GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume IV, Issue 961, 10 March 1917, Page 10

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

COMMISSION'S REPORT. INCONCEIVABLE BUNGLING. POLITICIANS AND EXPERTS AT VARIANCE. Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, March 8. The report of the Royal Commission which investigated the origin and conduct of the Dardanelles campaign slates that the majority of the Commission find that Mr Winston Churchill (then First Lord of the Admiralty) initiated the attack on the Dardanelles in the War Council on November 24, 1914, as the ideal method of defending Egypt and Russia. Lord Kitchener (Secretary for War) declared that troops were not available, and the War Council's acceptance of this statement was unfortunate, because an investigation would have revealed the position to be otherwise.

Thus, whether there was to be naval action or not had to be decided bv Admiral Lord Fisher (First Sea Lord) and Admiral Sir Arthur K. Wilson, both of whom did not express dissent to the proposal for a naval action alone. They should have expressed their views if they thought the project was from a military point of view impracticable. They did not object, however, because they regarded the operation as experimental only. Mistaken and 111-Advised. The Commission thinks there was an obligation first on Mr Churchill, next on Mr Asquith, and next on other members of the War Council to insist on a clear expression of expert opinion, on the naval action alone, because the chances of a surprise amphibious attack offered such great military and political advantages that it was mistaken and illadvised to sacrifice them by a hasty, purely naval attack, which could not itself secure the desired objects. "Clumsy and Inefficient."

The report goes on to stale that from the commencement of the war until November 25, 1914, no change w»s made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations. This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and Admiralty acting as the executive agents. It must have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous a body effectively to control and conduci the war, and it was regrettable that this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of the war. Thus for four months when events of the utmost importance were occurring, the machinery for the conduct of the operalions was both clumsy and. inefficrent.

Ministers Deliberately Ignorant. Eventually an improvement was effected, the Cabinet appears to have been generally informed of any important decisions taken by the War Council, but not until executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to the council's decisions.

This is what happened over the! naval and military operations at the! Dardanelles. Some members of the Cabinet did nor wish to be informed i of what was going on. Mr Winston Churchill during his examination, said: "I often heard the Cabinet say. it did not wish to hear about this secret matter, the fewer knowing: about it the better." The report adds that, these members were very rightly content to delegate the full powers of the Cabinet to their colleagues on the War; Council, and Mr McKenna, in his: evidence, confirmed this delegation, j The Chief Responsibility. The report states that a distinc-j Hon has to be made as to the degree of responsibility devolving on the several Ministers who were: members of the War Council. Mr: Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and the' Marquis of Crewe exercised an: undoubted and very legitimate infill-j ence, but the main responsibility, rested on Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr Churchill. The last-nam-, ed in his evidence said: "In the early stages, the war was carried on by Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and j myself, hut I was on a rather dif- j ferent plane. I had not the same | authority as Mr Asquith or Lord; Kitchener. If thev said this or that] should he done, that settled it." The Commission finds this descrip- : : lion of the working of the machine i to he substantially correct, save that] Mr Churchill probably assigned him-i self a more unobtrusive part than he ! actually played. Experts Not Consulted.

There was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. Lieut.-General Sir James Wolfe Murray stated that Lord Kitchener acted Very much as his own Chief of StaJf. lie (General Murray) was never asked to express any opinion. Willi the Admiralty it was different. Mr Churchill was no! an expert, and Lord Fisher and Admiral Wilson acted as the experts. Lord Fisher explained that neither he, nor General Murray, nor Admiral Wilson was a member of the War Council. "We were," he said, "experts who only opened our mouths when we were told." They were never asked anything about the Dardanelles.

Admiral Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher's statements. Minister's Evidence. Mr Winston Churchill, in his evidence, declared that his naval colleagues had the right and power to correct him or dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Viscount Grey (then Foreign Secretary) stated that the War Council went entirely in naval and military matters hy the opinions expressed by the two Ministers, Mr A. J. Balfour (the present First Lord of the Admiralty) gave the opinion that if the experts did not express their opinions the War Council would infer that they assented. He did not think they should remain silent if they did not agree to the propositions. The military experts stood on a different fooling, because Lord Kitchener was an expert. However, he thought the member of the Cabinet presiding should have encouraged the experts' assent or dissent by asking them for their views. Lord Haldane said he would expect Lord Fisher, if he had objections, to have stated them. He did not concur with Lord Fisher's view of the War Council. The Marquis of Crewe thought

the political members of the council did too much talking, and the experts too little.

