THE DARDANELLES REPORT.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume IV, Issue 960, 9 March 1917, Page 11

THE DARDANELLES REPORT.

BLUNDERING IN EARLY DAYS. A SHARP REPRIMAND FOR INEFFICIENCY. ATTITUDE OF THE CABINET TO WAR MATTERS. By Cable. — Press Association. — Copyright. Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. (Received March 9, 1.50 p.m.) LONDON, March 8. The Dardanelles report states that from the commencement of the war until November 2f>, 1914, no change was made in the machinery for the superior conduct of naval and military operations. This machinery consisted of the Cabinet, assisted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the War Office and Admiralty acting as executive agents. It imist have been obvious from the first that it was far too numerous to control effectively the conduct of the war. It was regrettable that this rudimentary fact was not recognised immediately after the outbreak of war. Thus, for four months, when events of most importance were occurring, the machinery for the higher operations was both clumsy and inefficient. Eventually an improvement was effected. The Cabinet appears to have been generally informed of any important decisions taken by the War Council, but not until executive steps had been taken to give whole or partial effect to the Council's decisions. This is what happened over the naval and military operations at the Dardanelles. Some of the members of the Cabinet did not wish to be informed of what was going on.

Mr Winston Churchill, during his examination, said: "I often heard Cabinet say that it did not wish to hear this secret matter, as the fewer knowing about it the better." The report adds: "These members very rightly were content to delegate the full powers of the Cabinet to their colleagues on the War Council. Mr McKenna, in his evidence, confirmed this delegation."

A distinction lias to be made between the real responsibility devolving on several Ministers who were members of the War Council. Mr Lloyd George, Sir Edward Grey, and Lord Crewe exercised an undoubted and very legitimate influence, but the main responsibility rested on Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and Mr Churchill.

The last-named, in his evidence, said: "In the early stages the war was carried on by Mr Asquith, Lord Kitchener, and me; but I was on a rather different plane. I had not the same authority as Mr Asquith or Lord Kitchener. If they said that this or that be done, that settled it."

The Commission finds this description of the working of the machine substantially correct, save that Mr Churchill probably assigned himself'a more unobtrusive part than he actually played. There was a distinction between the War Office and the Admiralty. Lieutenant-Colonel Wolfe-Murray stated that Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own Chief of Staff. He (Lieut-enant-Colonel Wolfe-Murray) was never asked to express any opinion. At the Admiralty it was different. Mr Churchill was not an expert, and Lord Fisher and Admiral Wilson acted as experts. Lord Fisher explained that neither he, LieutenantColonel Wolfe-Murray, nor Admiral Wilson were members of the War Council. "We Avere experts who only onened our mouths when we were told." They were never asked anything about the Dardanelles.

(Received March 9, 2.10 p.m.)

LONDON, March 8. The report, by a majority, finds that Mr Winston Churchill initiated the attack on the Dardanelles at the War Council on November 24, 1914, as the ideal method of defending Egypt and Russia. Lord Kitchener declared that-troops were not available. The War Council's acceptance was unfortunate, because an investigation would have revealed otherwise. Thus naval action, or none, had to be decided upon. Admirals Fisher and Wilson! both of whom did not express dissent to the proposed naval action alone, should have expressed their view if they thought the project, from a naval point of view, impracticable/ They (Jid- not object, however, because they regarded the operation as experimental only.

The commission thinks it was an obligation, first on Mr Churchill, next on Mr Asquith, and next on the other members of the War Council, to insist on a (dear expression of the expert opinion on naval action alone, because the chances of surprise by an amphibious attack offered such great military and political advantages that it Avas mistaken and ill-advised to sacrifice them by a hasty, purely naval attack, which could not of itself secure the desired objects.

Admiral Wilson confirmed Lord Fisher's statement. Mr Churchill, in evidence, declared that his naval colleagues had the right and power to correct him or dissent from his views, and were fully cognisant of their rights. Sir Edward (now Viscount) Grey stated that the War Council went entirely, in naval and military matters, by the opinions expressed by two Ministers. The report continues that Mr A. J. Balfour gave his opinion thai if the experts did not express their view he would infer that they assented, lie did not think that they should remain silent if they did not agree to the propositions. The military experts stood on a different footing, because Lord Kitchener was an expej't. He, however, thought that the member of the Cabinet presiding should have facilitated the experts' assent or dissent by asking them.

Lord Haldane said ho would expect Lord Fislior, if he had objections, to have stated them. He did not concur in Lord Fisher's view of the War Council. Lord Crewe thought that the political members of the Council did too much talking, and the experts too little. Mr Lloyd George also disagreed with Lord Fisher's view. None of the Junior Sea Lords was consulted about the Dardanelles. Commodore Lambert expressed the opinion that the Dardanelles was a proper subject for Admiralty Board discussion. On November 22. 1915, the Junior Sea Lords submitted a minute to Mr Balfour that the principle thai the supremacy of the First Lord is complete and unassailable had been pushed too far, and tended to imperil the national safety. (Received March !), 2.30 p.m.) LONDON, March 8. The Commission considered that had the naval members of the Board been regularly and collectively consulted on largo questions of war policy during the pros 'lit naval campaign, some at least of the events which the Empire was bitterly deploring wo dd not have happened; that, until the authority and responsibility of Ihe Sea Lords had been enlarged and defined, there could lie i'o adequate assurance that similar disasters would not recur. Mr Churchill agreed that the four Sea Lords should be fully consulted. Prince Louis of Battenburg and Lord Fisher did not favour this. The Commission found that Air Asquith was ill-informed as In the way in which Admiralty business was conducted when he told the Commission that the War Council was entitled to assume that any view submitted, by the First Lord was considered the opinion of the Admiralty BoardRegarding the War Office administration, ihe Commission thinks it regrettable that the devolution of authority and responsibility, whereon the War Office was based, was ignored by Lord Kilchener. All the evidence points to the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consult his subordinates. lie gave orders over the chiefs of departments, and centralised the whole administration in his own hands. When an Order-in-Council, at a later stage of

the war, restored the power of the Chief of the (general Staff, Sir Reginald Herbert Brade, of the War Office, opined that this was due to Lord Kitchener's not asking, or disregarding, the advice of the General Staff. Lord Kitchener pushed centralisation to extremes. Though it proved eminently successful in the Soudan, it was unsuitable for large-scale operations, and threw work on the hands of one man with which no individual could successfully cope.