Issue 4528, 26 January 1942, Page 3

NAVAL POWER

WAR IN THE PACIFIC COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS Great as the Allied naval losses in the Pacific may have been and serious as their result will be on short-term strategy, they must '-be balanced against the total naval strength that still remains and also against those parts of the British and American building programmes which are nearing completion. The broad balance of naval power (writes the military correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald”) still lies with the democracies; on the other hand, it must never be forgotten that Allied responsibilities are spread over the seven seas, whereas the Japanese are able to concentrate upon a one-ocean navy. The United States had 17 battleships when the Pacific war broke_ out, ail of them old ships except the North Carolina and Washington, which are new 35,000-tonners. No fewer than 15 additional battleships are being built, but most of these will probably not be available until 1943 or later. Much may depend upon whether the American shipyards can make additional capital ships of the 16-inch-gun Washington type ready enough for service in the near future. It is not unreasonable to expect that four more Washingtons will come within this category, because they were originally planned for next year, and it is known that the rate of production has been greatly expedited since the North Carolina was commissioned eight months ago. It is fortunate that America is very far from starting from scratch in replacing her losses at Pearl Harbour. Six of the Washingtons were laid down as early as 1938, and their con-

struction was well advanced last year. One of them—the North Carolina—was commissioned on April 10 of this year and the Washington on May 15, while another, the South Dakota, was launched in June, followed quickly by the Philadelphia, and, six weeks ago, by the Massachusetts. The time between launching and commissioning has been greatly reduced, the South Dakota, for instance, being promised for active service next month. If this rate of production can be maintained America will have the first five of her 35,000-tonners fighting by next March. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET Thus, even though the disaster at Pearl Harbour was as great as the more pessimistic reports suggest, America will still have a considerable battle fleet in the Pacific, with a steady flow of reinforcements in the next few months. The constructional

programme of cruisers and light craft is also proceeding on parallel lines, and naturally the rate of production of smaller warships is much more rapid than that of capital ships. One of the intangible features in the naval position is the extent to which, fresh British capital ships can be diverted to the Pacific, following the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Counting these ships, Britain has lost only two battleships and two battle cruisers since the war started; she still has 12 capital ships of her older types, together with the four remaining King George V’s, of which two at least are in service. The disposition of these battleships must be determined by the general naval position, and there are clearly limits beyond which the striking power of the Royal Navy in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean cannot be reduced. These are all the narrower because of the uncertainty regarding the balance of the French fleet. Vichy still controls three good battleships, 14 cruisers, 43 destroyers, and about 60 submarines, which make up a formidable force-in the aggregate. JAPANESE FLEET The immediate problem, however, is to cope with 12 Japanese battleships and two or three so-called “pocket battleships,” which are stronger than their German prototypes. Ten of the battleships date back to before 1921, but the last two are new, and resemble the Washington type, although they are probably heavier and faster. Three more of the new 40,000-tonners are believed to be building, but it is impossible to ascertain at what stage of production they are, although most American sources believe that the Nissin programme in Japan has not kept pace with the Washington programme in the United States.

Admitting the presence of many incalculable or unknown factors, the general position seems to be that Japan may have a temporary preponderance of power in the Pacific, in so far as heavy capital ships are concerned, but that the American Pacific fleet can be reinforced while the longer-ranged building programmes greatly favour the Allies. Nor can it be concluded that Japan’s losses will be limited to the bombing of one battleship. The Americans must recover from the original hard blow they suffered before they seek out the enemy. Since they were not the aggressors, it could scarcely be expected that they ‘ would be in a position to engage the Japanese so early in the war. The time factor needed in Pacific manoeuvres must be kept in mind. The immediate danger is that Japan will capitalise her original gains and wrest such advantages from the Allies that their permanent naval strategy may be affected. She is already profiting in so far as the Philippines and Malaya are concerned. The fate of both depends ultimately upon the naval position.