Mr Lloyd George also disagreed with Lord Fisher's view. None of the Junior Sea Lords, he said, were consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert expressed the opinion that the Dardanelles was a proper subject for an Admiralty Board discussion. On November 22, 1915, the Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle that the supremacy of the First Lord was complete and unassailable, had been pushed too far, and tended. to imperil the national safely. What Might Have Been.

The Commission considered that had the naval members of the board been regularly and collectively consulted on large questions of war policy during the present naval campaign, some at least of the events which the Empire was now bitterly deploring would not have happened, and that until the authority and responsibility of the Sea Lords were enlarged and defined, there would be no adequate assurance that similar disasters would not recur. Mr Churchill had agreed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted, but Prince Louis of Battenberg and Lord Fisher did not favour this. The Commission further found (hat Mr Asquith was ill-informed of the way in which the Admiralty business was conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assume that any view submitted by the First Lord was the considered opinion of the Admiralty Board. Kitchener Too Independent.

Regarding the War Office administration, the Commission thought it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility on which the War Office was based, was ignored by Lord Kitchener. All the evidence pointed to the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates, but gave orders over the heads of chiefs of departments and centralised the whole administration in his own hands. When an Order-in-Council at a later stage of the war restored the power of the Chief of the General Stair, Sir Reginald Brade (Secretary to the War Office) was of opinion that this was due to Lord Kitchener's not asking, or disregarding, the advice of the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed centralisation to extremes. Though this policy proved eminently successful in the Sudan, it was unsuitable to a large scale of operalions, and tin w work on the hands of one man with which no individual could successfully cope.

Bombardment a Mistake

Dealing with the narrative of the Dardanelles events, the Commission concurs with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson (formerly First Sea Lord of the Admiralty) that the bombardment of November 3 was a mistake, and was calculated to place the Turks on the alert. The order emanated solely from the Admiralty, and the War Council was not consulted. On the 25th, Mr Churchill suggested the attack on Gallipoli, which would give the control of the Dardanelles and enable the Allies to dictate terms at Constantinople. To Aid Russia. He admitted that the operation was difficult and would require a large force. Lord Kitchener ..greed that it might be necessary to make a diversion by attacking the Turkish communications, but the moment for this, he said, had not arrived. On January 2, .1915, the Russians were somewhat hard pressed in the Caucasus, and Russia asked for a demonstration against, the Turks in order to relieve the pressure. The Foreign Office sent a telegram drafted by the the War Office, slating that such demonstrations would be made, though it was feared that any action would not seriously affect the withdrawal of (he enemy troops in the Caucasus. Mr Asquith and Mr Churchill did not see the telegram, though the latter thought that Lord Kitchener's reply was the outcome of a conversation with him.

Lord Kitchener, writing to Mr Churchill, said he had not troops to land anywhere. The only place for the demonstration was the Dardanelles, but we would not be ready for anything big for some months. . The Commission was of opinion that although Lord Kitchener was pressed for demonstrations, the request did not necessarily involve an attempt to force a passage. Joint Operations Preferred.

Admiral Sir Henry Oliver thought that by the time the Fleet overcame the initial difficulties the military force might have been ready. Generally speaking, the Admiralty Staff preferred joint operations. The Commission thinks that the War Council in its action was probably governed excessively by the fact that an entry into the Dardanelles would have a profound effect on the course of the war, and it therefore neglected to consider whether it was advisable to undertake a purely naval enterprise.

It is highly probable that if Lord Kitchener and Lord Fisher had objected upon technical grounds the project would have been abandoned. Mr Asquith slated that Lord Fisher's main objection was not b;.sed on the naval merits or demerits of the Dardanelles operations, but upon the facts thai he preferred another objective. Lord Fisher's Position.

The Commission stales that the evidence confirms the accuracy of Mr Asquith's statement that Lord Fisher reluctantly acquiesced in the Dardanelles operation so long as he thought it would not seriously interfere with his plans elsewhere. It might he that he was convinced that the demands to be made upon the Fleet for the Dardanelles prejudiced his alternative schemes, and he resigned. Although Lord Fisher in his evidence said he was dead against a naval operation alone, he did not at any time express any such decided opinions. The actual decision was arrived at by the War Council on January 13, after hearing Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill, while Lord Fisher, Admiral Wilson, and General Murray remained silent. It was couched as follows: —"A naval expedition in February will take Gallipoli, with Constantinople as its objective." Unwarranted Optimism.

