HITLER’S ARMY

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 62, Issue 4427, 19 May 1941, Page 6

HITLER’S ARMY

REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS. EVERY PRIVATE HAS A MARSHAL’S BATON. (By Joseph C. Harsch.) [Published by Arrangement with the Christian Science Monitor.] Mr Harsch, Berlin correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, has returned to the United States. In a series of articles, he gives his uncensored views of the setup in Germany. In the following article, which has been summarised, he gives a frank description of the German Army, emphasising that its long line of successes must .be attributed to its equalitarian spirit, which has made it the most unorthodox military weapon forged since the armies of the French Revolution. BOSTON, March 8. One of the most skilful jobs of propaganda put over on the outside world in the days before the German Army crashed into France was the illusion that the Reichwehr was much weaker than it was. Wishful thinking and complacency played into the hands of Dr Joseph Goebbels’ Propaganda Department. In fact, there was almost nothing it had to do, except keep quiet and let the people in France, Britain, and the United States feed upon what they wanted to hear. The unwillingness to believe the facts extended high up. Before the war began, an unusually brilliant military attache at the British Embassy in Berlin Was forced by his Ambassador tp leave his post because he reported the factual truth about the German armed forces to his War. Ministry in London. An equally brilliant attache at the American Embassy was branded as a proNazi in Washington. and nearly was forced out of the United States Army because he did the same thing. No one wanted to believe the truth.' In those days, people believed exactly what was most in the interest of the German High Command to have them believe. They believed the mechanical equipment of the German Army was inferior, and would break down under war service: that there was a lack of trained non-commis-sioned officers; that the officers corps was opposed to the Nazi regime, and never would fight for it; that the conscripts would turn on the Nazis if weapons were put into their hands; that the individual German soldier lacked initiative; that German strategy still employed the mass attack, with callous disregard for sacrifice. CONCEPTS DEAR TO OLD SOLDIERS. They paid a heavy price for the -satisfaction they derived from such beliefs. Greater alertness might not have saved Holland and Belgium, but it probably would have saved the Channel ports and France. Comfortable wishful thinking was the best ally German militarism had during the first year of the war. Fortunately for the defenders of democracy, most of this complacency has been liquidated by events. But a new danger has replaced it in the thinking of those forging new military defences against Hitlerism. This is a tendency to ignore the material sources of the German Army and to try to find some mechanical explanation for its successes which could be repudiated easily and without much change in traditional military concepts so dear to the hearts of old soldiers. There still is a fallacious and dangerous tendency to find the explanation of German victories in “secret weapons,” cunning espionage, and “fifth column” work alone. While it is true that the German Army’s success owed much to espionage, to subversive activity behind the opposing lines, and to the confusion and internal disagreement developed by propaganda and “fifth columns,” this is only part of the story. SOME LESSONS INTERCEPTED. For anyone sincerely interested in forging an adequate military defence against Germany’s armed forces there is still a great deal to be learned from the German Army. Most of the technical, innovations have been fully reported. The United States General Staff knpws that technically the strength of the German Army derives from a balance of different weapons and types of equipment, rather than on preponderance of any one weapon such as tanks; from a highly trained, resourceful officer corps which has performed phenomenal feats in planning the supply of enormous armies in motion; from equipment which often is inferior but always adequate in quantity and simple to maintain and operate.

But if American defence is to take the fullest possible advantage from Germany military progress much more must be known and appreciated about the military Weapon which is poised to-day for Herr Hitler’s announced attempt to seek final Nazi victory in 1941. It must be realised first of all that it is a new kind of army as different from the Kaiser’s

