EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 53, Issue 3824, 21 October 1936, Page 3

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

THE FRENCH DILEMMA. “Wjth the realisation of the fact that the first and only business of Europe at this time is to save itself, if it is still possible, from the wrath to come, the Blum Government, like its predecessors, at once perceived that it was sheer lunacy to push Italy into the arms of Germany. “Whatever we may think of the crimes of Italy, they cannot be weighed for a moment in the balances against the crime of constructing an Italo-German alliance which would yield up Europe to the domination of the dictators. The combination, were ft effected, would be irresistible. “Nor is there, anything in the nature of things, to prevent an ItaloGerman understanding. The importance of the Austrian question has been greatly exaggerated. It mattered to Italy chiefly inasmuch as it provided an opportunity for the assertion of Italian strength, and thus increased Italian prestige. It would matter to Italy in a more material manner were Germany and Italy rivals in Central Europe. “But its importance is immenselydiminished if the postulate of an Italo-German partnership • can be accepted. It is an obstacle to the partnership only if either party chooses to regard it as an obstacle. So that while Leon Blum and Yvan Delbos were ready enough to declare themselves sanctionist when they were in opposition they were driven by the necessities of the case to become antisanctionist in office. “If the problem were not so grave —grave because it involves the whole

equilibrium of Europe one would be tempted to indulge in sardonic laughter at the fond and persistent belief of certain British politicians that a change of Government in France would bring about a change of policy in regard to Italy. Flandin, like Laval, Delbos, like Flandin, knewthat it was suicidal folly to push sanctions to the point of permanently alienating Italy. The pressure of an unfriendly Italy in the south-east would render untenable France’s position in the north-east.

“No kind of ideology can alter geography. It is true that when Blum came to power the Abyssinian war was over, but even had it not been over, he could not have behaved differently from his predecessors. As it is, he is criticised for leaving the initiative of lifting sanctions, which had failed, as they were bound to fail from the beginning, to Great Britain. The Ministerial statement on the subject reads uncommonly like an apology to Italy and a plea for Italian support.

“For no statesman in France with the smallest consciousness of his responsibilities can afford to forego Italian support. I read in the ‘Petit Parisien,’ which closely follows Ministerial thought: “ ‘The interest of Italy is in complete conformity with our ardent desire of a general and durable peace. If Great Britain is hesitant in its intentions, and necessarily slow in bringing its eventual assistance in territorial forces, Italy, on the contrary, can throw in the balance very important contingents, ready at all times. We can communicate with our friends of the Little Entente only across Italian territory. It is necessary, therefore, that Italy and France should adopt a Danubian policy com-

patible with the interests of the Little Entente.

“ ‘lf not, Germany will become the arbiter of an inextricable European situation. If the hope of a FraucoGermah rapprochement formulated by Marshal Petain is not to be a mortal illusion, it can only be effected in an indispensable framework of nations who will sincerely guarantee the present frontiers, and will admit no other revision than that which is freely consented. In order to realise this hope, the unresei-ved help of Italy and that of the Little Entente are required .... There is not a moment to lose, not another fault to commit.’ “That is the plain truth, and the delusion which apparently some British statemen still cherish of an Anglo - French - German understanding from which Italy is excluded may have fatal consequences. The sooner they see that France cannot consent to come into what would really be an Anglo-German alliance in which she would figure without force, the better it will be for Europe. “France needs British friendship; she would like to be on good terms with Germany, provided such relations do not imply the abandonment of the Russian and Little Entente alliances; but she knows that without Italy she would be at the mercy of Great Britain and Germany, and therefore diplomatic conceptions which are circumscribed to the socalled Western Powers are merely another blunder—which may be fatal this time—added to the staggering succession of blunders of the past year.

“If we want to work with France we must work with Italy. Without a Four (or more) Power pact that can be no assurance of peace in Europe. To put any Great Power in a rival camp infallibly means war.”