The proper conclusion seemed to be that when the demonstration appeared to be necessary, Mr Churchill thought it possible to convert it into an attempt to force a passage. As the new Army was not ready, and as he had to provide for Home defence,

Lord Kitchener was unwilling to withdraw a single man from Fiance. Mr Churchill's views as to the success of a purely naval operation were more optimistic than was warranted by the opinions of experts. Therefore Lord Kitchener grasped too eagerly at the proposal to use the Fleet alone, but the responsibility rested rather on Mr Churchill. The latter claimed marvellous potentialities for the Queen Elizabeth, whose astounding effectiveness, he said, would revolutionise naval warfare.

Admiral's Opinion

Admiral Sir Sackville Carden, who commanded the Allied Fleet at the preliminary bombardment of the Dardanelles, replying to a telegram asking whether it would be practicable to force the Dardanelles by ships alone, said he did not think it could be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of ships. Mr Churchill replied: "High authorities concur with your opinion." Admiral Carden supposed that "high authorities" meant Lord Fisher and Admiral Jackson. The former did not see the reply, and later could not remember whether he had consulted Admiral Carden, and suggested the methodical destruction of the Dardanelles' and the Narrows' defences. The advance into the Sea of Marmora was estimated to take a month to carry out, and Admiral Jackson agreed to attack the outer forts, but considered it was not feasible for the Fleet to get through the Dardanelles alone.

The Critical Stage.

The decision on February 16, 1915, to mass troops in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles marked the critical stage in the whole operation. The Commission considered that, inasmuch as time was all important, no compromise was then possible between making an immediate and vigorous effort to ensure success by a joint naval and military occupation, or falling back on the original intention of desisting from naval attack if the experiences gained during the bombardment were unsatisfactory. Lord Kitchener decided on February 20 that the 29th Division, part of the troops which, by the decision of February 10, were to have been sent eastward, should not then be sent, and Colonel Fitzgerald, by Lord Kitchener's order, instructed the Director of Naval Transport that the transports for that division and the rest of the Expeditionary Force would not be required. This was done without informing Mr Churchill. The consequent delay of three weeks in the dispatch of the troops gravely compromised the probability of success of the original attack by the land forces, and materially increased the ditliculties of the final attack.

Commission's Finding. Following is a summary of the finding of the Commission:— The Commissoners consider, in vi«w of the opinions of the naval and military authorities on the spot, that the decision to abandon the naval attack after the bombardment of March 18, was inevitable. The Commissioners point out that there was no meeting of the War Council between March 19 and May 14, while important land operations were being undertaken. They think that before such operations commenced the War Council should certainly have reconsidered the whole position. They express the opinion that the Prime Minister (Mr Asquith) ought to have summoned a meeting of the War Council for that purpose, and that if it was not summoned by him, then other members of the War Council should have pressed for such a meeting. The Commission thinks that this was a serious omission. The Commissioners further express the opinion that Lord Kitchener did not sufficiently avail himself of the services of his general staff, with the result that he undertook more work than it was possible for one man to do, thus causing confusion and want of efficiency. The Commissioners are unable to concur in Lord Fisher's view that it was his duty, if he dif-

fered from Mr Churchill, to maintain silence at the War Council, or resign, or both, and they think that any adoption of any such principle generally would impair the efficiency of the public services. The Commission's final remark is:—"Although the main object of the expedition was not attained, certain important political advantages were secured by the expedition, but whether those advantages were worth the loss of life and treasure involved must remain a matter of opinion." The report is signed by all (he members except Mr W. F. Roch, M.P. War Office Blunders. The Commission adds:—lt is impossible to read all the evidence and the papers without being struck by the atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which characterised the War Council's proceedings. It is almost inconceivable that anyone, whether of military or naval rank, or even a civilian, could have imagined that Constantinople could be secured without military help on a somewhat large scale. In the case of the Dardanelles and the reduction of the forts, the difficulties were more hazardous than those presented at Port Arthur and Wei Hai Wei, while the narrow waters lent themselves to be defended by means of mines and torpedoes, thus interfering with Mr Churchill's presentment of the enterprise to the War Council. The Commission, without impugning his good faith, says it seems clear that he was carried away by his sanguine temperament and firm belief in the undertaking. The evidence shows that he obtained the experts' support to a less extent than he imagined. It is also clear that Admiral Carden greatly underestimated the Turks' opposition. Lord Kitchener held the opinion that once the ships were through, the position of Gallipoli would cease to be important. Moreover, he and others, including Viscount Grey, confidently anticipated a revolution in Constantinople when the Fleet entered the Sea of Marmora. Then the idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped. Argument grew, and we drifted into a big military attack. Lord Kitchener, on May 14, said he had realised that if the Fleet failed, the Army would need to help the

