EASTERN CAMPAIGN

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 64, Issue 4528, 26 January 1942, Page 5

EASTERN CAMPAIGN

PROBLEMS OF SUPPLY LONG-TERM STRATEGY AND SHIPPING Not the least impressive feature of the United States war production plan outlined to Congress by President Roosevelt lately, and certainly no less important than the aircraft, tanks, and guns figures, was the forecast of dead-weight shipping tonnage which it is proposed to construct in United States shipyards in the years 1942 and 1943. In the year 1941 the existing yards produced 1,150,000 tons. In 1942 it is planned to produce 8,000,000 tons; and in 1943 a further increase of 2.060,000 tons is scheduled. These are impressive figures. When, however, one considers the far-flung nature of the Allied battlefi'ont and the immense problems that have to be met in the transport of supply for the large forces which are likely to be employed in all theatres of the war, it win be. realised that shipping, and shipping in huge quantity, is a vital essential for the organisation of Allied victory. I’HE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST It has been stated by Mr Churchill and other British Ministers on several occasions that a balance had to te struck between Libya and Malaya ai]d the Far East when the distribution of available armament resources was settled, and in view of the. strategical importance of the Libyan campaign a risk had to be taken in the under-supply of areas now involved in war by the Japanese onslaught. Mr Anthony Eden, in a recent special debate in the House of Commons on the'"Far--East, made it clear that there was no question of negligence ,ih. the unprepatedness of the Malayan -forces; it was the. outcome of the risk which had to be taken. It now seems clear that the Allied forces, including British, in the Middle and Far East, will in future have to rely on armament supply from the United States for means to carry on their share of the common war against the Axis. To supply the Libyan campaign British tonnage was stretched td the 'utmost, and food ships for Britain were even cut down to. fill the need. It can be realised, therefore, that every ton of shipping coming from United States shipyards will be invaluable. . . SHIPPING ROUTES

Till Japan entered the war, supplies I for the Far East and the Middle East from the United States followed the shortest safe routes. Of those destined foy the Middle East many sailed by the South Atlantic lane round the Cape of Good Hope and up the east of the African continent to Suez, and those for the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, and the Rangoon entry to the Burma Road crossed the | Pacific Ocean. The latter route has | now been rendered unsafe by Japan’s, I entry into’ hostilities, and it is probable that the South Atlantic and Cape route will'be used for'both Middle and Far East supply. Actually the sea distance from New York to Rangoon, via the Cape of Good Hope, is a few hundred miles shorter than that from San Francisco to: Rangoon across the Pacific. The chief effect of the change will be to stteich seriously the port facilities of the eastern seaboard of the United States. German hopes of break-down ofi United States aid to Russia and the Middle East through disorganisation of shipping routes seem likely to be (Jenied realisation, and. with the rapid increase of output planned ths extension of the number of areas to ba supplied seems unlikely to cause I failing off of quantity in any single | area provided shipping is increased in parallel. ■ IMPORTANCE OF RANGOON It was suggested recently that Allie d strategy in the Pacific might be i to enclose Japanese aggression withj in' the line Chungking, Singapore, the [ Netherlands East Indies, South Pacific [lsland’s, Hawaii, North American Pacific Coast, Alaska. This was, of course, the short-term strategy to in^ef'the'first onslaughts, and bad no rejiition jp an ultimate plan for Japan’s final defeat. The hint given by ' Mi- Roosevelt in his Congressional statement that United States troops and air units. might be used in any theatre of war, including specifically many, places in the Far East, opens up a prospect that the beginnings of Allied offensive action against Japan may be based on the rolling back,of her force, in China, with consequent isolation of her troops south of. Indo-; China, and the ultimate use of the. Chinese mainland as the base for carrying, war to the Japanese, islands ‘fhbmselves. China certainly has the man-power necessary for s'jeh a plan, but her difi’i<”jltv. hithexto has been the provision of sufficient a.moments for their equipment., With almost unlim-it-,d supply co-opbration from the United States, -and the assistance of ..Allied officers in. the training of both land and air personnel, this difficulty is likely, in the long run, to be overcome.

Rangoon and the Burma Road, therefore, gain added importance in the long-term strategy of the Pacific The transfer of Chinese troops to Burma gives added protection against any Japanese land thrust from Thailand and Indo-China, while mention has been made in overseas reports on several occasions of the increasing, numbers of United States and British aircraft which go up to oppose Japanese aircraft seeking to attack Rangoon. In addition, y.'e also hear that B"itish and United St-'tos experts arc at work on the probl<“"s of the Burma Road, and are advising Marshal Chiang Kai-shek on “ ' best means of improving its capai :fy as a supply line.