THE BATTLE OF GERMANY

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4465, 18 August 1941, Page 5

THE BATTLE OF GERMANY

ROYAL AIR FORCE’S OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

WILL ULTIMATELY BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT RESPITE DAY AND NIGHT.

Despite one or two breaks due to bad weather the offensive operations of the Royal Air Force are implementing Mr Churchill’s promise to bomb Germany by day and* by night in ever-increasing measure. A yeai ago the Battle of Britain had begun; it ended in the decisive defeat of the Lu7tvvaffe. This time it is the Battle of Germany, and the Royal Air Force is casting upon her seaports and war industries month by month a heavier discharge of bombs. The R.A.F. is in process of working up its offensive till it can be maintained without • respite day and night. s INCREASING WEIGHT. The real weight of the Royal Air Force is at last being directed to the attack upon Germany, in power and in plan. The offensive has involved immense planning and preparation. Production of aircraft in Great Britain continues to mount, the output of components being so well dispersed that it is not likely to be injured by all the bombing the enemy can command. The rapid increase in output of aircraft in the United States is adding week by week to the growing strength of the Royal Air Force and its offensive. Tuesday’s operations constituted the greatest daylight attack yet carried out by the Royal Air Force, targets being spread over a wide area of western Germany, the Netherlands and northern France. High-flying Hampdens and Fortresses and many low-flying Blenheims, the latter ; escorted by fighters part of the way, W took part in highly successful ' attacks. The day’s operations cost 12 Blenheims and eight fighters a marked contrast to the heavy losses \ of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of . Britain a year ago, when it completely •W failed to penetrate far inland. As is only to be expected in such an offensive as is being carried out by the R.A.F. in western Europe—and also in the Middle East—the casualty rate is bound to increase. The 69th casualty list issued by the Air Ministry on May 22 contained 517 names. It was the longest list issued up to that time and brought the total of R.A.F. casualties officially reported since the war began up to 11,068. AIR SUPPORT. Some interesting and pertinent comments on the war in the air were made by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard in a speech in the House of Lords on June 18. He said the reason for the German successes in Greece and Crete were the same as in Poland, in Norway, in Belgium, Holland and France air superiority. It was not because the German aircraft were an integral part of their army—they were not. It was not because the dive-bomber 4 was a new and terrible weapon; it was not new and terrible, indeed it was a very inefficient machine in itself. It was because in every one of his campaigns Hitler had had the initiative in the choice of time and of the theatre in which he could concentrate overwhelming air strength. Germany, in the fight for Greece had the immense advantage of a chain of aerodromes, 40 miles apart, all the way from Berlin to the Greek coast. This meant that, right from the centres of production in Germany to the air battle zone, aircraft and aircraft supplies could roll forward continuously to sustain the air battle day and night. The British forces

were fighting with their backs to the sea, using only a small area in which aerodromes were possible. LESSON OF CRETE. The operations in Crete began before it was possible for the serious losses of equipment in Greece to be i made good. Whether it was ever possible to accumulate enough equipment adequately to defend the aerodromes in Greece as well as in Crete during the seven months of occupation in Crete was a point which only full knowledge of the supplies available could answer. No one could form a judgment on these matters, said Lord Trenchard, unless he was able to study the whole picture—and the scope of that picture was far wider indeed than the whole of the Mediterranean theatre of war. No one commenting upon the Crete operations from a responsible standpoint could fail to remark that the i construction of more aerodromes than it was possible to defend because of the shortage of guns and equipment would have been a very serious handicap and not an advantage. The only point of criticism or inquiry in regard to Crete was whether, in the conditions obtaining, we should ever have tried to defend the island. The enemy’s bombers and fighters were part of the Luftwaffe, a separate autonomous service. They were concentrated in support of the German armies as and when required to take part in a land campaign. Though he did not underrate the dive-bomber and troop-carrier in the special circumstances in which the Germans had so far been able to use them, Lord Trenchard said he thought he should be 1 hankful that the resources absorbed by these squadrons, in production, personnel and effort generally, were not devoted to equivalent | numbers of heavy long-range bombers i capable of attacking Britain and her < shipping. STEPS TO SUPERIORITY. There was great need for adequate air support for the Army, said Lord Trenchard. It had had to fight during the last 18 months with inadequate support. Britain was concerned ■ with long range planning, and it ; would not be right to expect her relaI tively small army to take the offensive in future without the essential i condition of air superiority. j But situated as we were with the German air forces based from Narvik to Cherbourg, were we to cut down the production of the long-range heavy bombers that alone could reach the vitals of Germany and equip a number of our squadrons with a short-range specialised type for close support of the Army? Until Britain could achieve moral and material superiority over the German Air Force, until she could wear down the resistance of the German people by relentless and unremitting attack on their war industries and communication throughout the length and breadth of Germany, it was vain to think of pitting the relatively small British Army against the land power of Germany. For that essential preliminary Britain must build up quickly a great force of bombers and fighters of the most efficient types, which, while possibly not ideal for the one specialised role of Army support, would be quite capable of fulfilling that role once air predominance was achieved; until it was achieved nothing could fulfil that role.—(S.D.W.)