Navy through. On February 16 he informed a meeting of Ministers that he had decided to dispatch the 29th Division. Sharp Difference of Opinion.

j Acute discussion took place in the i War Council between February 10 ! and 2<i. Lord Kitchener's views linI derwent a change. There was now j no chance of breaking off the Dardanelles attack. There was a sharp difference on February 2(1 between Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill owing to the decision not to send the 29!h Division, as Lord Kitchener held that the Naval Division, with [ the Australians and New Zealanders i from Egypt, would be adequate, i Lord Kitchener said he still thought | that the Fleet would get through.

Three Weeks Lost. i General Birdwood, on March f> 'telegraphed to Lord Kitchener:—

"Very doubtful if Navy can forcepassage unassisted. In any case, it will take considerable time. Admiral's forecast too sanguine." Then Lord Kitchener decided to dispatch the 29th Division, but three weeks of valuable time had been lost. Lord Kitchener was mainly responsible for these decisions, although if he were alive he might throw new light upon them. It was strange that the actualities of the situation should not have been more fully realised by Lord Kitchener and his colleagues. There were only two alternatives before them. They had either to lace the loss of prestige by abandoning the Dardanelles or boldly face the risk which would have been involved elsewhere by a determined effort to force the Dardanelles by a rapid, combined attack in great strength. Unfortunately, • the Government adopted neither plan. For three weeks the Government vacillated. The moment for action lapsed, and the Turks were enabled to formidably strengthen their position. Mr Churchill was justified in attaching importance to the delays in dispatching the 29th Division. General Hamilton Misled.

Even when General Sir lan Hamilton, on the eve of his departure from London, conversed with Lord Kitchener, it was abundantly clear that the scope of the operations was not fullv decided upon. Sir lan Hamilton, in his evidence, dwell strongly on the absence of information given him by the War Office Staff, and said that no scheme had been drawn up, no water supply arrangements had been made, and that there was a great want of Staff preparation. Lord Kitchener stdl clung to his belief in getting through without military aid. Sir lan Hamilton went out with that impression. He took Lord Kitchener's telegram that the passage of the Dardanelles must be forced as peremptory. Gambling on Revolution.

Admiral Sir John de Robeck, who took command of the Fleet after the retirement through illness ot Admiral Garden, in his evidence, said that he realised that it would only be possible for the Fleet to stay in the Sea of Marmora if a revolution broke out in Constantinople, otherwise they would have to come out again. It would have been difficult, anyway, for the transports to follow the Fleet up the Straits. The Commission thought it clear that Admiral de Robeck's opinion had been greatly influenced by political considerations and by the loss of prestige if the attack were abandoned. Not Altogether Useless.

Sir Inn Hamilton, on March 19, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was reluctantly convinced that the battleships were unlikely to force the passage, and that it the Army was to participate, the operations would not assume that subsidiary form anticipated for them. Owing to Sir lan Hamilton's and Admiral de Robeck's representations on March 23, the operations were postponed until adequate military forces had assembled. The Commission find that although the attempt to force the Dardanelles was a failure, it was fairly successful in relieving the presure on Russia, while it delaved the earlier entry of Bulgaria into the war, and kept a large force of Turks a long while immobilised. Mr Fishers Views. Mr Andrew Fisher (High Commissioner for Australia) attached a minute to the report dissenting from one view the report takes. He disagrees with the view that the naval advisers should have expressed their views to the council, whether asked for them or not, if they considered the council's project impracticable from a naval point of view: also with the Commission's inability lo concur with Lord Fisher's viewthat he should maintain silence or resign. Mr Fisher expresses the opinion that it would seal the fate of responsible government if State servants shared the responsibility of Ministers. Too Soon for Decision.

