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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

HITLER’S DESPERATE GAMBLE.

DESPERATE TURN TO CHEMICAL WARFARE.

From the Christian Science Monitor.)

Various signs of enemy, activity point to the likelihood of a desperate turn to chemical warfare. If Hitler is putting everything to the test of a final blow against Britain he will employ every weapon at his disposal; and, although no use has been made of poison gas in the war so far, its employment at this juncture would be quite in accord with German military precedent and Hitlerian psychology. It is quite definitely known that German chemical factories have been producing gases since 1934, when Wickham Steed adduced conclusive proof of the fact and when a Department of Chemical Warfare was added to the Central War Office in Berlin. The British authorities expected gas to be used at the very outset of the war, and had been building up vast reserves of gas masks since 1938. A mask was provided for every citizen, and great sums of money were spent on gas and bomb-proof enclosures, and on educating the public in how to deal with gas attacks.

The omission of the Germans to use gas, either in the field or against civilians, was one of the surprises of the first seventeen months of "war, although military experts found the explanation in the fact that gas was more likely to be a hindrance than a help in the kind of lightning attack which the Germans used in Poland and later perfected in western Europe last summer. The development of new mechanised arms has produced far more efficacious weapons for an attacking army, especially in a war of rapid movement; and most tacticians believe that persistent chemicals of the mustard-gas type are better suited for defensive than for offensive purposes.

Moreover, the correlation of international research after the last war showed that once the initial stage of panic and confusion was past, poisongas did not inflict insuperable damage on an enemy army. Statistics do not support the contention that it was the very height of frightfulness, even in positional trench warfare, when conditions most favoured its employment. CLOUDS AND SHELLS. A brief survey amply proves this. Although the Germans used irritant substances at Neuve Chapelle in October, 1914, and on the Russian front in January, 1915, the first effective use of gas in modem warfare occurred at Langemarck on 22nd April, 1915; but within a few days the Allies had evolved a crude form of respirator. The first British gas attack was not made until 25th September, 1915, at Loos.

After the first few months of cloud discharges of gas there was an increasing turn to gas shells, and these proved to be a more dangerous weapon than the clouds. Gas shells became a very serious factor in the tactical situation in 1917, and the famous Livens projector, first used at Arras in March of that year, was one of the deadliest weapons in trench warfare. The German introduction of mustard gas in July, 1917, may be said to have opened the phase of gas warfare which still pertains. It was hard to detect; it remained for days or weeks in the soil; and it produced serious blisters as well as affecting the eyes and lungs. Nevertheless, in spite of the tremendous use of mustard gas in 1918, the number of casualties directly attributable to gas was relatively small, and a very slight proportion of these proved fatal. In the last year of the war, for instance, only 16 per cent of all British casualties were due to gas, although, for various reasons, the rate was 33 per cent with the Americans. During the whole war the British gas casualties numbered 180,983, but of those only 6062 resulted in death. General Hartley, the controller of the Chemical Warfare Department, who made this claim, said that, on a comparable basis, the mortality amongst other battle casualties was nearly 25 per cent. TOTAL WARFARE.

The Surgeon-General of the United States Army and General Fries, the head of the Chemical Warfare Service in America, came to a similar conclusion from America’s experience. Only 2 per cent of the American gas casualties resulted in death, as compared with 24 per cent of other battle casualties. The Surgeon-General’s final report was also emphatic in saying that “ there is seldom any permanent after-effect from gassing,” thus supporting General Hartley, who wrote at a later date that “ it was striking how small a proportion of the gas casualties suffered any permanent disablement.” In passing it is interesting to note that while Germany inflicted over 720,000 gas casualties, she suffered only 78,763 herself. In view of these and many other well-authenticated facts it would seern that the importance of gas as a purely military weapon has been exaggerated, although not all the statistics in the world could convince a gassed soldier of this. But, strategically speaking, the problem now has changed, for “ total warfare ” has developed in every meaning of that foul term, and every civilian in Great Britain is in the firing line. The question now is whether the indiscriminate use of gas can produce a panic on a scale sufficient to disorganise Britain’s resistance to invasion. In the last war no gas was used in naval actions or from aircraft, but to-day it is possible to launch vast gas attacks from bombing aeroplanes under conditions in which the attacking forces will not be affected in any way. The gas bomb has taken the place of the "-as shell, and aeroplaneborne gas has become a weapon of offence against civilian populations. It is true that tremendous quantities of gas would be needed to produce any decisive result, and that attacks would have to be limited to crowded