army of 1914 as the army of the French Revolution differed from its Bourbon predecessor. DEMOCRATIC ARMY. Probably the greatest single element of strength in this new German Army—and this is hard to believe but a fact attested to by those who have seen that army at close range—is the spirit of equalitarianism upon which itfe personal relationships are founded. It comes remarkably close to being a democratic army, using the word democratic in the sense of fellowship and mutual respect between officers and men. True, there is some Prussianism left, particularly in the High Command where the older officers date from the Kaiser’s army. The clinking of heels and the “Ja Wohl” are as mechanical as ever. But the distinction between the officers and enlisted men has been reduced to what is probably a military minimum. The Russians tried to go farther and have had to abandon the experiment, reverting to a greater distinction than exists in the German Army. One thing about this new German Army is so simple that it has gone almost unnoticed in the outside world. Yet it is of extreme and revealing importance. In the German Army of to-day a private soldier salutes another private soldier—and he does so with the same meticulous care with which he salutes an officer. In other words- the distinction between the the officer’s and privates’ uniform has been reduced to a new minimum. With the change in the meaning of the salute much of the old distinction between officer and private has disappeared. Privates dine at the Adlon or any of the best Berlin restaurants —provided they have the money—with no inhibitions whatever. I have seen officers and enlisted men dining together in such places on many occasions with complete ease of relationship. The old “brass hat” tradition has been eliminated right and left. On campaigns, officers eat the same rations as men. Of extreme importance—officers actually lead their men where the, danger is greatest-. Generals commanding whole army corps frequently advance with the front line. During the campaign in Poland one commanding general was the first man across the river. FAT OLD FRENCHMEN. Official instructions for officers place major emphasis on taking detailed and sympathetic interest in the welfare of the men. They are instructed to keep themselves informed about the personal problems of the men. These instructions include giving a man leave if he has any personal difficulties at home; sendinggreetings to the family, and inquiring sympathetically about his home life on his return. The greatest care is taken for the safety and welfare of men in action. Herr Hitler was not boasting idly when he said that having been a private soldier himself he planned this war with the greatest care for the lives of the men in the ranks. No position ever is taken by manpower if it can be taken mechanically. One of the most striking contrasts this war has produced is that between the men commanding the Germap Army and those who commanded the French Army. The German Army expects of its officers a degree of daring, quick thinking, initiative, and physical activity which are characteristics of youth. Seniority and age are handicaps to advancement rather than assets. The result is that men under 35 years of age have reached field marshal’s rank and command whole armies. Physical youth with all its daring and emancipation from tradition and caution mark the command of this army. By contrast, French officers with incapacitating physical disabilities, burdened with obesity, often marked by the -Worst rather than the best characterstics of age were strikingly numerous in the officers’ prison camps behind the German lines during the 1940 campaign. Another thing worth noting. No nation can have an army like the German without making extreme sacrifices in civilian life for it. When you live in Germany, as I have been living since the beginning of the war you begin to think of the army as the only thing in Germany of really first quality. It has all the good woollens on its back, all the good leather on its feet, all the best metal in its weapons, all the best food on its tables. Everything else in Germany seems shoddy and second rate. This concentration of quality in the army even extends to men. Thinking back over nearly a year and a-half in Germany at war I am struck by the fact that the most interesting, the most intelligent, the most honest, in fact in all respects the most desirable men I met were in the army—taking order?. The great tragedy of Germany lies in this fact that its best people take the orders and do the technical work, deliberately closing their minds to the implications of what they are doing. Indicative of this is the case of a German landowner who had lived in Poland before the war. As a German he looked forward to, and welcomed the arrival of the German Army. But after he had lived for a few months under the new regime he came to Berlin to join the army saying: “I am too ashamed of my country to live with it so I am going into the army ill the hope of dying for it.” Any idea that the Army is prepared

to do anything about Nazism should be discarded at once. There are many officers in its ranks who disapprove of the regime. But every time there has been a conflict between them and a party authority they have given in —even when there was a sound military reason for the Army position. It never has been to their advantage, for example, to have the Gestapo and S.S. take over control of occupied countries from the Army. In every instance the Army got along relatively well with the conquered population. In every instance the arrival of the Gestapo and S.S. has marked the beginning of friction, resentment, retaliation, and mounting hatred for Germans. This has increased enormously the Army’s police problem and endangered its security. But the Army invariably has surrendered. ENTHUSIASM WANES. Having said so much about the strength and power of the German Army, this much can be added without arousing false hopes: The initial sense of adventure among the ranks which gave it its elan during the campaigns in Poland and F’rance largely has disappeared. Classes called to the colours before these campaigns went with a sense of relief and anticipation. For the individual soldier it meant relief from responsibility, political uncertainty, boredom, and civil drudgery. It also meant comradeship in the field and a change of scene. For boys from farms, offices, and factories who never had been outside their home communities the first campaigns were exciting larks keyed up by easy military victory. That phase seems to be approaching its conclusion. The novelty has worn eff and the end is not in sight. This winter I met soldiers home on leave who expressed for the first time a preference for staying at home. Heretofore they always were eager to get back to their units. It is only a straw in the wind and can have no effect on discipline or morale during the coming campaign season. But it is worth noting as something which might become significant a year or two from now.