Sir Thos. Mackenzie (High Commissioner for New Zealand), in a minute, declares that it is premature for the report to express an opinion upon the general results of the expedition as sufficient evidence was not taken to enable decision lo be reached on the objects attained. It would be necessary to complete the inquiry into the subsidiary operations of the campaign to secure a true perspective. He agrees with Mr Fisher respecting experts giving their views without being asked.

A MINORITY REPORT. INTERESTING INCIDENTS. Auitraluin and X.Z. Cable Association. LONDON, March 8. In a lengthv minority report Mr W. F. Roch, M.P., states that the forcing of the Dardanelles had been considered when Lord Fisher commanded the Mediterranean Fleet, later when Lord Fisher was First Sea Lord, and still later by the General Staff." Lord Fisher decided that it would be mighty hazardous and the General Staff decided against any naval or military action. On December 28, 1914, LieutenantColonel Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, circulated a memorandum to the War Council suggesting that Germany could be struck effectively through Turkey. In January, 1915, Mr Lloyd George, in a memorandum, outlined a far-reaching policy against Austria in co-operation with the Greeks, Rumanians, and Serbians; also the withdrawal of substantial forces from France. Admiral Jackson also presented Mr Churchill with a memorandum against the possibility of rushing the Dardanelles, and show-

ing the losses which would be involved in even reaching the straits.

"Didn't Like It."

Lord Fisher, Admiral Wilson, and Admiral Oliver (Chief of the Admiralty War Start), expressed objections to a naval attack, but after the meeting of the War Council on January 1.3 they commenced working out the details for the systematic reduction of the forts by a naval bombardment. Later, Lord Fisher told Mr Churchill that he would attend the War Council, as he did not | like this Dardanelles affair, whereupon Mr Asquith wrote to Lord Fisher stating that he thought it imperative that Lord Fisher should attend half-an-hour before the meeting on January 28 for a discussion. Mr Asquith, Mr Churchill, and Lord Fisher then fully discussed the proposal. A Dramatic Incident. Cater, at a War Council meeting, a dramatic incident occurred. After Mr Churchill had explained the scheme on the map. Lord Fisher left the fable. Lord Kitchener followed him and asked Lord Fisher what he intended to do. Lord Fisher replied that he would not return to the table, and intended to resign his position as First Sea Lord. Lord Kitchener then urged Lord Fisher that as he was the only dissentient, and as Mr Asquith had decided upon the venture, it was Lord Fisher's duty to remain at the Admiralty. Lord Fisher, after further conversation, reluctantly gave in to Lord Kitchener's entreaty and resumed his seat. Fisher's Plans Doomed. On May 14, when the War Council decided to persevere with the scheme Lord Fisher thought that his great alternative scheme which had been his main pre-occupation during this period, and to which all his mind and energies had been almost exclusively devoted, was doony ed. He said: "I was faced by a progressive frustration of my main schemes of naval strategy," and the following day he resigned his post. General Without Instructions. Meanwhile on March 12, Sir lan Hamilton had been nominated to the command of the Dardanelles forces, and left for the Dardanelles the next day, assisted by no staff preparations and no preliminary scheme of operation of any kind. It was still assumed that the Navy would force a passage.

The War Council on March 19 authorised Mr Churchill to inform Admiral dc Robcck to continue the Dardanelles operations as he thought lit. After this the War Council did not meet again until May 14. Turks Underestimated.

The minority report concludes: — The War Council concentrated its attention too much on the political ends to be gained by an Eastern offensive. The War Council never had before it the detailed staff estimates as to the men, munitions, or material needed, or definite plans showing what military operations were possible. The War Council underestimated, without any real investigation, the strength of the Turkish opposition. The War Council rejected, without sufficient consideration, all the previous expert opinions against a naval attack upon forts Mr Churchill failed to present fully to the War Council the opinions of his naval advisers. Mr Churchill failed to consult the Board of the Admiralty.

Mr Roch decides that important political advantages were gained by the first success of the naval attack, hut strongly urges that similar operations in the future should be thoroughly considered by a joint naval and military staff.

DISCUSSION OF REPORT. REQUESTED BY ASQUITH. Australian and.N.Z. Cable Amoriation. (Received March 10, 9 a.m.) LONDON, March 9. Mr Asquith will ask the Government whether it will grant a day for the discussion of the Dardanelles report, and will publish the evidence. It is understood that the debate will he permitted, but it is unlikely that the evidence will be published without careful editing.