urban or factory areas or large troop concentrations; and it is equally tru° that preparations and training can largely off-set such attacks. But one of the main German aims is to introduce an element of confusion into Britain’s defence system, and they may be counting upon the initial demoralisation and upon the use of gases for which present civilian gas masks are inadequate. In short, they may be staking everything on the factor of surprise in a short, sharp gas attack preparatory to, or as part of, an invasion by all the weapons at their command. A POPULATION PREPARED. Such a threat could not be underestimated, but it must be insisted upon that the Nazis are not dealing with conditions similar to those in which the Italians poured Yperite on to Abyssinians, who had never even heard of gas. However apathetic ths long immunity may have made the ordinary Englishman feel towards his gas mask, there is no doubt that the public is well trained, alike in the domestic precautions to be taken against gas and in the use of masks and of antidotes to burns and blisters. Gas-proofing is as regular a part of public shelters as is ventilation; and outside workers are well versed in methods of decontamination and in the use of mustard-proof clothing. Psychological and practical preparations are an admitted answer to the worst evils of a gas attack, and it may be assumed that the Government has provided the necessary facilities. Repeated warnings issued within the last fortnight to civilians show that tbe possibility of a gas offensive has not been overlooked; and it is believed that after the first period of readjustment the worst effect of heavy gas attacks would be the disorganisation of movement and supply, rather than a very heavy loss of life. The main danger is from the blister gases, such as mustard gas and Lewisite, because with those the respirator alone does not afford complete protection. Oilskin clothes and rubber boots are also necessary. Such gases are persistent and penetrate many materials. They contaminate food supplies, and their presence may seriously interfere with industrial production. They are much more dangerous than the non-persistent lung irritants of the chlorine and phosgene type.

Experts believe that propaganda about revolutionary new poison-gases is mostly alarmist, and it is felt that that the main problem is to cope with new methods of using the older and well-known gases. There is a constant struggle for adaptation in gas warfare. The rival intelligence services make it one of their main tasks to find out if the enemy is producing large quantities of gas or if his troops are being provided with new forms of respirators or antidotes; while the chemists, realising that there are definite chemical limitations on the production of entirely new gases in vast quantities, are steadily increasing the range o'f safety provided by gas masks. FOUR TYPES. Practicable gases are still of fourtypes—lung irritants, Ipchrymiators, or tear gases, nose irritants or “ toxic smokes,” and vesicants or blister gases. German propaganda, in its more horrific moments, continues to spread stories about Nazi humanity in withholding gases that can destroy al| vestiges of life in a given area, and their “ chemical generals ” tell of gases which will attack the nervous system.; but these belong to the war of words rather than to actual combat. It is believed that, if Germany has any surprises, they will take the form of variants of existing gases, which will necessitate new types of filters in gas masks, and which will naturally cause much demoralisation until the antidote is produced. Thus, so far as can be seen at the moment, gas is essentially a panic instrument, and, failing this, its main use would be to impede industrial production. Large-scale gas attacks have never been tried against European civilian populations, and, for th : s reason alone, the Germans mav feel inclined to put the matter to the actual test, although, in this regard, the fear of retaliation must act as a strong deterrent. In any case, it is difficult to see how gas could become a deciding factor in the battle for Britain, whether used in shells or bombs or sprays; and it is not likely to subdue a peculation fully warned and trained to take counter measures—a population, moreover, that has withstood the greater menace of concentrated highexplosive from the air. Britain will not be taken unawares, and her people are well trained to resist panic; so that, if the Government has done its part and provided adequate anti-gas facilities, the worst threats of gas attack are removed before the first gas bombs drop.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TAWC19410317.2.42

Bibliographic details

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 62, Issue 4403, 17 March 1941, Page 5

Word Count
1,730

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 62, Issue 4403, 17 March 1941, Page 5

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 62, Issue 4403, 17 March 1941, Page 5

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